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Venezuela: Oil and Madness. Politics, Propaganda, and Realities of the Chavista Era                   
by 
Álvaro Eduardo de Prat 
Advisor: Kenneth Paul Erickson 
Venezuela: Oil and Madness. Politics, Propaganda, and Realities of the Chavista Era, is an 
interdisciplinary exploration of Venezuela’s politics and its consequences during the Chavista 
years. On a concrete level, in this thesis I propose how the very manner in which Hugo Chávez 
implemented his at first apparently benign redistributive politics could do nothing but precipitate 
what I will argue are the times of starkest inequality in modern Venezuelan history, as well as its 
current humanitarian crisis. Integral to this, although on a more philosophical level, here I also 
offer a theory of how and why Chávez’s representations might have been so misinterpreted.  
The list of eminent political thinkers who have vouched for Hugo Chávez’s “socialism” 
is puzzling; the damage that they have caused by ignoring the counterevidence and discarding 
even the most radically progressive and honest of Chávez’s critics as “neo-conservatives” has 
been profound. It has served only the most undemocratic extremes of the Manichean divide that 
Chávez contrived to consolidate his “neo-totalitarianism,” and today to the general discredit of 
the Left in the continent, perhaps for decades to come. The above notwithstanding, although I 
intend to show how Chávez and his successors have made of Venezuela one of the most unequal 
countries in the planet in the material domain of its economy, essential to Marxism, I will also 
present in what ways, in the theater of appearances of the political, Chávez was the first Latin 
American politician in the neoliberal era who could effectively articulate for its dēmos that there 
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could never be true democracy with rampant poverty. For while he empowered “the people” in 
the end only symbolically, Chávez showed his spectators how they were players of their play.  
This work was initially planned to be a much longer Ph.D. thesis, both inspired by and 
including the full series of ten interviews—eight of which were hours-long conversations—that I 
conducted in Venezuela with well-known leaders, politicians, and intellectuals of its government 
and opposition during 2013. I offer brief summaries of all ten interviews (of roughly 1,200 words 
each) as an appendix due to their prescience and historical value, but the limitations of space for 
this master’s thesis, as well as the time elapsed, has forced me to refocus instead on my own 
interdisciplinary explorations. However, without those conversations this thesis would not exist. 
Among my interviewees, there were two former ministers: the first, vice-Secretary of the 
Presidency during Chávez’s first term and later Minister of Culture until 2011; the second, a 
former vice-minister of Health. There were two former presidential candidates: one, a legendary 
guerrilla leader during the 60s, founder of the Venezuelan party “MIR,” and prolific writer; the 
other, Venezuela’s highest vote-getter to Congress in 2010. But I also interviewed some well-
known intellectuals: historians, journalists, and political analysts, as well as the heads of leading 
public and private institutions, such as the then director of both the National Center of History 
and the National Archive; the then President of the UNT—the largest trade-union organization in 
Venezuela—; and the former Dean of the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello—President of the 
“Association of Universities Entrusted to the Society of Jesus in Latin America,” as well as the 
chief research coordinator of PROVEA, one of the country’s most prominent HR organizations. 
The first and more theoretical chapter of this thesis studies what populism, neo-populism, 
and rentierism are and how they operate. It also explains the ways in which Chavismo fits and 
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exceeds these categories. In this chapter’s first half, we consider works from the Argentinian 
post-Marxist theorist Ernesto Laclau to the Mexican philosopher Ernesto Dussel, the political 
theorist Benjamin Arditi, the comparativist Kenneth Erickson, and other specialists for their 
“political science” understandings. The second half incorporates the French Marxist theorist Guy 
Debord, the Russian philosopher Mikhail Backhtin, and several experts in cultural and literary 
studies for what I offer as my first original contribution in this text: it is both a psychological and 
literary deconstruction of Chávez’s myth and his “Aló Presidente” program in a baroque key.   
The second, more sociological chapter, presents Venezuela’s gruesome off-the-charts 
statistics, albeit focusing on its homicide rates—Caracas has been the “world’s homicide capital” 
since 2015, and Venezuela has the second highest murder rate worldwide. While the first chapter 
considers the magic of Chavismo’s “magical realism,” this one deals with its realities, its darkest 
side. In it, I establish the link between those statistics and the systematic dismantling of the 
country’s institutions, and proceed to discard alternative explanations. Since the country’s 
institutional meltdown is common knowledge in Venezuela, this chapter’s contribution is to have 
linked that reality to the country’s collapse in general, and to present it to the American public.  
The last chapter analyses the prior statistics from the point of view of economics and 
income inequality, to propose how Chavismo’s “socialism” might have turned Venezuela into 
one of the world’s most unequal countries. Because the search for social equality is what brings 
together all socialisms from their most democratic to their totalitarian forms, at least rhetorically, 
I consider these findings as my third original contribution to the text. In the concluding section, a 
journalistic postscript, I present a sequence of the political events after the constitutional coup 
d’état, on March of 2017, and of the ensuing crimes against humanity to repress street protests. 
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This work was initially planned to be a much longer Ph.D. thesis, inspired by but also including a 
series of ten interviews that I conducted in Venezuela with well-known leaders, politicians, and 
intellectuals of its government and opposition during 2013. For making that initial stage possible, I 
owe a special debt of gratitude to some very dear people, both at the City College of New York’s 
Division of Interdisciplinary Studies and in Venezuela. Before concluding a Master’s in the Study 
of the Americas at the CCNY, I traveled to Venezuela under the auspices of that program with a 
superb recommendation letter from the division’s dean, Dr. Juan Carlos Mercado, written at the 
instigation of my professor and former mentor of undergraduate studies at the CUNY BA, Martin 
Woessner, and of my former professor Alessandra Benedicty, then director of that M.A program. 
Without their constant encouragement during that summer to pursue my “independent studies” this 
thesis would not exist. However, in its present form this work would not be possible either without 
a course I took under Professor Carlos Aguasaco to complete that master’s upon my return from 
Venezuela. The first chapter of this text incorporates many ideas of my final paper for his course.  
I lived in Venezuela most of my adult life and know personally two of my interviewees. 
Guillermo Cerceau, a dear lifelong friend, facilitated another three of my interviews. The rest of 
notable intellectuals and political figures granted me interviews thanks to the good offices of María 
Elena Ramos and Ricardo Martínez. I dedicate this thesis to María Elena and Ricardo not because 
they made those interviews possible (nor because Ricardo later helped me transcribe those rather 
long conversations that ran into many hours of tape) but because they are my mother and stepdad, 
and with them I have had many of the most fruitful discussions about Venezuelan politics ever. 
Regarding the preparation of this thesis as part of my requirements to obtain a Master’s in 
Liberal Studies at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, I would like to thank 
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Professor David Halle for his course, “Global Cities.” His classes as much as his books inspired 
me to venture into the domains of sociology and statistics to develop this thesis’ down-to-earth 
second chapter, and with that a new approach. I also want to specially thank the economist Branko 
Milanovic, whose writings and course, “Within-National Inequalities: From Pareto to Piketty,” 
both sparked and helped me articulate this thesis’ third chapter, which I see as one of its original 
contributions. I express my gratitude to Professor Tomohisa Hattori for an important addition I had 
to make in the first chapter to help clarify Hugo Chávez’s rise to power, and to Professor David 
Gordon for important reflections during our long conversations about the left-right controversy. 
Before graduating summa cum laude at the CUNY Baccalaureate for Interdisciplinary 
Studies, I was granted the opportunity to study over half a dozen courses at the graduate level. One 
of the Ph.D. courses I studied, at the Graduate Center, in 2011, was with Professor Kenneth Paul 
Erickson. Near the end of this second master’s I had the opportunity to take a second course under 
Professor Erickson, but already in 2011 I knew that Ken was then, and would continue to be for 
many years to come, one of the very few professors who I would ever want as my thesis’ tutor.  
Indeed, everything in this thesis that has transcended my affinity for “debater’s phrasings” 
and my bent to write “a mystery story,” as Ken puts it, as well as my lack of rigor to “define all 
key concepts” and to provide documentation to “support every claim,” is due to him. But thanks 
also to his dedication I have made innumerable additions to this text that have both enriched it and 
made it clearer. What I could not fully incorporate after so much caring advice is only my fault. 
Finally, I want to thank my dear friend Alex Wieder for translating into English the many 
interview excerpts and citations in Spanish that I have used in this text. Without Alex’s generous 
offer when I was just too burnt-out to translate anything, and without the intellectual support and 




At first, I thought that Chávez’s failed coup d’état was right wing.                                                                  
Then I realized that there was no coup that was not right wing.                                                             
Manuel Caballero 
Socialism is the equivalent of developing the productive forces, because a socialism                      
that impoverishes them would be a step backwards in the name of social charity.                   
Américo Martín 
Already in my first academic paper in the United States, entitled “The Sleep of Reason Produces 
Monsters”—for my first B.A. course at the City College of New York, in the summer of 2009—, 
I dealt with a subject that bothered me as the most intriguing and vexing contradiction: How was 
it possible that Hugo Chávez’s government in Venezuela was almost universally perceived as a 
leftist administration, both by its population and in major academic circles overseas?1 Cui bono: 
“to whose benefit” was this, admittedly not so obvious, misrepresentation of the facts? The 
Italian philosopher of law and political sciences and historian of political thought, Norberto 
Bobbio, tells us in his now classic, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction: 
One of the most significant achievements of the socialist movements, which for a century 
have been and are still, for the moment at least, identified with the left, is the recognition 
of social rights alongside libertarian rights […] There is an element which typifies the 
doctrines and movements which are called and are universally recognized as left-wing, 
and that element is egalitarianism, by which we mean a tendency to praise that which 
makes people more equal rather than that which makes people less equal. 2 
 
																																																								
1 “The Sleep of Reason” is Goya’s best known print from his masterful series “Los caprichos.”  
All the scholars mentioned below have affirmed at some point Chavismo’s democratic spirit. 
Thus, like them, by “left wing” I imply its democratic variations. But all left wing and “socialist” 
ideologies share one trait, at least rhetorically: the search of egalitarianism and social equality.  
2 Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1976), 70-71	
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And, in his Political Economy: A Comparative Approach, the political economist Barry 
Clark also explains how “leftists claim that human development flourishes when individuals 
engage in cooperative, mutually respectful relations that can thrive only when excessive 
differences in status, power, and wealth are eliminated.”3 While, for him, “rightists claim that 
hierarchical social relations are essential to a good society. A society lacking sufficient hierarchy 
will fail to provide incentives for citizens to excel, resulting in a stifling mediocrity, dragging the 
entire society into economic stagnation, boredom, and apathy.”4 In any case, Bobbio clarifies: 
It was pure accident that the names given to the two political poles were ‘left’ and ‘right.’ 
As is well known, the use of these two words goes back to the French Revolution, at least 
as far as national politics are concerned. It is an extremely banal spatial metaphor, whose 
origin was pure chance, and whose sole function was to name the dichotomy which has 
prevailed in politics for two centuries, [but it] has prevailed because it is essential. 5 
 
On a concrete level, in the following pages I propose how the specific manner in which 
Chávez implemented his at first apparently benign redistributive politics could do nothing but 
precipitate what I will argue are the times of starkest inequality in modern Venezuelan history. 
Integral to this, albeit on a more philosophical level, here I will offer as well a theory of why and 
how Chávez’s representations might have been so misinterpreted. In his translator’s introduction 
to Jacques Rancière’s The Politics of Aesthetics, the philosopher Gabriel Rockhill observes: 
[For Rancière] the essence of politics consists in interrupting the distribution of the 
sensible by supplementing it with those who have no part in the perceptual coordinates of 
the community, thereby modifying the very aesthetico-political field of possibility […] 
Those [without] name, who remain invisible and inaudible, can only penetrate the police 
																																																								
3 Barry Clark, Political  Economy: A Comparative Approach (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 
1998), 34.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 33 
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order via a mode of subjectivization that transforms the aesthetic coordinates of the 
community by implementing the universal presupposition of politics: we are all equal.6 
 
 Whereas I argue how Chávez and his successors have made of Venezuela one of the most 
unequal countries in the planet in the material domain of its economy, essential to Marxism, here 
I also propose in what manner, in the theater of appearances of the political, Chávez was the first 
Latin American politician in the neoliberal era who could effectively articulate for its dēmos that 
there could never be true democracy with rampant poverty. While empowering “the people” in 
the end only symbolically, Chávez “showed his spectators how they were players of their play.”7  
From extraordinary internationally renowned thinkers, such as the Nobel Prize economist 
Joseph Stiglitz, Slavoj Žižek, Noam Chomsky, and Gianni Vattimo, to intellectuals—only in the 
United States—like NYU’s History Professor Greg Grandin; Pomona College’s historian and 
political analyst Miguel Tinker Salas; economist, writer, and activist Michael Albert, or Drexel 
University’s political theorist George Ciccariello-Maher, the list of political thinkers who have 
vouched for Hugo Chávez’s “socialism” is puzzling.8 In Europe, we could add to this group the 
																																																								
6 Jacques, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2004), 3. For Rancière, “Subjectivization” is the process by 
which a political subject extracts itself from the dominant categories of identification and 
classification; and “the police” “is an organizational system of coordinates that establishes a 
distribution of the sensible or a law that divides the community into groups, social positions, and 
functions. This law implicitly separates those who take part from those who are excluded.” Ibid. 
aesthetic division between the visible and the invisible, the audible and the inaudible, the sayable 
and the unsayable. 
7 As we will read later in thist text, a very appropiate sentence paraphrased from Issac V. Joslin, 
“Baroque and Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa: The Aesthetic Embodiment of 
Unreason” (Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the University of Minnesota, 2010), 211.	
8 Just to name a few books relevant in U.S. academia: the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo’s 
(with Santiago Zabala) Hermeneutic Communism: from Heidegger to Marx (2011); Steve 
Ellner’s Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon (2008); 
Miguel Tinker Salas’ Venezuela, What Everyone Needs to Know (2014), and his The Enduring 
Legacy: Oil, Culture, and Society in Venezuela (2009); George Ciccariello-Maher’s We Created 
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enormously influential circle around the former editor-in-chief of Le Monde Diplomatique from 
1991 to 2008, Ignacio Ramonet. The list only grows exponentially in Latin America and the 
“Third World.” But the damage that many of these thinkers have unwittingly caused by ignoring 
the counterevidence and discarding even the most radically progressive and honest of Chávez’s 
critics as “neo-conservatives” has been profound.9 It has served only the most undemocratic 
extremes of the Manichean divide that Chávez contrived to consolidate his “neo-totalitarianism,” 
and today to the general discredit of the Left in the continent, perhaps for decades to come. In 
reality, as the Mexican historian and political writer Enrique Krauze already described in 2008: 
La Revolución bolivariana es ante todo un fenómeno mediático posmoderno en el que un 
solo hombre, Hugo Chávez (el teleevangelista político más extraordinario que ha nacido 
en América Latina), actúa el papel de revolucionario heroico frente a una multitud de 
sinceros adeptos a su mensaje mesiánico […] El teleevangelista es militar y ha salido de 
compras para comprar armas, cada vez más armas. El teleevangelista es dueño del 
petróleo y reparte dinero, mucho dinero. El teleevangelista es propietario privado de la 
presidencia venezolana. El teleevangelista, en suma, puede salir de las pantallas y hacer, 
en un acto de “realismo mágico”, su “real gana”. Es un monarca absoluto.10 
Paraphrasing my epigraph by the notable left-wing Venezuelan historian, essayist, and 
journalist, Manuel Caballero: There is no political televangelist who is not right wing either.11 
Indeed, long before 2005, when Chávez proclaimed his “Socialismo del Siglo XXI” at the Fifth 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Chávez: A People's History of the Venezuelan Revolution (2013). Also, see Greg Grandin and 
Michael Albert’s related articles and interviews, and those of Slavoj Žižek and Noam Chomsky.  
9 Showing that counterevidence from an interdisciplinary perspective is one of this thesis’s goals. 
10 The Bolivarian revolution is, first and foremost, a post-modern media phenomenon in which 
one man alone, Hugo Chávez (the most extraordinary [political*] televangelist born in Latin 
America) plays the role of a heroic revolutionary before a crowd of sincere followers of his 
messianic message […] The televangelist is a military and has gone shopping to buy arms, more 
and more arms. The televangelist is the owner of the oil and distributes money, lots of money. 
The televangelist is the private owner of the Venezuelan presidency. The televangelist, in short, 
can come out of the screens and perform, in an act of “magical realism” “whatever he wants.” He 
is an absolute monarch. Enrique Krauze: El poder y el delirio (Caracas: Editorial Alfa, 2008), 62	
11 *On “televangelism” as transcending the original connotation used in the U.S. to encompass as 
well any televised form of politics with strong messianic components that addresses a group of 
“elect” vs. the reject, see the interviews’ excerpts quoted on pages 15 and 16 and my comments.  
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World Social Forum, in Brazil, he founded his Movimiento Revolucionario “Bolivariano” 200 in 
1982, with which he planned and executed his failed military coup in 1992. And only much later, 
after 1997 through its decade-long transformation into the Movimiento V República, he would 
create the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela in March of 2007. For as Carl Schmitt cleverly 
observed nearly a century ago, in his “The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy:” “Until now the 
democracy of mankind and parliamentarism has only once been contemptuously pushed aside 
through the conscious appeal to myth. And that was an example of the irrational power of the 
national myth.”12 But Chávez did not need to say, like Mussolini, “We have created a myth, this 
myth is a belief, a noble enthusiasm […] the great nation which we want to make into a reality 
for ourselves.”13 In his new and exuberant iconography, he created a foundational tale: the “Tree 
with the Three Roots,” which reminded us of how Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution 
had been inspired by the lives and spirits of Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodríguez, and Ezequiel 
Zamora.14 Instead, he settled for renaming the country “Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela:” 
Audazmente hemos tratado de buscar un punto de referencia original y autóctono, de un 
modelo ideológico que pudiese ser cohesionado en torno al planteamiento bolivariano, 
zamorano y de Rodríguez […] Somos un movimiento revolucionario, un movimiento 
popular a favor de la causa de los dominados de este país y de este planeta.”15 
																																																								
12 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1985 
[1923]), 75 
13 Ibid., 76 
14 Simón Bolívar was the Venezuelan soldier and statesman who led the independence wars 
against the Spanish Empire that established Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Bolivia, and 
Panamá as independent states. Simón Rodríguez was Bolívar’s tutor and mentor; Ezequiel 
Zamora was a legendary caudillo in the 19th century (See more about this on pages 12 and 13).  
15“We have boldly tried to search for an original, indigenous reference point, of an ideological 
model that might fit around the premise of Bolívar, Zamora and Rodríguez… We are a 
revolutionary movement. A popular movement working on behalf of the subjugated of this 
country and this planet.” Cristina Marcano y Alberto Barrera-Tyszka, Hugo Chávez sin 
uniforme. Una historia personal (Caracas: Ramdom House Mondadori, 2004), 154. 
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Venezuela: Oil and Madness. Politics, Propaganda, and Realities of the Chavista Era, is an 
interdisciplinary exploration of Venezuela’s politics and its consequences during the Chavista 
years. This work was initially planned to be a much longer Ph.D. thesis, both inspired by but also 
including the full series of ten interviews—eight of which were hours-long conversations—that I 
conducted in Venezuela with well-known leaders, politicians, and intellectuals of its government 
and opposition during 2013.16 However, the vertiginous political, economic, and social changes 
that started to unravel in the country in February of 2014, shortly after my interviews, and later 
personal circumstances that led me to pursue this M.A. in Liberal Studies with a specialty in 
International Studies, rather than my envisioned Ph.D., complicated that project.17 Still, I offer 
brief summaries of all ten interviews (of roughly 1,200 words each) as an appendix due to their 
																																																								
16 Those conversations lasted from nearly fifty minutes in one case to over three hours on two 
occasions. Among my interviewees, there were two former ministers: the first, vice-Secretary of 
the Presidency during Chávez’s first term and later Minister of Culture until 2011; the second, a 
former vice-minister of Health. There were two former presidential candidates: one, a legendary 
guerrilla leader during the 60s, founder of the Venezuelan party “MIR,” and prolific writer; the 
other, Venezuela’s highest vote-getter to Congress in 2010, later impeached, in 2014, after co-
leading the movement “The Way Out,” which capitalized from and further promoted massive 
student protests on the streets since February of that year. I was also able to interview some well-
known intellectuals: historians, journalists, and political analysts, and some heads of leading 
public and private institutions. Among them were the then director of both the National Center of 
History and the National Archive; the then President of the UNT—the largest trade-union in 
Venezuela—; the former Dean of the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello—and President of the 
“Association of Universities Entrusted to the Society of Jesus in Latin America”—; and the chief 
research coordinator of PROVEA, one of the country’s most prominent HR organizations. 
17 In February of 2014, La salida—translated by the international press as “The Exit,” but rather 
meaning “The Way Out” (as in “the only way out”)—, was a spontaneous wave of massive 
student protests that had started in January of that year in the city of Mérida, after the murder of 
Héctor Moreno, a student of the Universidad de los Andes – Mérida, that spread to the rest of the 
country after a second student was nearly raped in February in the city of San Cristóbal, at the 
Universidad de los Andes – Táchira. On February 12th,, three important leaders of the opposition: 
at the time Caracas’s Mayor, Antonio Ledezma, popular former presidential candidate Leopoldo 
López, and Member of Congress María Corina Machado (one of my interviewees) helped 
organize that movement as a national protest to oust Nicolás Maduro’s government. The drastic 
fall in oil prices later that year has ended by submerging Venezuela in a humanitarian crisis. 
 
	 7	
prescience and historical value, but the limitations of space for this Master’s thesis, as well as the 
time elapsed, has forced me to refocus instead on my own interdisciplinary explorations. The 
above notwithstanding, without those conversations this thesis would not exist; there are multiple 
quotations of those interviews interspersed in the text for a more encompassing understanding.18 
During the past few years alone, I have read literally thousands of articles and several dozen 
books related to Venezuela and its circumstances. Only to mention a fraction of representative 
books just by the Venezuelan left: Teodoro Petkoff’s El chavismo como problema (2010), El 
socialismo irreal (2007), and Las dos izquierdas (2005); Manuel Caballero’s La peste militar. 
Escritos polémicos (2007); and my interviewees’ Margarita López Maya’s (who proclaimed the 
official discourse for Hugo Chávez’s ratification before the National Assembly, in 2004), Del 
Viernes Negro al Referendo Revocatorio (2005); Américo Martín’s Huracán sobre el Caribe 
(2013) and Socialismo del siglo XXI. ¿Huida hacia el laberinto? (2007); and Rafael Uzcátegui’s 
La revolución como espectáculo (2010). In fact, from the majority of my interviewees who are 
prolific writers, I have read many of the texts they have published (and from the few who are not, 
most of their testimonies). A bibliography of some fifty books by Venezuelan authors from its 
full political spectrum and by international experts on the subject is offered at the end of this 
thesis. But, as with my now remote first paper, beyond all the interviews, books, articles, and 
interactions, it is my passion as a knowledgeable Venezuelan that has vitally motivated and 
informed this work. I write this thesis as an engaged observer as much as a dedicated scholar. 
The first and more theoretical chapter of this thesis involves a general study of what 
populism and neo-populism (and rentierism) are, and how they operate. It also explains the ways 
																																																								
18 Translations in footnotes of the original excerpts and citations in Spanish by Alex Wieder.	
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in which Chavismo fits and exceeds these categories. In its first half, we consider works from the 
Argentinian post-Marxist theorist Ernesto Laclau to the Mexican philosopher Ernesto Dussel, the 
political theorist Benjamin Arditi, the comparativist Kenneth Erickson, and other specialists for 
their “political science” understandings. The second half incorporates the French Marxist theorist 
Guy Debord, the Russian philosopher Mikhail Backhtin, and other experts in cultural and literary 
studies for what I consider to be this thesis’ first original contribution: it is a psychological and 
literary deconstruction of Chávez’s myth and his “Aló Presidente” program in a baroque key.  
The second, more sociological chapter, presents Venezuela’s gruesome off-the-charts 
statistics, albeit focusing on its homicide rates—Caracas has been the “world’s homicide capital” 
since 2015, and Venezuela has the second highest murder rate worldwide. While the first chapter 
considers the magic of Chavismo’s “magical realism,” this one deals with its realities, indeed its 
darkest side. In it, I establish the link between those statistics and the systematic dismantling of 
the country’s institutions, and proceed to discard alternative explanations. Since the country’s 
institutional meltdown is common knowledge in Venezuela, this chapter’s contribution is to have 
linked that reality to the country’s collapse in general, and to present it to the American public.  
The last chapter analyses the prior statistics from the point of view of economics, and 
specifically of income inequality, to propose how Chavismo’s “socialism” has turned Venezuela 
into one of the world’s most unequal countries. Because the search for social equality is what 
brings together all socialisms from their most democratic to their totalitarian forms, at least 
rhetorically, I see these findings as my third original contribution. In the concluding section, a 
journalistic postscript, I offer a sequence of the political events after the constitutional coup 
d’état, on March of 2017, and of the ensuing crimes against humanity to repress street protests. 
	 9	
La Cuarta República: Venezuelan democracy in crisis before Chávez’s rise to power      
Two introductory sections seem essential before we start considering our explorations. The first 
involves a brief account of the institutional crisis that led to the social explosion of 1989, known 
as El Caracazo, and to the two failed coups d’état in 1992, the first of them led by Lieutenant 
Colonel Hugo Chávez Frías together with other field and junior officers. This historical narrative 
is crucial to understand important aspects that in my opinion explain the perfect timing, acumen, 
and naturalness with which Chávez started to be perceived as a “Bolivarian socialist” during the 
neoliberal period. The second segment deals with the subject of Venezuela’s exceptionalism. 
Contrary to all of Latin America except for Costa Rica, Venezuela lived decades of 
representative politics—and remarkable social achievements—from the late 1950s to the early 
1980s, until the infamous “Black Friday” that wrecked the country on February 18 of 1983 (La 
Salida, El Caracazo, and Chávez’s coup also occurred in a February).19 The region’s most stable 
and widely accepted currency since the 1930s lost over half of its value that day. During the next 
decade, the Bolívar’s unstoppable downward spiral and the geometrically increased corruption 
due to the mix of a sudden and unprecedented scarcity and new currency exchange controls, all 
but severed the democratic channels that a vertiginously impoverishing population had once 
																																																								
19  Not to make an overstatement, many political analysts consider that Colombia and Mexico 
should also be included as imperfect democracies during this period, but this author disagrees. 
Venezuela’s “Black Friday” happened on February 18 of 1983 due to massive capital flights of 
U.S. dollars, mostly from corporate sectors (estimated at US$90 billion) that started to occur in 
1981 as a consequence of declining oil prices after the Islamic Revolution in Iran cut production, 
making oil prices peak in 1979. With the Central Bank devoid of foreign exchange reserves, that 
day banks did not open their doors, and the government of President Luis Herrera Campins was 
forced to devalue the Venezuelan currency by 100% and soon after to impose exchange controls. 
For more about Venezuela’s “Black Friday,” see Ramón Santiago, “On the Anniversary of Black 
Friday: Venezuela’s Devaluation and Inflation Debacle from 1983 to 1998,” Axis of Logic, 
February 18, 2008: http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_26069.shtml 
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enjoyed with its representatives. The IMF’s neoliberal “adjustment program” further deepened 
the population’s protests and despair. However, alternative channels of expression started to fill 
that vacuum: groups of students and intellectuals, more attuned and nimble new (and renewed) 
socialist parties, HR NGOs, communal organizations, the media, the Church, and of course the 
military: Hugo Chávez rode that tsunami. Once on the shore, he carefully started to adjust his 
uniform. Few of those civilian groups kept leverage after El Comandante Chávez’s second year 
in power. And only in 2005, after those groups had been either tossed or absorbed into Chávez’s 
militias, he proclaimed his Socialismo del Siglo XXI at the Fifth World Social Forum, in Brazil. 20 
But a second set of events catapulted Chávez to enter the presidential elections of 1998 
and win the country’s presidency. And it was the series of incidents, or rather of extraordinary 
blunders, that led to his early release from prison a mere two years after his unsuccessful coup 
against then President Carlos Andres Pérez, when Chávez briefly appeared on national TV to 
proclaim his celebrated “Por ahora” allocution (“Comrades: unfortunately, for the moment, the 
objectives that we had set for ourselves have not been achieved”); there, he personally assumed 
responsibility for the coup and asked his comrades to lay down their arms.21 After spending two 
years in jail, Chávez received a “pardon” from Carlos Andrés Pérez’s nemesis—and then newly 
reelected President—Rafael Caldera.22 Caldera had been one of the original signatories of the 
Pacto de Punto Fijo (the Punto Fijo Pact, named after Caldera’s house, where it was signed) that 
had consolidated the two-party system of representative politics forty years earlier. The pact was 
																																																								
20 Term coined by Heinz Dietrich, first used by Chávez in 2005 at the Fifth World Social Forum. 
21 Hugo Chávez, “Por Ahora,” with English captions, archive of February 4, 1992, YouTube: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iKcoFPsoKLU For a full analysis, see Christopher Conway, 
“Hugo Chávez and Bolivarian Nationalism,” in Christopher Conway\’s Research Page: 
https://christopherconway.wordpress.com/hugo-chavez-and-bolivar/ 
22 Popularly called a “presidential pardon,” it was rather a dismissal with prejudice of the case 
decided from Rafael Caldera’s Presidency. In fact, Chávez’s trial was still pending at the time. 
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signed by Rómulo Betancourt, the founder of Pérez’s own party, Acción Democrática, Rafael 
Caldera for his party, COPEI, and an important political figure who was never to achieve the 
presidency, Jóvito Villalba, for his party, URD. In the aftermath of Chávez’s coup, Caldera gave 
some polemic declarations justifying the “painful and deplorable incident of the military revolt” 
that infused with new life his long declining political career: “We cannot ask people to immolate 
themselves for freedom and democracy, when freedom and democracy are not able to feed them 
[…] Democracy cannot exist if the people are hungry.”23 Those words gained him the people’s 
trust to become the country’s president for a second term after having tried for two decades; he 
also promised to pardon the coup plotters should he be elected.24 At a time when the Venezuelan 
people had become disenchanted with the two-party “partidocracia” (indeed, the shrewd Caldera 
disavowed the party he founded to run and win as an independent), Chávez’s release from jail—
and some gross miscalculations by those parties during the next election, further weakened after 
Caldera’s victory—opened the gates for Chávez to become the next Venezuelan president.25 
According to Michael Coppedge’s “Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela:”  
Partyarchy helped channel this moral outrage into a rejection of AD and COPEI at the 
polls. The downside to being so much in control for so many years is that everyone 
knows whom to blame when things go wrong. (Of course, voters could have blamed the 
IMF or oil buyers, but they were not on the ballot.) […] When the oil economy went bust, 
the middle class shrank and working-class unions lost membership and clout. The 
political culture became less moderate and more radical. Venezuelans withdrew some 
																																																								
23 Kajsa Norman, A Hero’s Curse. The Perpetual Liberation of Venezuela (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2017), iv  





support for the regime and the moderate parties, and turned instead to leftist parties and 
an immoderate, intransigent, and intolerant politician—Hugo Chávez Frías.26 
 
But Venezuela’s exceptionalism is not only due to its oil riches, or to Simón Bolívar’s feats in 
the continent to liberate six countries from the Spanish monarchy and help cement with his 
writings the bases for modern Latin American republicanism. Venezuela also had the largest 
civil devastation during the Independence wars (a third of its population died).27 And, following 
its Independence, it suffered 166 caudillo insurrections during half a century of wars that left 
between 400,000 and one million casualties, depending on the source.28 According to Steve 
Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas, two scholars who vouch for Chavismo’s socialism, those events 
“nearly decimated the established aristocracy,” which contributed to the country’s “having 
greater social mobility than its socially stratified neighbors […] a high degree of miscegenation 
and [a lack of] the legal structures of [social] separation evident elsewhere in Latin America.”29 
Venezuela is the only country in Ibero-America never to have fought a war against a neighboring 
nation. And, together with Costa Rica, it was the only Latin American nation not to fall under 
																																																								
26 Michael Doppage, “Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela through Nested 
Inference,” (presentation, Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política, Universidad de 
Salamanca, España, 9-11 de julio de 2002), 5 and 13. 
27 Robert L. Sheina, Latin America’s Wars: The Age of the Caudillo, 1781 – 1899, (Dulles, VA: 
Brassey’s, Inc., 2003). 
Luis Salamanca, “Las tres etapas más violentas en la historia de Venezuela,”Polítika UCAB, 
Revista del Centro de Estudios Políticos, Junio 12, 2015: https://politikaucab.net/2015/06/12/las-
tres-etapas-mas-violentas-en-la-historia-de-venezuela/ 
28 Francisco Armando Castillo Linares, “Los Andes siglo XIX. Crónicas de guerra y caudillos,” 
Tierra Firme, Universidad de los Andes - Táchira, 2005: http://biblat.unam.mx/es/revista/tierra-
firme-caracas/articulo/los-andes-siglo-xix-cronicas-de-guerra-y-caudillos 
29 Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker Salas “The Venezuelan Exceptionalism Thesis. Separating 
Myth from Reality. Introduction,” Latin American Perspectives Vol. 32, No. 2, Venezuelan 
Exceptionalism Revisited: The Unraveling of Venezuela's Model Democracy (Sage Publications, 
March 2005), 5 
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some form of dictatorship or civil war from the late 1950s until the early 2000s. Indeed, as the 
Venezuelan political scientist Andrés Stambouli points out in his book, La política extraviada: 
No logramos la democracia porque tuvimos petróleo, más bien, los logros democráticos 
son producto de la artesanía política dirigida a confeccionar una comunidad política, 
utilizando al petróleo para tal fin […] Venezuela pudo evitar, durante los años sesenta y 
los setenta, la ola militar autoritaria de la América Latina, no porque dispusiera del 
petróleo sino por el uso que le dio el liderazgo político social, en función de los fines 
democráticos compartidos. Venezuela dispuso de petróleo desde principios de siglo, pero 
de una democracia en proceso de permanente consolidación solo a partir de 1958.30 
 
Today, together with Cuba, Venezuela is the only country in Latin America under a 
hybrid military-civilian regime. In fact, after Chávez’s death, Venezuela has transitioned to a 
unique military takeover: the most exceptional in the Americas.31 In a country where, as Ellner 
and Tinker Salas explain, “its protracted democratic stability after 1958 appeared to differentiate 
the nation from the military dictatorships that dominated Latin America from the 1950s through 
the 1980s,” in the following pages we will examine an era of exceptions of a different kind.32  
 
																																																								
30 “We did not achieve democracy because we had oil; the democratic achievements are rather 
the product of a political craftsmanship aimed at creating a political community that used oil to 
such end [...] During the sixties and seventies, Venezuela was able to avoid the authoritarian 
military wave of Latin America, not because it had oil at its disposal, but because of how the 
socio-political leadership made use of it in terms of shared democratic purposes. Venezuela had 
access to oil since the beginning of the century, but to a democracy in a permanent consolidation 
process only after 1958.” Andrés Stambouli, La política extraviada. Una historia de Medina a 
Chávez (Caracas: Fundación para la cultura urbana, 2009), 123	
31 According to Sergio Bitar (a former Chilean minister in the administations of Salvador 
Allende, Ricardo Lagos, and Michelle Bachelet), who was a political refugee in Venezuela 
during Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, “Se ha instalado un poder que tiene la complicidad de 
unas Fuerzas Armadas que son incapaces de señalar que se respete la Constitución. Yo diría 
que, siendo algo muy propio de Venezuela, que no se puede asimilar con las dictaduras de los 70 
y los 80, es más sofisticada, usan mecanismos democráticos de fachada para ir devorando a la 
democracia.” Sergio Bitar, “Uno no gana con ética en la política, gana con poder; por Hugo 
Prieto,” Prodavinci, August 13, 2017: http://prodavinci.com/2017/08/13/actualidad/sergio-bitar-
uno-no-gana-con-etica-en-la-politica-gana-con-poder-por-hugo-prieto/  





I. Populism, Neo-Populism, and Paradoxes of the Chavista Era 
 
The root of the spectacle is that oldest of all social specializations, the specialization  
of power. The spectacle plays the specialized role of speaking in the name of all  
the other activities. It is hierarchical society’s ambassador to itself, delivering 
its messages at a court where no one else is allowed to speak. The most  
modern aspect of the spectacle is thus also the most archaic. 
Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle 
 
Form is the limiting principle by which a thing is itself.   
R. P. Blackmur  
 
To understand the Hugo Chávez phenomenon, as well as the appalling deterioration of 
Chavismo and his successors after his death, a panoramic view of classical populism and of 
“neo-populism”—the later tellingly so-called only after the Washington Consensus—will help us 
elucidate in what ways Chavismo became the emblematic embodiment of neo-populism, the 
implications of the reemergence of populist politics in many parts of our world upon the seeming 
shortcomings of liberal democracy, and the ways in which Chávez and his successors are at once 
representative of neo-populist traits and unique to the Venezuelan experience. Besides, when 
confronted with what according to most poststructuralist analysts is the false binary of liberal 
democracy and neo-populist politics, such an analysis will help us decipher how, more than an 
articulatory form (Ernesto Laclau), or an internal periphery of democracy (Benjamin Arditi), 
Chávez’s radical takeover of the country through his baroque televised revolution marked a 
departure from traditional political forms, both liberal and populist, not as a hybrid, either, but 
rather as a mutation: a crude but clear manifestation of a detour in the unfolding of democracy.  
In the introduction to their Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century, the 
political scientists and editors Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia J. Arnson argue that “the 
reemergence of populism as part of the discussion of contemporary politics in Latin America is, 
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for the most part, a product of the regime and persona of Hugo Chávez;”33 For his part, Francisco 
Panizza, a senior lecturer in Latin American politics at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science as well as a prolific analyst on the subject of populism, adds in his “What Do 
We Mean When We Talk About Populism?” “If the political conflict in Venezuela in the 1990s 
and 2000s had been defined only by struggles about the distributions of oil rents, it is unlikely 
that it would have led to such a radical rupture of the political order as seen in the Bolivarian 
Revolution.”34 Similarly, the Ecuadorian politician, scholar, and political analyst César Montúfar 
concludes in his “Rafael Correa and his Plebiscitary Citizen Revolution” that our current populist 
radical regimes do not see themselves as “another government, subject to democratic alternation, 
but as a new political regime that will endure over time, opening a new epoch.”35 One of my 
interviewees, the historian Luis Pellicer, at the time President of Venezuela's Archivo General de 
la Nación and President in charge of the Centro Nacional de Historia, explained it this way: 
Te lo digo con Tucídides y con Manuel Briceño Guerrero: Hay hombres que empalman 
su corazón con el corazón colectivo y las circunstancias históricas para lograr grandes 
hazañas y grandes hechos. Si esos hombres siguen vivos en la memoria del colectivo, en 
el corazón del colectivo, su legado logrará perpetuarse. Lo que llamamos aquí corazón 
es la afectividad y el raciocinio. Eso fue Bolívar y eso debe ser Chávez para nosotros.36 
 
If this paean may seem like a radical statement coming from the acting director of two of 
Venezuela’s most important historical institutions, Chavismo’s messianic reality has been the 
cause of much consternation as well as of considerable curiosity for many of its opponents. One 
																																																								
33 Carlos de la Torre and Cynthia J. Arson, Ed. Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First 
Century (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013), 2 
34 Ibid., 98 
35 Ibid., 8 
36	“I'll tell you with Thucydides and with Manuel Briceño Guerrero: There are men who join 
their hearts with the collective heart and the historical circumstances to achieve great feats with 
great deeds. If those men remain alive in the collective memory, in the collective heart, their 
legacy will perpetuate itself. What we call here “heart” is emotion and reason. That is who 
Bolívar was, and that's who Chávez must be for us.”	
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of my interviewees, Luis Ugalde, s.j.. President of the “Association of Universities Entrusted to 
the Society of Jesus in Latin America,” author of numerous books and essays on the subject, and 
member of the Academia de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, sees this as a motive of great concern: 
Chávez, con su magia comunicacional, con su audacia verbal y con su condición militar 
encarnadora del poder de imposición armada, resultó para muchos ideal para castigar a 
los que traicionaron al pueblo y colmar las esperanzas de éste. [Un problema con esto] 
es la ilusión mesiánica de que hay acceso a la felicidad por la vía de creer en el mesías 
político, fértil en imaginación y promesas, pero anti modelo en la responsabilidad de 
gestión pública, eficiente, honesta. […] Uno de los daños mayores que hemos heredado 
es que el mesías no creía en la democracia y sobre todo descalificaba a todos los que no 
fueran seguidores y dóciles a él. Sin reconocimiento desde el Estado de la dignidad y 
razón de los que opinan de otra manera, no es posible la democracia.37 
 
But Rafael Uzcátegui, the Chief Research Coordinator of PROVEA (Venezuelan 
Program of Education-Action on Human Rights), one of Venezuela's most prominent Human 
Rights NGOs, author of Venezuela, Revolution as Spectacle, and other works, and coeditor of the 
only anarchist publication in the country, told me something that in part inspired this chapter’s 
second half. A critic both of the government and of the traditional opposition, he wondered:  
Una cosa en la que he estado pensando mucho […] es en todos los elementos subjetivos, 
carismáticos, de la relación de Chávez con la gente. Yo creo que eso faltó. En el libro 
[above] había mucha racionalidad, un análisis profundo, una necesidad de racionalizar 
mucho el análisis para dar un primer elemento, pero creo que faltó explicar toda esa 
sintonía que tenía con los sectores populares por una serie de sincretismos religiosos, 
carismáticos, esa construcción de una nueva religiosidad popular llamada chavismo.38 
																																																								
37	“With his communicational magic, his verbal audacity, and military condition that embodied 
the power of armed imposition, Chávez was ideal, for many, to punish those who betrayed the 
people, and thus to sate their hope. [A problem with this] is the messianic illusion that there is 
access to happiness through the belief in this political messiah, fertile with imagination and 
promises, but an anti-model with regards to efficient, honest, public policy responsibility […] 
One of the greatest harms we have inherited is that the messiah did not believe in democracy 
and, above all, disqualified all who weren't followers and docile to him. Without the State's 
recognition of the dignity and reason of those who think differently, democracy is not possible.”	
38	“Something I've been thinking about a lot […] is all the subjective, charismatic elements of 
Chávez's relationship with the people. I believe that that was missing. In the book there was 
much rationality, a profound analysis, a need to overly rationalize the analysis in order to provide 
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After offering an analysis of what populism and neo-populism are—and are not—to ask 
whether Chavismo has inaugurated a new political category, in the second part of this chapter I 
suggest that to understand Chavismo’s seismic repercussions in the continent we must transcend 
the strictly political and inquire into what gave form to the revolution that made Chávez a major 
protagonist in contemporary history: the style and meaning of his relatively neglected and often 
derided media government from the “Aló Presidente” program. Only through its conduit could 
Chávez impress his “politics,” first by re-presenting and progressively by molding Venezuela’s 
mass culture. Indeed, as his fervent admirer and remarkably successful new kid on the “populist” 
block, Spain’s Podemos party’s Pablo Iglesias, explains: “En el año 2012, el 90% de un discurso 
político es un dispositivo audiovisual, el 95% de un liderazgo es un dispositivo audiovisual.”39  
 
Following the Argentinian post-Marxist political theorist Ernesto Laclau, most political analysts 
explain neo-populism today variously (and aptly, but insufficiently) as a “mode of articulation.” 
Rather than exploring the contents of populist discourses or offering us a functionalist analysis, 
Laclau tells us: “a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual 
contents identifiable as populistic, but because it shows a particular logic of articulation of those 
contents—whatever those contents are.” 40 Thus, to intend the paradoxical goal of more fully 
encompassing a subject that can only be comprehended by “the isolation of smaller units than the 
group, and the consideration of the social logic of their articulation,” Laclau invites us to see in 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
one initial element, but I believe that his being so in tune with the popular sectors due to a series 
of religious and charismatic syncretism, that construction of a new popular religiosity called 
“Chavismo,” was left unexplained.”	
39 Eduardo Muriel, “Cinco claves del éxito de la campaña electoral de Podemos,” La Marea, 
May 26, 2014: https://www.lamarea.com/2014/05/26/cinco-claves-del-exito-de-la-campana-
electoral-de-podemos/ 
40 Francisco Panizza, Ed, Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (New York: Verso, 2005), 33 
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the distinct demands of the multiple collective wills the social building blocks that must be thus 
articulated.41 In his essay, “Whats’s In a Name?” we find the three structural elements that will 
link these demands to understand (neo) populism: “equivalential chains,” an “internal frontier,” 
and “empty (or floating) signifiers.” For Laclau, “a social situation in which demands tend to 
reaggregate themselves on the negative basis that they all remain unsatisfied is the first 
precondition of that mode of political articulation that we call populism.”42 He explains: 
A logic of equivalence (is) one in which all the demands tend to reaggregate themselves, 
forming what we will call an equivalential chain of reivindicaciones [“demands,” where] 
each demand presents its own claim as only one among a large set of social claims […] 
The subject of a demand conceived as differential particularity we will call a democratic 
subject. In the other case the subject will be wider, for its subjectivity will result from the 
equivalential aggregation of a plurality of democratic demands. A subject constituted on 
the basis of this logic we will call a popular subject […] A situation in which a plurality 
of unsatisfied demands and an increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb 
them differentially co-exist, creates the condition leading to a populist rupture.43 
 
However, if a popular subject emerges through equivalential chains, there can still be no 
popular subjectivity “without the creation of an ‘internal frontier’ [because] the equivalences are 
only such in terms of a lack pervading them all. Equivalential popular discourses divide the 
social into two camps:” the power block and the people.44 But a fourth “articulatory surface” is 
still missing from our compound articulation: the “empty” and/or “floating” signifier.45 For the 
																																																								
41 Most post-structuralists resort to varying sets of jointed and disjointed metaphors: “internal 
frontier” (Laclau); “de-alignments” (Panizza); “antagonistic dimensions” (Chantal Mouffe); 
“internal periphery” (Benjamin Arditi); “constitutive outside” (Glenn Bowman); “body-in-
pieces” (Joseph Lowndes); “mirror-imaging” (David Laycock); a “network of meaning” with a 
“nodal point” (Yannis Stavrakakis); “structural dislocations” (Sebastián Barros), etc. Like with 
any efficient articulation, their styles adjust to their explored subjects: because both post-
structuralism and populism reject the self-sufficiency, respectively, of the human sciences and of 
liberal politics, each calls into question the binary oppositions that constitute these structures. 
42 Panizza, Ibid., 33 
43 Ibid., 37 
44 Ibid., 38 
45 A “compound articulation” has three or more articulatory surfaces where the bones connect.  
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hegemony of one symbolic signifier over the rest can only be achieved by the populist 
production of tendentially empty signifiers: “As their function is to bring to equivalential 
homogeneity a highly heterogeneous reality, they can only do so on the basis of reducing to the 
minimum their particularistic content.”46 Hence, for Laclau, populism is a mode of discourse 
made of empty or floating hegemonic signifiers that symbolically link a diversity of unsatisfied 
demands in equivalential chains by creating an internal frontier (a culpable other). And I would 
add: thus molding, while assuming its shape, the popular subject that it purports to embody. 
Two advantages of this formula are that it can be equally applied to the neo-populism of 
the extreme right and of the radical left and to the full spectrum between them. And, as I will 
propose here, that by putting an emphasis on its “articulatory” logic, this formula immediately 
refers us to its enhancing prosthesis: the mass media. This is what sets neo-populism apart as a 
mutation. Intuitively copying Guy Debord’s third thesis, early in his mandate, Chávez discovered 
that “The spectacle presents itself simultaneously as society itself, as a part of society, and as a 
means of unification. […] But due to the very fact that this sector is separate […] the unification 
it achieves is nothing but an official language of universal separation.”47 This is strikingly similar 
to how the political analyst Joseph Lowndes describes the populism of George Wallace, the 
segregationist 45th Governor of Alabama: “hegemonic movements all require some illusion of 
complete commonality—a particularity that comes to stand for the general—as well as foes 
against which to forge that commonality.”48 Right or left, the formula makes no difference. 
 But if most poststructuralist definitions of neo-populism differ considerably from more 
classical explanations of populism (perhaps obviously, for they are distinct political phenomena 
																																																								
46 Ibid., 40 
47 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black and Red Books, 2000), 3rd thesis. 
48 Panizza, Ibid., 170-71 
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regardless or their similarities), both interpretations, as well as their traits in common and those 
where they stand apart, will help us identify where Chavismo stands as a political phenomenon. 
Of classical populism, Kenneth Erickson, the co-editor-in-chief of the Journal of Comparative 
Politics, says that: “Nationalism, stemming from political and economic dependence, marks all 
populist movements.”49 And “At best, Latin American populist movements reflect what Theodor 
Geiger defined (in contradistinction to ideologies) as mentalities, i.e., non-codified ways of 
thinking and feeling which are more emotional than rational.”50 We could argue how both 
nationalism and a “non-codified way of thinking” function as structural equivalents of Laclau’s 
internal frontiers and “empty signifiers.” But, for Erickson, these traits also help explain that: 
Populist movements, because they seek a social base in the lower class, and their rhetoric 
emphasizes economic nationalism, state enterprise, and equitable distribution of food and 
services, are sometimes confused with socialist ones. This is a fundamental 
misunderstanding. Unlike socialism, populism fails to address itself to two important 
aspects of production […] Because populist movements lack a comprehensive ideology, 
they see workers merely as consumers and thus focus mainly on distributing food and 
services to them […] Second, their exclusive focus on distribution leads them to neglect 
the saving and investment necessary to create the food and services, [failing] everywhere 
to emphasize the necessity to create enduring political institutions to safeguard the just 
society they seek to establish […] Hope for social justice rests instead with a hero-figure 
who will create with one blow the just society. Even if a savior could work such wonders, 
however, no political institutions would exist to ensure their preservation.51 
 
 Although Erickson’s paper was written a full quarter century before Chávez’s first 
government, it brings together what I believe is the central confounding aspect of Chavismo 
(thanks to its rhetoric) and accurately describes the country’s maladies today. I address those 
realities in detail in the following two chapters, but specifically as to Chavismo’s trait of treating 
																																																								
49 Kenneh Paul Erickson, “Populism and Political Control of the Working Class in Brazil,” 
Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies, Vol. IV, 1975, pp. 117 – 
144. (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1977), 119 
50 Ibid., 120 
51 Ibid., 123. But read as well the long excerpt of my interview with Américo Martín, on page 40. 
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“workers merely as consumers,” contrary to any socialism, that was, interestingly, a critique of 
several of my interviewees regardless of political affiliations. I will only quote three of them. 
Tulio Hernández, arguably one of the handful of most influential intellectuals for the 
opposition (self-exiled in Spain in June of 2017 due to public threats of incarceration received 
from the Venezuelan president), a sociologist expert in culture, communication, and politics, as 
well as an international consultant for cultural and urban politics, explained it to me this way: 
Lo único nuevo fueron las misiones que hacían sentir a la gente que se les estaba 
prestando atención directa, pero la verdadera gran inclusión fue la redistribución del 
ingreso que permitió que mucha gente se incorporara al consumo, sobre todo al consumo 
de determinados bienes eléctricos, electrónicos, del hogar, y al consumo de ropas de 
marcas y al consumo globalizado. Esa inclusión a través del mercado es realmente la 
única transformación profunda porque, a juzgar por el aparato económico, esto es un 
capitalismo de estado con un mercado tradicional de sociedades mono-productoras.52 
 
But José León Uzcátegui, a former Health Vice Minister and at the time Carabobo State’s 
Director of Misión Barrio Adentro (the government’s flagship social welfare program, with over 
7,000 centers nationwide that provide healthcare in poor communities), with an M.A. in Oil 
Economy, an M.D in Psychiatry, and a Ph.D. in Social Sciences, diagnosed a similar problem:   
En la gente está la idea del “buen vivir” antes de saber que viene de los aimara o de los 
quechuas.53 Solo que el buen vivir en el lenguaje oficial -de nuevo, allí creo que el 
comandante supremo en esa parte no lo leyó bien- se convirtió en algo tan simple como 
que con una tarjeta de crédito podían adquirir electrodomésticos, colmar los mercados 
																																																								
52	“Las misiones (missions) were the only new thing that made people feel they were getting  
direct attention. But the true great inclusion was the re-distribution of income, which allowed 
many to join consumption, especially the consumption of certain electric, electronic home goods, 
and the consumption of brand-name fashion and general consumption. This inclusion through the 
market is really the only profound transformation because, judging by the economic apparatus, 
this is state capitalism with the traditional market of single-commodity producing societies.”	
53 “Rooted in the indigenous belief system of the Quechua, “sumak kawsay,” the Quechua word 
for “buen vivir,” or “good living,” connotes a harmonious collective development that conceives 
of the individual within the context of the social and cultural communities and his or her natural 
environment.” It is in the constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia. Adapted from Wikipedia: 
“Sumak Kawsay:” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sumak_Kawsay 
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bicentenarios, más equipos de aire acondicionado, más lavadoras, con lo cual de paso el 
problema eléctrico se hace mayor. Y vivir mejor así es lo contrario del buen vivir.54 
 
While for his part, Luis Ugalde, who has been accused from each extreme of the political 
spectrum in Venezuela of being, respectively, a communist and a CIA agent, had this to say: 
Esta demagogia lleva a despreciar la educación de calidad, el profesionalismo y la 
eficiencia productiva, a nombrar incompetentes, siempre que sean incondicionales 
políticamente. Crea además la ilusión y el deseo de acceder al consumo abundante de 
bienes superiores importados sin pasar por la producción de los mismos o de los 
equivalentes, que se transan en el mercado. Cuesta salir de la ilusión de que en 
Venezuela se puede dar la revolución del consumo sin la revolución de la producción.55 
 
However, there are several features of Chavismo that do not match classical populism’s 
traits. According to the former consultant for the Argentinian Ministry of Social Development, 
Hector E. Schamis, the main defining characteristics of classical urban-industrial populism are: 
“movement, proindustrialization, multiclass, urban, inclusionary, reformist and redistributive, 
corporatist, nationalist, and a charismatic leader.”56 Chávez’s movement, which never was 
“proindustrialization,” “multiclass,” or “corporatist” (and “urban” only inasmuch as 90% of the 
country’s population already lived in its cities), displays just half of classical populism’s traits.57 
Following, we explain why Chavismo has been anything but multiclass and corporatist; and 
																																																								
54	“People have this notion of what ‘good living’ is before realizing that it originates from the 
Aymara or the Quechua. Except that in the official language—and, again, I believe that the 
supreme commander didn't quite ‘get’ that part—it became something as simple as the ability to 
acquire home appliances, stock the Bicentenario supermarkets, get more air conditioners, more 
washing machines, with a credit card, which, in turn, exacerbates the electrical problem. And 
living better this way is the opposite of ‘good living.’ ”	
55	“This demagoguery leads to contempt for quality education, professionalism and productive 
efficiency, to the naming of incompetent individuals as long as they're politically unconditional. 
It also creates the illusion and the desire for access to abundant consumption of superior, 
imported goods foregoing the production of similar or equivalent products traded in the market. 
It is difficult to leave behind the illusion that the revolution of consumption can take place 
without a revolution of production in Venezuela.”	
56 De la Torre and Arnson, Ibid., 151 
57 Editorial, Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/venezuela/urban-population-
wb-data.html 
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Chavismo’s most solid constituency is not in the urban slums but in the smaller cities, towns and 
hamlets in the countryside (populations that during the past eighteen years have progressively 
become consumers of highly subsidized imported goods). And regarding “proindustrialization,” 
after in fact decimating the country’s private industry and laying waste its farm land, its civilian-
military ruling caste has been fabulously enriching itself under the euphemism of an Alianza 
Cívico-Militar Bolivariana that sucks its oil and sacks the country by having also become its de 
facto trading elite.58 Felipe Pérez, for instance, former minister of planning under Chávez’s first 
government, recently denounced the regular theft of 80% of the imported food managed by the 
military.59 Yet, during Chávez’s first presidential campaign, one of his most powerful arguments 
was that it was a disgrace that in Venezuela nearly half of the goods consumed were imported. 
But eighteen years later the country must import nearly every good and over 70% of its food!60  
The Argentinian-Mexican philosopher Enrique Dussel calls today’s “populism:” “El 
‘pseudo-populismo’ de hoy. Epíteto peyorativo como crítica política conservadora sin validez 
epistémica,” and tells us that classic urban-industrial populism emerged in the periphery thanks 
only to the hegemonic center’s “loosening of the grip” during its “world wars” for supremacy:  
Fue un pacto social, en el que una débil burguesía nacional crecía al mismo tiempo que 
la clase obrera y organizaciones de campesinos. Las “Confederaciones Generales” de 
																																																								
58	Refer to the second and third chapters for a more detailed explanation of this.	
59 Federico Parra, “Felipe Pérez: Militares se quedan con 80% de las importaciones de los 
CLAP,” El Interés, January 4, 2017: http://elestimulo.com/elinteres/felipe-perez-militares-se-
quedan-con-80-de-las-importaciones-de-los-clap/ 
See also Anna Pratt, “Venezuela’s military has turned its food crisis into a ‘racket’. And it’s 
profiting from people going hungry,” Public Radio International, PRI, January 6, 2017: 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-01-06/venezuelas-military-has-turned-its-food-crisis-racket-
and-its-profiting-people 
60 Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Venezuela has to Converge FX Rates to Grow, Ramirez Says,” 
Bloomberg News, Jun 15, 2014: https://www.bloomberg.com/authors/ARFe0MFySwc/anatoly-
kurmanaev  
Also, according to the United States Department of Agriculture, Venezuela imports 70% of its 
food. http://www.fas.usda.gov/data/venezuela-prospects-us-agricultural-exports 
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empresarios, obreros y/o campesinos pusieron de manifiesto la irrupción de una nueva 
constelación política, económica, social y cultural que se denominó “populismo”. Esta 
categorización no era negativa, sino intentaba mostrar el hecho de un proyecto político 
hegemónico (en tanto cumplía con los requerimientos de la mayoría de la población, 
incluyendo a la elite industrial) que afirmaba un cierto nacionalismo y protegía, gracias 
a un Estado con relativa autonomía de las clases dominantes, el mercado nacional.61 
 
Other than for the systematic dismantling of Venezuela’s liberal institutions and a more 
socio-electorally conscious redistribution of its oil wealth (which after destroying the national 
industry is now more vital than ever), Chávez and his successors have been dramatic examples of 
anything but of a corporatist “pacto social,” and indeed of classical populism’s opposite traits.62  
In fact, de la Torre and Arnson explain five ways in which these neo-populist democratic 
revolutions constitute a distinct phenomenon in the region. First, the “revolutions” are “carried 
out through [permanent] elections”; second, they are carried out in the name of a “substantive” 
and “redemptive” democracy; third, they seek to “refound” the nation, “creating expanded 
																																																								
61 “It was a social pact, in which a weak national bourgeoisie grew, at the same time as the 
working class and peasant organizations. The “General Confederacies” of entrepreneurs, 
workers, and/or peasants brought to light the irruption of a new political, economic, social, and 
cultural constellation that was denominated “populism.” This categorization wasn't negative, but 
rather attempted to present the fact of a hegemonic political project (at the same time as it met 
the requirements of the majority of the population, including the industrial elite) that would 
affirm a certain nationalism and protect, thanks to a State with relative autonomy from the 
dominant classes, the national market.” Enrique Dussel, “Cinco tesis sobre el ‘populismo’ ” 
(México, UAM-Iztapalapa, 2007)	
62 For a more detailed explanation, read the last section of this text’s second chapter, “Death by 
Politics: On the Dismantling of the Country’s Institutions and Its Consequences,” from page 50. 
For a meticulous analysis of this subject, refer to the noted Venezuelan legal scholar Allan 
Brewer-Carías, Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: the Chávez Authoritarian Experiment 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For a brief elucidation of the destruction of the 
country’s agriculture, read Grace Livingston’s eclectic, “Venezuela’s Farmers: Planting for the 
Revolution,” BBC News, February 25 2016: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-
35642365 ; and for a more detailed narrative of the systematic destruction of Venezuela’s 
industry in general, see, among others, Enrique Krauze, “Hell of a Fiesta,” The New York Books 




mechanisms of direct and semi-direct citizen participation and elaborately enshrining the role of 
the state in providing for social welfare;” fourth, they rely on state intervention of the economy 
in the name of distributing wealth and reducing poverty and inequality; and, lastly: “They view 
their governments as part of a continental or even worldwide movement aimed at the realignment 
of international politics.”63 As to all these traits, more than merely representative, Chavismo was 
pioneering in the continent. Margarita López Maya, former editor of the Venezuelan Magazine 
of Economics and Social Sciences of the Universidad Central de Venezuela, visiting professor, 
among others, at the universities of Oxford, Columbia, and Notre Dame, and member of both the 
Academies of Social and Political Sciences and of History, elaborated this during our interview: 
Chávez fue el primero que puso la agenda de los pobres sobre la mesa en lugar principal 
y dijo: si no hacemos igualdad, aquí no hay democracia y no hay nada. Cuando él lo dijo 
en los años 98 y 99 eso era absolutamente contracorriente en América Latina y ahora es 
absolutamente de consenso, de derecha y de izquierda, Santos repartiendo tierras en 
Colombia, Lula y Roussef pasando los pobres a ser clase media en Brasil, Chávez con su 
discurso súper radical y todos de alguna manera […]  Él hizo el esfuerzo para que, 
además, se diese un diálogo entre estos países que no se hablaban. Hoy la relación que 
hay entre los gobiernos es muy diferente a la que había antes, incluso porque hay una 
camada de dirigentes que se han mantenido mucho rato en el poder. Se abrieron vasos 
comunicantes en esas naciones que pueden ir a otra cosa y el tema de la inclusión se 
volvió un tema importante de México para abajo. Cómo va a incidir eso en el planeta no 
lo sé porque venimos de un boom de materias primas en toda América Latina y eso está 
llegando a su fin. Claro, es más grave para Venezuela porque su materia prima es el 
petróleo. Cuando venga el tiempo de las vacas flacas no sé si esto va a retroceder…64 
																																																								
63 de la Torre and Arnson, Ibid., 9-13 
64	“Chávez was the first to put the agenda of the poor on the table, in the main place and said: ‘if 
we don’t build equality, there's no democracy and there’s nothing here.’ When he said it, in 1998 
and 1999, that was absolutely counter-current in Latin America and now it’s the absolute 
consensus, of left and right: Santos distributing land in Colombia, Lula and Roussef bringing the 
poor into the middle class in Brazil, Chávez, with his super-radical discourse and all somehow 
[…] He made the effort so that, also, a dialogue would ensue between those countries that didn't 
talk to one another. Today, the relationship that exists among governments is quite different from 
the one that existed before, even because there is a cohort of leaders who have stayed in power 
for a very long time. Communicating vessels opened up in these nations that could lead to 
something else, and the topic of inclusion became an important one from Mexico and to the 
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In his “Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions,” Schamis echoes the last point:  
Chávez’s rule represents an oil-funded, twenty-first century version of patrimonial 
domination. Along with the nebulous socialist goals come clearly undemocratic methods. 
The question is whether, with a shift in the price cycle, his “Bolivarian Revolution” will 
collapse just as the Punto Fijo arrangement did in the late 1980s and, if that happens, how 
much farther from stable and democratic party politics in Venezuela will then be.65 
 
We can only understand the paradox of calling “neo-populist” projects that have little in 
common among them, other than media-enhanced messianic leaders that present themselves as 
outsiders, if we analyze the forms in which these leaders appear as being superior to the political 
class but are still subordinated to capital and corporate interests.66 This is important, for “neo-
populism” stretches from various rights (Uribe, Fujimori, Menem), through the tepid and more 
liberal lefts (the Kirchners, Lula, Mujica), to those who have moved on a misleading axis all 
their own, such as Correa and Chávez. Thus, if Chávez was essentially “the most extraordinary 
political televangelist born in Latin America,” as Krauze puts it (as I did, too, after watching my 
first “Aló Presidente”), it is time for us to take a detour into the mass media and psychological 
dimensions of his neo-populism. Speaking of audience democracy, the Mexican political theorist 
Benjamin Arditi elaborates in his “Populism as an Internal Periphery of Democratic Politics:”  
Media experts replace party bureaucrats and activists (and transform) politics into a 
spectacle run by media and marketing professionals […] There is a personalization of the 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
South. How will that impact the planet, I don't know, because we’re coming from a raw materials 
boom in all of Latin America and that is reaching an end. Of course, it’s direr for Venezuela 
because its commodity is oil. When lean times come I don't know if this will go backwards...”	
65 Hector E. Schamis, “Populisn, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions,” Journal of 
Democracy, 27, no. 4 (October 2006): 31	
66 See the last chapter for a more detailed description of this, and in more than one sense. 
To quote Schamis again on what is still a not so well-known fact, even after Chinese companies 
started participating with their own large share in the Venezuelan oil industry: “most of 
Venezuela’s offshore exploration remains contracted out to U.S. firms and all the country’s oil 
continues to be refined in Louisiana.” Ibid. The latest negotiations for Citgo are with Russia.	
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link between candidates and voters […] characterized by the “as if” of virtual immediacy. 
Audience democracy intertwines with populist representation as a crossover between 
acting for others, authorization, and the strong role of symbolic imagery.67 
 
However, Chávez did not need any media or marketing professionals, López explains, 
“either because there was no clear or coherent government communication strategy or because 
Chávez decided it should be that way, Chávez himself became the center of [the strategy of] 
nationwide government broadcasts and the ‘Aló Presidente’ program.”68 Guy Debord tells us in 
his introductory thesis that “in societies where modern conditions of production prevail […] 
everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation;” Arditi echoes this: 
“representation means bringing into presence through a substitute, ‘the making present of 
something that is nevertheless absent’ […] acting for others.”69 In the next section we explain 
how Hugo Chávez—El Líder Supremo, El Comandante Eterno, and empty signifier par 
excellence—by indefatigably reenacting the battle of good vs. evil in a panoply of Latin 
American myths, powerfully articulated a whole worldview rather than just “a diversity of 
unsatisfied democratic demands.” For after the initial push to gain the presidency, Chávez did 
not need to “articulate” much in the democratic sense: his neo-populism purged its multiple and 
many times conflicting origins, and the poorest segments of the population that comprised the 
vast majority of the country were solidly behind him (and after eighteen years of Chavismo, they 
remain poor).70 Rather, after copiously showing the obscene class divide of the richest country in 
Latin America, Chávez radicalized his message by “naming” the split as one between Chavistas 
and oligarchic right wingers. He did not need to “articulate” the old liberal institutions either, for 
																																																								
67 Quoted in Panizza, Ibid., 84-6 
68 de la Torre and Arnson, Ibid., 253-53 
69 Debord, Ibid., 1st. thesis, and Panizza, Ibid., 80-81 
70 Poverty in Venezuela as compared with pre-Chávez years is covered in the third chapter. 
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he either dismantled or replaced them, but could only coopt part of the workers movement and 
his intents to win the student movement and sectors of the middle class ended up in failure.71 
 According to another of my interviewees, the former National Coordinator of the UNT 
Unión Nacional de los Trabajadores, or “ÚNETE” (the largest trade-union confederation in the 
country) and editor of the former pro-government journal Marea Socialista, Stalin Pérez Borges: 
Yo pertenezco al partido (PSUV), a una corriente, como dirigente sindical. Ahorita soy 
del Consejo Consultivo de la nueva Central de Trabajadores. Yo me desprendí de Chávez 
y en privado me he burlado del socialismo tropical, socialismo bucal, pero no creo que 
haya socialismo. El capitalismo está muy arraigado en Venezuela, pero hay un proceso 
revolucionario en marcha. Ha habido cambios importantes dentro de la sociedad. De 
hecho, el gobierno ha hecho conquistas sociales y democráticas, las primeras mediante 
una redistribución distinta de la renta petrolera, que no es cualquier renta, para 
desarrollar inversiones sociales  […] Con Chávez vivo, y fue un error de Chávez, todo se 
fue corporativizando, institucionalizando. A todos los movimientos les quitaron su 
independencia […] Al sector campesino también. En el movimiento sindical no tan así, 
aunque tiene un sector que sí. Con la UNT lo quisieron hacer pero nunca lo lograron. 
Nunca perdió su independencia. Muchos compañeros y yo logramos que se mantuviera.72 
 
But Chávez would have replied: “Exijo lealtad absoluta a mi liderazgo porque yo no soy 
yo […] yo soy un pueblo, ¡carajo!”73 How this came to happen is the subject of our next section. 
																																																								
71 The dismantling of the country’s institutions is addressed in detail in the second chapter.  
72	“I belong to the party (PSUV - United Socialist Party of Venezuela), to a current, as a union 
leader. Right now I belong to the Council of the new Workers' Central. Y seceded from Chávez 
and have mocked tropical socialism, speech socialism, in private, but I don't believe that there's 
socialism. Capitalism is very deeply rooted in Venezuela, but there is a revolutionary process 
underway. There have been important changes within society. In fact, the government has 
achieved social and democratic conquests, the former through a different re-distribution of oil 
rents, which aren't just any rent, in order to develop social investments […] In the beginning of 
Chávez some initiatives of social movements were developed. With Chávez alive, and this was a 
mistake of Chávez, everything was slowly corporatized, institutionalized. All the movements 
were stripped of their independence […] The farming sector too. In the unions, not so much, 
even though there is a sector where it was so. With the UNT they tried to do it, but were never 
able. It never lost its independence. Many comrades and I managed to keep it that way.”	
73 “I demand absolute loyalty to my leadership because I am not me […] I am a people, damn it! 
Hugo Chávez, Video “No soy un individuo, yo soy un pueblo, ¡carajo!” Youtube Video, 1:15, 
Globovisión – RCTV, February 10, 2010: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=swBsxRWAmbk 
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II. On Hugo Chávez’s Baroque Televised Revolution  
But for the present age, which prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the 
original, representation to reality, appearance to essence . . . truth is considered                   
profane, and only illusion is sacred. Sacredness is in fact held to be enhanced                                
in proportion as truth decreases and illusion increases, so that the highest                                  
degree of illusion comes to be the highest degree of sacredness.                                                                                                                  
Ludwig Feuerbach  
To the eyes of any liberal democrat or petit bourgeois, the “Aló Presidente” programs seemed 
like an abhorrent compendium of Mikhail Backhtin’s “four categories” of the Carnivalesque. 74 It 
is no wonder that in the long-forgotten first years of his mandate—as right before them—one of 
Chávez’s epithets among “la gente bien” was “that ignorant clown.” And, indeed, in his “Aló 
Presidente” Chávez used, abused, and supremely excelled at becoming an embodiment of “the 
familiar and free interaction between people” with his “eccentric behavior,” his “carnivalesque 
misalliances,” and “the sacrilegious” tirades with which he treated topics from George W. Bush 
to nearly everything under the sun. Chávez artfully weaved his programs with myriad allusions, 
quotations, and parodies in a multifarious pastiche that transcended the intertextual to become 
true appearance of a promised land where an upside-down people had finally seized power. 
																																																								
74 Mikhail Bakhtin’s four categories of what he calls the “carnivalistic sense of the world” are: 1. 
Free and familiar interaction between people: normally separated people can interact and freely 
express themselves. 2. Eccentric behavior: behavior that is otherwise unacceptable is legitimate 
in carnival, and human nature's hidden sides are revealed. 3. Carnivalistic misalliances: the free 
and familiar attitude of the carnival enables everything which is normally separated to connect – 
the sacred with the profane, the new and old, the high and low etc. 4. The Sacrilegious: the 
carnival is a site of ungodliness, of blasphemy, profanity and parodies on things that are sacred. 
These categories are not abstract notions of freedom and equality, but rather a lived experience 
of the world manifested in sensual forms of ritualistic acts that are played out as if they were a 
part of life itself. See “Mikhail Bakhtin "Carnival and Carnivalesque,” Cultural Reader: Articles, 




It is unlikely that Chávez ever read—at least back then—anything by Backhtin, Debord, 
or Julia Kristeva. But what makes him both fascinating for many and abhorred by just as many is 
that he intuitively tapped from the same springs that have nurtured some of our most lucid and 
iconoclastic critics of modernity and the enlightenment. Yet, if for Backhtin the carnivalesque 
refers to a literary mode where “social hierarchies of everyday life—their solemnities and pieties 
and etiquettes, as well as all ready-made truths—are profaned and overturned by normally 
suppressed voices and energies,” the carnival itself is circumscribed to a very limited time of the 
year, and thus has more significance as a cathartic release of energies where the profane meets 
the sacred. Backhtin never considered the carnivalesque as a revolutionary force. But associated 
with the carnivalesque is the Baroque, of which in fact it is one of the main traits. Dr. Esperança 
Camara, St. Francis University’s specialist in the Italian Renaissance and Baroque Art, says:  
In the context of European history, the period from c. 1585 to c. 1700/1730 is often called 
the Baroque era. The word baroque derives from the Portuguese and Spanish words for a 
large, irregularly-shaped pearl—barroco and barrueco, respectively. Eighteenth-century 
critics were the first to apply the term to the art of the 17th century. It was not a term of 
praise. To the eyes of these critics, who favored the restraint and order of Neoclassicism, 
the works of Bernini, Borromini, and Pietro da Cortona appeared bizarre, absurd, even 
diseased—in other words, misshapen, like an imperfect pearl […] While the Protestants 
harshly criticized the cult of images, the Catholic Church ardently embraced the religious 
power of art. The visual arts, the Church argued, played a key role in guiding the faithful. 
They were certainly as important as the written and spoken word, and perhaps even more 
important since they were accessible to the learned and the unlearned alike. In order to be 
effective in its pastoral role, religious art had to be clear, persuasive, and powerful. Not 
only did it have to instruct, it had to inspire. It had to move the faithful […] Caravaggio 
turned to a powerful and dramatic realism, accentuated by bold contrasts of light and 
dark, and tightly-cropped compositions that enhanced the physical and emotional 
immediacy of the depicted narrative. Other artists […] turned to daring feats of 
illusionism that blurred not only the boundaries between painting, sculpture, and 
architecture, but also those between the real and depicted worlds. In so doing, the divine 
was made physically present and palpable. Whether through shocking realism, dynamic 
movement, or exuberant ornamentation, 17th-century art was meant to impress. It 
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aimed to convince the viewer of the truth of its message by impacting the senses, 
awakening the emotions, and activating—even sharing—the viewer’s space.75  
Indeed, the Baroque’s subverting force has been amply studied, particularly in the Latin 
American arts. Following, we will explore Chávez’s baroqueness to grasp the uniqueness and 
impact of his “Aló Presidente” program. It is only poetic justice to thus interpret the mass media 
power of a figure whose critics kept lambasting for making of Venezuela a “magical-realism.”  
What follows is a collage of journalistic texts in English taken from the web, all devoted 
to Chávez’s “Aló Presidente.” In The New York Times, the journalist Rachel Nolan tells us: 
Chávez sits at a desk in a field before a collection of rural supporters, while cows swish 
their tails behind him. “You are an ignorant man,” he says, looking straight into the 
camera, addressing President George W. Bush, whom for the purposes of the show he has 
nicknamed Mr. Danger after a villain in a popular Venezuelan novel. It is the height of 
the Iraq war. “You are a donkey, Mr. Danger,” Chávez says, then goes on to call him a 
coward, assassin and genocidist. “It’s very easy to command an army from far away,” he 
says. “If one day you ever get the crazy idea of invading Venezuela, I’ll be waiting for 
you on this savanna.” His eyes blaze. The crowd cheers. “Come on here, Mr. Danger!” 76 
In The Radical Philosophy Journal of the Independent Left, Martin Marinos says: 
Chavez’s television show, Aló Presidente, is also mainly treated as a joke. The 
programme began in 1999 and was broadcast every Sunday from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m., 
although its ending was never firmly fixed. […] It is true that some of the conversations 
with audience members, as well as the frequent dancing and singing demonstrations by 
Chavez, created a comical and amusing presidential image. For this reason, the 
description of Chavez as a ‘clown’ and a ‘buffoon’ was very common in mainstream 
media discourses. But one should not forget that the success of a populist discourse 
depends on its capacity to connect with the broader masses and not with the refined 
university, middle and upper classes in Venezuela and the West. 77 
																																																								
75 Esperança Camara, “Baroque Art in Europe, an Introduction,” quoted in Khan Academy: 
https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/monarchy-enlightenment/baroque-art1/beginners-
guide-baroque1/a/baroque-art-in-europe-an-introduction 
76 Rachel Nolan, “The Realest Reality Show in the World” The New York Times, May 4, 2012: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/magazine/hugo-chavezs-totally-bizarre-talk-
show.html?mcubz=0 




For its part, the ubiquitous and ever more reliable Wikipedia describes in English: 
 
Chávez addressing topics of the day and touring locations where government social 
welfare programs were active. The first broadcast was made on May 23, 1999 […] 
Government ministers were required to attend the program. They may be questioned by 
the president about anything […] even military policy is made on the show. During the 
March 2, 2008 airing, Chávez ordered a top general to send ten battalions of troops to the 
border with Colombia in response to a bombing by Colombian forces inside Ecuador that 
killed Raúl Reyes, a top member of FARC (the battalions were not deployed).78 
 
From another U.S. major newspaper, in The Washington Post, Juan Forero explains: 
 
It's true that the program usually goes on and on—the record is eight hours straight—but 
some say "Aló Presidente" is anything but tedious. In fact, no matter which way they lean 
politically, many Venezuelans watch "Aló Presidente" to learn what new social program 
officials have hatched or which companies the state plans to seize. Chávez's foes monitor 
it to see which one of them is in the government's sights […] Without a teleprompter, 
Chávez gabs about whatever catches his fancy, all in the argot of the working class, 
which supports him. Sipping one cup after another of strong Venezuelan coffee, Chávez 
often breaks into song (he favors folkloric ballads from his native plains region), scolds 
his ministers and discusses the love of his life—his job. He once spoke at length about a 
bout of diarrhea […] "Never has a revolutionary idea made use of a medium of 
communication with such efficiency," former Cuban President Fidel Castro wrote… 79 
 
 
Quoting Michel Foucault in his Postslavery Literatures in the Americas, George B. Handley tells 
us: “Political power is characterized by its ability to divide truth in two parts repeatedly […] and 
conceal those parts from each other. Thus a coherent whole becomes fragmented and incoherent, 
unintelligible in any of its individual parts.”80 Or, as the political scientist Susan Buck-Morss 
explains in her Hegel and Haiti: “Disciplinary boundaries allow counterevidence to belong to 
someone else’s story.” 81 Anglo America’s emphasis on the “sciences” (related to the Latin 
																																																								
78 “Aló Presidente,” Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al%C3%B3_Presidente 
79 Juan Forero, “‘Aló Presidente,’ Are You Still Talking?” The Washington Post, May 30 2009: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/29/AR2009052903379.html 
80 George B. Handley, “Postslavery Literatures in the Americas: Family Portraits in Black and 
White,” in New World Studies, A. James Arnold, ed. (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 2000), 33 
81 Ibid., 822. 
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scindere, “to cut, to divide;” and the Greek skhizein [root of “schizophrenia”] “to cut, to split”) 
as opposed to the “arts” (from the Latin artus, “to join” and the Greek artios, “complete”) is at 
the root of our incapacity to understand what Chávez has meant to the Latin American continent. 
Through his multifarious and ubiquitous “Aló Presidente,” Chávez was able to re-connect (to 
articulate, truly) “through everyday expressions, tropes, themes, and images” (Kazin) for many 
Venezuelans as well as in the continent how “the presence and consequences of global capitalism 
and the imperial power rhizomatically spread through various forms of cultural, economic, and 
racial domination.”82 He purportedly empowered the people to “grasp their reality and act.” 83 
How Chávez shattered those boundaries, thus lifting the veil for his viewers through his 
“Aló Presidente” program and larger-than-life persona—in the process mocking to oblivion the 
Western understanding of liberal politics as inherently self-serving, elitist, and corrupt—can be 
better grasped when we explore the meaning of his style through the concept of the Baroque. 
Paraphrasing Paul Gilroy’s The Black Atlantic, Modernity and Double Consciousness, Chávez 
re-created “not a succession of tropes and genres, but a philosophical discourse to hold on to the 
unity of ethics and politics sundered from each other by modernity’s insistence that the true, the 
good, and the beautiful had distinct origins and belong to different domains of knowledge.84 
 
In her work Barroco y América Latina, un itinerario inconcluso, the former Venezuelan 
coordinator of the Universidad Simón Bolívar’s Literature Graduate Program, Carmen Bustillo, 
notes as one of the fundamental aspects of the Baroque its opposition to “master narratives:” 
																																																								
82	Panizza, Ibid., 8	
83 Unrelated phrase from Michael T. Martin and David C. Wall, “The Politics of Cine-Memory: 
Signifying Slavery in the History Film,” in A Companion to the Historical Film, Robert A. 
Rosenstone and Constantin Parvulesu, eds. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 448, 451;  
84 Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge: Harvard 
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La escritura “clásica” trata de equilibrar lo central y lo lateral, dando a cada uno su 
peso correspondiente, y manteniendo la importancia semántica también a partir del 
centro. En cambio la escritura barroca presentará una alteración de ese equilibrio, 
reforzando la lateralidad en detrimento del núcleo o explotando una sola rama lateral 
que destruye el centro de gravedad: construcción en fuga que se vale de un efecto de 
derivación de sentido […] En el fondo del barroco está la destrucción del equilibrio 
entre alma y cuerpo, espíritu y materia, como anota (Arnold) Hauser, para quien “(su) 
esencia consiste en esta unión de oposiciones aparentemente inconciliables: 
racionalismo e irracionalismo, intelectualismo y anti-intelectualismo, ilustración y 
misticismo, anhelo de Dios y sensualismo”.85 
 
Viewing the Baroque as a style that “dissolves” master narratives acquires new meaning 
in the context of dependency theory’s “center” and “periphery.” Bustillo’s lines also remind us 
of one of the Argentinian philosopher Rodolfo Kusch’s main tenets to understand the continent: 
Either América is the hole where a humanity limited to homo faber is to be buried, or 
homo faber covers only one aspect of the totality of man. In the later case, it is possible 
that the blockage is due to the fact that in América residual aspects of man accumulate, 
those aspects that were not predicted by Western thinking [...] Could the blockage be due 
to a dialectical moment pointing to the rescue of the missing part of the mutilated 
conception of modern man? Not to accept this would be to suppress the […] Américan 
pueblo so that a small executive bourgeoisie may fulfill its programs of development.86 
 
Indeed, Kusch adds that these programs presuppose all different aspects of the thinking 
“of a bourgeoisie in crisis, in which I gladly include the most utopian revolutionaries as well as 
the most enterprising of progressives. The one and the other are segregated—and history shows 
																																																								
85 “‘Classical’ writing tries to balance what is central with what is lateral, giving each its 
corresponding weight and maintaining also the semantic importance outward from the middle. 
Instead, baroque writing will present an alteration of this equilibrium, reinforcing laterality in 
detriment of the nucleus or exploiting only one lateral branch, destroying the center of gravity: a 
construction en fugue that relies on an effect of derivational meanings […] At the bottom of the 
baroque lies the destruction of equilibrium between body and soul, between spirit and matter, as 
noted by (Arnold) Hauser, for whom ‘(its) essence consists of this union of apparently 
irreconcilable oppositions: rationalism and irrationalism, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, 
illustration and mysticism, yearning for God and sensuality.’ Carmen Bustillo, Barroco y 
América Latina. Un intinerario inconcluso (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1990), 144	
86 Rodolfo Kusch, Indigenous and Popular Thinking in América (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2010), 155. (América also in its translation to English, a choice of the translators to refer 
to the Latin American continent). 
	 35	
this—from and by something that breathes within the continent itself. 87 To be sure, the hybrid, 
baroque, mythological Chávez embodied this “something” for his people. As Rancière put it, he 
modified “the very aesthetico-political field of possibility by supplementing the sensible with 
those who had no part in the perceptual coordinates of the community.” Born in the legendary 
Llanos that has inspired some of the greatest Venezuelan literature (on the topic of civilization 
and barbarism!), in one of the remotest corners of the country and as far from the modernizing 
process as from the racial Venezuelan-European mixtures of the twentieth century, Los Llanos 
would mark him with its myths and legends as “a heroic character from the plains, indomitable 
but also undisciplined an irreverent, whose origin goes back to the independence period.”88  
 
Born from a preceding split, thus longing for totality, it is no wonder that, of all the European 
countries, the Baroque fully flourished only in Spain—and Portugal—and achieved its splendor 
in Latin America (and again in Spain through a reverse movement). But, in Spain, it appeared as 
a response to Renaissance humanism in the South and to the Reformation and Enlightenment of 
the north in a country with a long history of hybridity and in the grip of a medieval worldview. In 
Latin America, the Baroque responded also to the very split that the Catholic Church imposed on 
the colonized and later to the rupture that the Independence wars (with ideals imported from 
France and the United States) caused after centuries of Spanish colonization. Still today, it lives 
in the schism that capitalism has forced upon a continent where the seamless presence of the 
worlds of the flesh and the spirit are active in myriad autochthonous and syncretic practices.89 
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89 Álvaro de Prat, “Syncretic, Indigenous, and Otherwise Embodied: On the Healing Return of 
the Repressed into a Dissociate World,” in Apuntes, Theological Reflections from a Hispanic-
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It should not surprise us that Chávez’s first “articulating portent” after his failed coup 
d’état, in February of 1992, was that the most popular carnival costume in March of that year 
was the “chavecitos:” myriads of kids across all social classes dressed in military uniform, like 
Chávez had appeared on TV during his first, now famous “Por ahora” allocution; or that, right 
after he was elected president, the discreet practice of Santería became a fashionable vogue.90 
Referring to how the Baroque erases these cultural separations, in his book, Sor Juana, 
or, the Traps of Faith, Octavio Paz tells us: “I must add that each of these societies is separated 
from the other by a negation […] Each negation contains within it the negated society—usually 
as a masked, a veiled, presence.”91 And the palimpsest and the polyphonic are all fundamental 
traits in Chávez’s “Aló Presidente.”92 The Cuban author Severo Sarduy explains the Baroque as: 
Espacio del dialoguismo, de la polifonía, de la carnavalización, de la parodia y la  
intertextualidad, lo barroco presentaría, pues, como una red de conexiones, de sucesivas  
filigranas, cuya expresión gráfica no sería lineal, bidimensional, plana, sino en volumen,  
espacial, y dinámica. En la carnavalización del barroco se inserta la mezcla de géneros, 
la intrusión de un tipo de discurso en otro --carta en un relato, diálogo en esas cartas--.93 
 
With his emphasis on the polyphonic and on “reflective appearance” rather than on the 
veracity of representation, “the realm of politics is no longer a fixed and immutable form of 
																																																								
90 Cristina Marcano y Alberto Barrera-Tyszka, Hugo Chávez sin uniforme. Una historia personal 
(Caracas: Ramdom House Mondadori, 2004), 266 
Associated Press, “Venezuelans increasingly turn to Santeria,” NBC News, February 8, 2008: 
(see second section): http://www.nbcnews.com/id/23057224/ns/world_news-
venezuela/t/venezuelans-increasingly-turn-santeria/ 
91 Octavio Paz, Sor Juana, Or, The Traps of Faith (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1988),13 
92	A palimpsest is “a manuscript or piece of writing material on which the original writing has 
been effaced to make room for later writing but of which traces remain.” Google Dictionary. 
93 “Space of the dialogic, of polyphony, of carnivalization, of parody, and of inter-textuality, the 
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Inserted in the carnivalization of the baroque is a mix of genres, the intrusion of one discourse 
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neobarroco”, en Obra completa, Edición crítica. Gustavo Guerrero y François Wahl, 
coordinadores (Madrid: ALLCA XX, 1999, t. II) 1395-1396.	
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authority and power, but subject to revisions based on its appearance to the mind of the once 
powerless spectator.” And Chávez showed his spectators how they were players of this play.94 
Héctor Soto, Minister of Culture until 2011, and founder of Misión Cultura and a Vice 
Minister of the Secretary of the Presidency during Chávez’s second term, put it to me this way: 
Chávez mató, liquidó, eliminó, exterminó, en poco tiempo, en dos años de ejercicio, a los 
pendejos, a los idiotas. En un pueblo en donde la política era algo solo de unos cuantos, 
de un 10%, de una gente que dirigía pase lo que pase, hemos pasado a una situación en 
la cual todo el mundo en Venezuela sabe para qué trabaja, para quién trabaja, para qué 
intereses. Ese es un logro de Chávez y quisiera recordarlo por ahí.95 
 
But Chávez, too, was split between his autochthonous and his militaristic self, between 
his honestly hybrid “embodiment of the people” and his totalitarian notions of authority. If he 
articulated anything outside a mythical heroic worldview of common resistance for the peoples 
of the “Third World,” it was his own dichotomous self in the eyes of his followers, an art that his 
successors are sorely lacking. And if his totalitarian tendencies prevailed after 2006, he was still 
capable through his mass media appeal to symbolically convey an empowering of the people, 
and thanks to the immensely deep pockets of the most abundant times in Venezuelan history, 
enough money to “the people” to think that this state of affairs, Chávez’s show, could go on.96 
But as Goya put it when naming perhaps the best-known print of his masterful series, Los 
caprichos: “the sleep of reason produces monsters.” Gone after Chávez’s death is his telegenic 
																																																								
94 Paraphrased from Joslin, Ibid. 
95 “In a short time, in two years of exercise, Chávez killed, liquidated, eliminated, exterminated 
the morons, the idiots. From a people for whom politics was a matter for just the few, for a 10%, 
for a group that would lead no matter what, we have reached a situation in which everybody in 
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“Populism, Rentierism, and Socialism in Twenty-First-Century Venezuela:” “The opposition’s 
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magic, and for the foreseeable future the huge oil revenues that he commanded. His successors 
have been increasingly resorting to violence to stay in power (see my concluding postscript for 
an account). Paraphrasing Arturo Sosa, the Venezuelan Superior General of the Society of Jesus, 
populist or not, the “media savvy, statist, presidentialist, autocratic and rentierist military-civilian 
system of dominion that during its first years was legitimized by a tyranny of the majority built 
on a doubtful redistribution of oil wealth with electoral purposes” is living its darkest hours.97 
 For even if the charismatic “hero-figure who would create with one blow the just society” 
somehow came to exist in Venezuela, paraphrasing Erickson, after his fiesta was over we are 
witnessing how he did so mostly symbolically and just for a limited time, like in a carnival. As in 
a carnivalesque frenzy the “savior who worked such wonders” rather went on and destroyed “the 
very institutions that were to ensure his just society.” That is the underlying subject of our next 
chapter, but if two decades of Chavismo have been nothing but a flash in the crawling time of 
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Death by Politics: On the Dismantling of the Country’s Institutions and Its Consequences 
The most potentially destructive forces today are hidden under the banner of “goodness”. 
Whether this is done hypocritically or because the rulers believe in such professions of 
“goodness” is immaterial; the latter is even worse. The terms under which such               
“goodness” is projected to the heathens—“the American exceptionalism”,                                
“the Third Rome”, “Hindutva”, “the new (old) Caliphate”— are                                                
nothing but a self-license to impose own [sic] values and  
beliefs on those who dare disagree with them. Such  
rulers are the most bloodthirsty because belief  
in own [sic]moral superiority renders  
them unconcerned with reality. 
Branko Milanovic 98 
 
 
If in the previous chapter we dealt with the “magic” of Chavismo’s “magical realism,” in this one 
we will consider its realities. For both sections I owe different debts of gratitude to one of my 
interviewees, Rafael Uzcátegui, and to his book, Venezuela: Revolution as Spectacle, published 
in 2010. 99 Uzcátegui used whenever possible the government’s official figures to turn Chavismo 
on its head. This section will present in numbers some of those realities. Although it will not be 
an exhaustive exploration of the subjects’ histories, it will contrast the figures that reflect those 
realities with what the official discourse calls its “great achievements” as they compare with their 
pre-Chavismo’s trajectories and countries that Chavistas love, and love to hate. Most Venezuelan 
institutions have stopped providing official statistics, some of them since 2005. In every case, I 
have matched either the official or most credible statistics against those of other countries.100  
																																																								
98 Branko Milanovic, “Machiavelli as an economist,” Globalinequality (blog) February 28, 2017: 
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99 Rafael Uzcátegui, Venezuela, Revolution as Spectacle (Tucson: Sharp Press, 2010) 
100 For instance, the Venezuelan government stopped publishing crime data in 2005, shortly after 
homicide rates took a sharp turn up. See Alice Speri, “Why More People is Murdered in Caracas 
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are-murdered-in-caracas-than-in-baghdad 
The same situation has affected Venezuela’s national Central Bank and other official institutions. 
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To say that Venezuela has gone “off-the-charts” in every calamitous manner possible 
would be an understatement. But neither such clichés nor any readily available adjective could 
do justice to the country’s deterioration, manifest in the dismal levels of its economy, of its 
governance and infrastructure, its public and private health, of the salaries, the media, even of its 
oil production together with record highs of crime, impunity, scarcity, poverty, lawlessness, 
emigration, hyperinflation, corruption, political prisoners, repression, and an external debt 
impossible to pay due to rock-bottom oil prices when the country imports almost everything! 101 
Américo Martín, the former presidential candidate and noted guerrilla combatant founder 
of the leftist MIR party, a lawyer, prolific writer, and editorial journalist, put it to me this way: 
Aquí se habla de revolución, pero cómo va llamarse así si lo que ha hecho es aniquilar 
las fuerzas productivas. Hasta etimológicamente es un contrasentido. Revolución es 
avanzar con doble rapidez […] Nadie entiende cómo teniendo un financiamiento tan 
monstruosamente alto de dólares y divisas para una población pequeña, de veinte y pico 
millones de habitantes, la agricultura se haya reducido a la cuarta parte de lo que era, se 
han aniquilado la mitad de las empresas industriales que había, todas las industrias del 
Estado se cayeron, estamos importando gasolina. He llegado a la conclusión de que los 
que realmente entiendan que esto es una farsa, profundamente, son los que vienen del 
socialismo -marxistas, socialistas- porque nosotros fuimos formados en varias ideas 
simples pero exactas. Marx decía que el socialismo implicaba un desarrollo descomunal 
de las fuerzas productivas. Precisamente ¿de qué surgía el socialismo? Lo dice en el 
prefacio de La crítica de la economía política. Dice que hay un momento en el que las 
fuerzas productivas se han desarrollado mucho pero que las relaciones de producción 
privadas asfixian ese crecimiento. Entonces, cuando las fuerzas productivas revientan 
esas relaciones de propiedad privada es cuando viene la revolución. Es decir, lo que 
viene es un desarrollo libre de las fuerzas productivas a tal grado que se producirá una 
súper abundancia de bienes materiales y espirituales y llegaremos al comunismo, porque 
el comunismo se basa en el principio de que a cada cual según su necesidad y de cada 
cual según su capacidad, es decir que aunque tú tengas menos méritos que otros pero 
tengas más necesidades te dan más. Ese es el comunismo basado en una solidaridad 
absoluta, pero para que eso sea así se requiere que haya una súper abundancia tal de 
bienes materiales y espirituales que cada quien reciba de acuerdo con sus necesidades. 
																																																								
101 Rather than offering an avalanche of footnotes here to illustrate each of these claims, in this 
chapter and the next I document many of these realities and provide a context to most of them.  
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Esa es la ilusión del marxismo y del comunismo. Y Marx decía que eso iba a ocurrir al 
desaparecer la propiedad privada sobre los medios de producción, porque entonces los 
trabajadores van a desarrollar libremente, sin la interferencia de las relaciones de 
propiedad privada y el derecho privado, la capacidad productiva. Es entonces cuando 
dice: de allí daremos el salto del reino de la necesidad al reino de la libertad. Partamos 
de este hecho: socialismo equivale a desarrollar las fuerzas productivas, porque un 
socialismo que las empobrezca sería un retroceso en nombre de la caridad social.102  
 
With a total urban population of 88.9%, it makes sense to follow Venezuela’s people into their 
cities, and, specifically, to Caracas, to grasp the magnitude of the country’s crisis in a few brief 
pages.103 Caracas is the country’s capital city, as well as the largest in a country with a hyper-
centralized government, with by far the most resources, slums, and better statistics. To guarantee 
																																																								
102 “There is talk here about revolution, but how can it be called so if what has been done is to 
annihilate the productive forces? Even etymologically, it's non-sense. Revolution is to advance at 
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dollars and foreign currency for a small population of twenty some million people, agriculture 
has been reduced to a fourth of what it was, half of the industrial companies that existed have 
been annihilated, all of the government's industrial enterprises have fallen through, we are 
importing gasoline. I have reached the conclusion that those who really understand that this is a 
farce, deeply, are those who come from socialism – Marxists, socialists – because we were 
educated on several simple but exact ideas. Marx used to say that socialism implied colossal 
development of the productive forces. Precisely, where did socialism stem from? He states that 
in the preface of his Critique of Political Economy. He states that there is a moment when the 
productive forces are quite developed but private production relationships asphyxiate that 
growth. Then, when the productive forces break those private property relationships, that's when 
the revolution comes. That is, what is coming is development free from the productive forces, to 
such a degree, that it will result in a super-abundance of material and spiritual goods, and we 
shall arrive at communism, because communism is based on the principle of ‘to each according 
to their need and from each according to their ability,’ in other words, even if you have less merit 
than others but have more necessity, they give you more. That is communism based on absolute 
solidarity, but in order for it to be so, there needs to be such a super-abundance of material and 
spiritual goods, that each and everyone receives according to their needs. That is the illusion of 
Marxism and communism. And Marx used to say that that would happen once private property 
over the means of production disappears, because then the workers will develop freely, without 
the interference of private property rights and relationships, their productive capacity. It is then 
that he says: from there we will jump from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. 
Let's start from this fact: socialism is the equivalent of developing the productive forces, because 
a socialism that impoverishes them would be a step backwards in the name of social charity.” 
103  Editorial, Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/venezuela/urban-
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Chavismo’s survival, Caracas is also the city least affected both by the electric infrastructure 
crisis and by the scarcity of food and medicines that is ravaging the country.104 And to be fair-
minded, we will compare Caracas to other cities in nations with every type of political system.  
 Not that long ago, until the early 1980s, Caracas’ best-known moniker for its massive 
populations of immigrants and us proud Caraqueños was “Heaven’s subsidiary.” Yet the year 
Hugo Chávez ascended to power—closing the old millennium, in 1999—Venezuela already 
shared with countries like Brazil and Mexico similar homicide rates (in 1999, there were 5,968 
homicides in Venezuela, and the UN’s “Global Study on Homicide” estimated the murder rate 
per 100,000 inhabitants at 32.9).105 However, after a decade of Chavismo that figure had tripled, 
according to the Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales del Observatorio Venezolano de la Violencia, 
a group founded in 2005 by the Social Science departments of Venezuela’s most important 
public universities to address the vertiginous increase in crime.106 And after the last three years 
of having the dubitable honor of competing with San Pedro Sulas in Honduras, San Salvador in 
El Salvador, and Acapulco in Mexico, in 2015 Caracas displaced all three hell subsidiaries as the 
world’s homicide capital, at 119.87 murders per 100,000.107 Four other Venezuelan cities are in 
the list of the world’s most dangerous twenty cities: Maturín (fifth, at 86.45), Valencia (seventh, 
with 72.31), Ciudad Guayana (eleventh, at 62.33), and Barquisimeto (twentieth, with 54.96).108 
To put Caracas’ abstract murder rate for 2015 in still impossibly abstract “murder totals,” 
when in a country of twenty nine million people there were 5,968 homicides the year Chávez 
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was elected president, by the end of 2015, in Caracas’ “Capital District” alone—with 3.3 million 
inhabitants of Greater Caracas’ total population of 5.3 million people—, 3,946 people had been 
murdered.109 In the whole country, there were 27,785 homicides!110 But before considering the 
multiple causes of violence in Caracas, let us compare these statistics with those of other cities. 
In murders per 100,000 inhabitants, in the United States only St. Louis, a city with 
317,420 inhabitants in 2104—roughly one tenth of Caracas’ Capital District population—and 
Baltimore, which is twice St. Louis’s size, made the “twenty most dangerous cities” list (and 
only in 2016: in 2015, Baltimore was 40th and St Louis was also much lower, at 49.93, which 
speaks of a rise in violent crime also in the U.S.). St. Louis ranks 15th now with a murder rate of 
59.93, and Baltimore 19th with a 54.98. The only other two cities in the U.S. to make it into the 
“fifty most dangerous” are Detroit, the 28th, at 43.89, and New Orleans, 32nd, with 41.44 a decade 
after Katrina’s devastation.111 However, when we speak of “systemic violence,” it is important 
that despite the arguably well-deserved reputation of the United States for violent crime when 
compared to Europe and many other countries in the world, these four cities combined comprise 
some 2.3 million of the country’s 320 million population (New Orleans had roughly 390,000 
inhabitants and Detroit 690,000, as of 2014). Composing far less than one percent of the US 
population, they represent rather an anomaly, which is rather the opposite of Venezuela’s case.112  
																																																								
109 Simeon Tegel, GlobalPost, “Venezuela’s Capital is World’s Most Murderous City,” USA 
Today, January 29, 2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/01/29/venezuelas-
capital-worlds-most-murderous-city/79508586/ 
110 Steven James Grattam, “Venezuela violence hits record levels in 2015, Colombia murders 
lowest in 20 years,” Latin Correspondent, January 5, 2016, 
http://latincorrespondent.com/2016/01/venezuela-violence-hits-record-levels-in-2015-colombia-
murders-lowest-in-20-years/ 
111 World Atlas, Ibid., http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/most-dangerous-cities-in-the-
world.html 
112 “Statistics 2013,” (with projected trajectories for 2015), United States Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/ 
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Venezuela’s murder rate fares much worse under Chavismo’s years when we compare it 
to those of the European nations, to the rest of Latin American countries with governments both 
“progressive” and “reactionary,” and to all totalitarian regimes. For instance, in communist 
Cuba, the country with which Venezuela sealed its political and economic fate after the failed 
coup d’état against Hugo Chávez in 2002, the per 100,000 rate of murder for 2015 was about the 
same of the U.S.: 5.113 Yet, even a 5-homicide rate is still very high when compared with most 
European countries and other cities in the world.  But Caracas’ rate is twenty four times that 5! 
The next graphic is The Economist’s Data Team chart of the 50 cities with most homicides:114 
  
 The fifty most dangerous cities in the world are all located in ten countries (with forty 
four in six countries): twenty one in Brazil, with 200 million people nearly seven times more 
populous than Venezuela; eight cities in Venezuela; five in Mexico with four times Venezuela’s 
																																																								
113 Ibid. 
114 With 320,000 million people, the United States has eleven times Venezuela’s population, but 
had fewer than 15,000 yearly homicides from 2010 to 2014: a fraction only over 50% of 
Venezuela’s 27,785 murders in 2015. 




population, at 120 million; four in the US (detailed above); three cities each in Colombia and 
South Africa, with respectively 48 and 52 million people; and the infamous Central American 
trio of Honduras, with two cities in a country with a quarter of Venezuela’s people, Guatemala 
with one city and half of Venezuela’s population; and El Salvador: with one city and a fifth of 
Venezuela’s population. Kingston, Jamaica’s capital city, in the 33rd place completes the list. 
However, when we compare those cities’ countries proportionally, Venezuela’s off-the-
charts homicide rates reveal a more dramatic reality, for even Brazil’s twenty one cities among 
the fifty most dangerous worldwide would dwarf at the Venezuelan rate. In 2012, for instance, 
there were 56,337 murders in Brazil vs. 21,692 in Venezuela.115 With Brazil’s population, total 
homicides in Venezuela would have exceeded 140,000!116 Admittedly, this would require a 
perfectly homogeneous homicide rate across each country, but this exercise shows how unique 
Venezuela’s catastrophe is, and may help explain why lynching has become a daily event.117 
Caracas has the highest homicide rate worldwide. There is no other city in the planet, 
whether Asian, Middle Eastern, African, rich or poor, managed by a government benignly 
socialist, savagely capitalist, or plainly totalitarian that shares the hellish honor of having 120 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. Thus, the government’s argument that “violence is endemic 
to the region” is a terrible excuse when most other countries in the region have kept their murder 
rates under 20 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and at least half of those countries have kept 
them under 11, like “left-leaning” Ecuador at 6.3, Uruguay at 7.9, and Nicaragua at 8; and “right-
																																																								
115 Jonathan Watts, “Latin America leads world on murder map, but key cities buck deadly 
trend,” The Guardian, May 6, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/06/murder-
map-latin-america-leads-world-key-cities-buck-deadly-trend 
116 This graphic exercise considers the rates of homicides per total country populations, not 
cities.  
117 Alexandra Ulmer and Diego Oré, “Livid over crime, some Venezuelans resort to mob 
justice,” Reuters, September 1, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-lynchings-
idUSKCN0R14EU20150901 
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leaning” Paraguay at 7.9; and Costa Rica at 11.118 When, in fact, there are even several countries 
under 5, the murder rate around which both Cuba and the U.S. have hovered during the past few 
years, such as the “leftist” Bolivia at 4.7 and the alternatively right and center-left-leaning Chile, 
at just 3 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.119 Indeed, even the poorest country in the continent, 
Haiti, has a 10.2 after a sharp increase since 2007, while in Argentina during the Kirchner years, 
from 2003 to 2015—an era regularly associated with Chavismo both in form and substance—the 
murder rate was checked under 9.120 Moreover, regarding some of their capital cities, Buenos 
Aires’ murder rate in 2014 was 5.5; Santiago’s was 3.9; Quito’s was 6; and Montevideo’s 6.4.121 
This numerical and eschatological tour through some regions, countries, and cities of our 
planet demonstrates with mathematical certainty the utter impossibility of anything said by the 
Venezuelan government to justify the country’s exorbitant homicide rate on account of “regional 
																																																								
118 Editorial, “2015 has officially set new record for murders in Costa Rica,” ICR News, January 
29, 2016, http://insidecostarica.com/2015/12/11/2015-officially-set-new-record-murders-costa-
rica/  
119 David Cagne, “InSight Crime’s 2015 Latin America Homicide Round-Up,” InSight Crime, 
January 14, 2016, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/insight-crime-homicide-round-up-
2015-latin-america-caribbean 
120 Editorial, “Homicide rates double in Haiti over a 5-year period, UN study,” Jamaica 
Observer, April 11, 2014, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/latestnews/Homicide-rates-double-
in-Haiti-over-a-5-year-period----UN-study 
121 James Bargent, “Why are robbery related killings rising in Quito, Ecuador?” InSight Crime, 
November 22, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/why-are-robbery-related-killings-
rising-in-quito-ecuador 
As for Europe, but for Russia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Estonia (with, respectively 9, 6.8, 5, and 
4.1) most are at decimal points or under 2 (but Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary, and Latvia in the low 
middle digits); and all Asian countries but for Myanmar (15.2) and Turkmenistan (12.8) are in 
the wider but still much lower spectrum between the high digits and the very low decimals 
regardless of government “system.”121 Yet Moscow’s murder rate is 4.6; while in Rangoon, 
Myanmar’s most populous city (without official statistics), according to the United States 
Department’s OSAC, “violent crimes and other major crimes are rare,” and most of them happen 
in remote areas of the country. Regarding Ashgabat, Turkmenistan’s capital and its largest city 
with nearly one million inhabitants, in the words of the OSAC, “unofficial sources claim that the 
murder rate in Ashgabat is about one per week,” coming to roughly 5.2: United States 
Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, “2015 Crime Safety Reports,” various, 
OSAC, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=17543 
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trends,” political challenges, economic conspiracies or historical patterns, because every poorer 
city in the world is safer, every capitalist, socialist, egalitarian, totalitarian or liberal city is safer, 
and as far as the early 1980s, Caracas was rightly called by its inhabitants “Heavens’ subsidiary.” 
Today, in Caracas only the economic charts of an expected hyperinflation of 18,000% for 
2018, those of its health and of its infrastructure crises, of the hyper-devaluation of its bolívar 
“fuerte:” meaning “strong” (called “strong” when in 2007 Chávez’s government eliminated three 
zeroes from the old bolivar, after the “strong” devaluation of previous years made it worth less 
than two thousandths of a U.S. dollar), and of the skyrocketing cost of living when life itself has 
become worthless, match the steep rise of the murderous race that was lost in the Chavista era.122  
To be sure, as The New York Times’ editorial board wrote on May 17 of 2016: 
The threats Venezuelans face today are not the result of foreign or domestic conspiracies, 
but of a disastrous leadership. The country’s health care system has atrophied so severely 
that scores of Venezuelans are dying every week because of chronic shortages of 
medicine and ill-equipped hospitals. Violence has soared as armed gangs loyal to the 
government roam the streets. During the first three months of this year, 4,696 people 
were murdered in Venezuela, according to the government […] The three-month death 
toll is higher than the 3,545 civilians killed last year in Afghanistan, a new record. While 
many Venezuelans got a taste of prosperity in better housing, subsidized food and higher 
wages when oil prices were high — oil accounts for roughly 96 percent of Venezuela’s 
exports — the government failed to build anything resembling a sustainable economy.123 
 
However, when the Times argues that “Mr. Chávez and Mr. Maduro made spending on 
welfare benefits their top priority to keep their base loyal, while neglecting institutional reforms 
that would have ‘diversified’ the country’s revenue sources and made lasting improvements to 
																																																								
122 David Biller, “IMF Sees Venezuela Inflation Soaring to 13,000 Percent in 2018,” Bloomberg 
Market, January, 25, 2018 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/imf-sees-
venezuela-inflation-soaring-to-13-000-percent-in-2018 
123 Editorial, “Venezuela’s Downward Spiral,” The New York Times, May 17, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/17/opinion/venezuelas-downward-spiral.html?_r=0  
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the education and health systems,” they are missing a crucial element, for, as we will read next, 
if anything is unambiguous in two decades of Chavismo is their distaste for diversification.124 
About this point, nearly all of my interviewees coincided regardless of their political 
affinities, although of course each provided a different judgment according to preference. Tulio 
Hernández, the intellectual political refugee whom I mentioned, explained it to me this way: 
El otro elemento negativo de estos 14 años es el retorno y la multiplicación de una tara 
nacional que nos ha hecho mucho daño, que es el estatismo y el paternalismo, y una de 
las incidencias más grandes es el retorno de la población a las prácticas del clientelismo 
que a su vez son prácticas de la mendicidad instaladas como forma de sustitución del 
trabajo […] Como nunca antes somos mono productores, somos un estado rentista, como 
nunca el Estado es el distribuidor arbitrario de la renta petrolera y como nunca antes se 
ha incrementado en la gente tanto el sentimiento de que el Estado le debe algo y de que, 
como el petróleo es propiedad de todos, el Estado tiene obligación de mantenerlo.125 
 
But this, as former minister Soto understands it, is really a matter of interpretation:  
 
Con el chavismo ha habido tremendo avance. El avance en concreto es: yo no quiero 
trabajar, pero de todo esto que se reparten denme mi parte. Ciertamente que hay algo 
cultural que marca la historia de Venezuela, que es el rentismo. Cuando el venezolano 
entendió o subjetivizó que su bienestar no tenía que ver con el trabajo, allí se produjo 
una dislocación ideológica tremenda, y tiene 120 años. No es del chavismo, ni del 
marxismo leninismo, ni de AD ni de COPEI. El venezolano dijo: se puede vivir sin 
trabajar. ¿Qué es lo que pasa con el rentismo, es decir, con ese vivir sin trabajar? Eso 
																																																								
124 Regardless of paying lip service to the contrary. See the following interviews excerpts. 
In general terms, a rentier state derives all or the majority of its revenues from the rent of its 
resources to the world market rather than from taxing internal economic factors. López Maya 
and Panzarelli say: “This enables those who gain access to the state to gain significant power to 
act arbitrarily or without deference or accountability to the demands and pressures of civil 
society […] Those who gain power in Venezuela tend to legitimize themselves by employing a 
nationalist discourse featuring themes of equality and social justice as well as a certain level of 
mistrust of foreign corporation and powers.” De la Torre and Arnson, Ibid., 241-2 
125 “Another negative element of these past 14 years is the return to national defects that have 
caused us much harm, that is, statism and paternalism, and one of the biggest incidences of the 
return of the population to the practices of patronage, which, at the same time, is the practice of 
mendicancy established as a work substitute […] We are mono-producers like never before, we 
are a rentier state, as never before the State is the arbitrary distributor of oil rents and, as never 
before, the State has reinforced the sentiment that it owes something to the people and that, as oil 
is everyone's property, the state has the obligation to maintain this practice.” 
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explica, complejiza, enreda todo. La teoría marxista dice que los hombres, por la 
industrialización, van a crear una clase obrera que cada día va a ser más explotada y se 
va a organizar y va a luchar por tomar los aparatos de producción y después se va a 
liberar. ¿Qué pasa en donde la riqueza sale del subsuelo? Marx no pudo prever eso. 126 
 
Given the calming advantages of having a tighter control of the population (and of their 
“popular vote” while elections were fashionable) by making most people dependent on one sole 
employer—and mainly on one product—did not seem to faze most Chavistas regardless of the 
likely cost, although opinions differed. Tepidly answering a follow-up question, Pellicer adds:  
Se han hecho ensayos, pero que no han pasado de ser ensayos. Y siempre fue una línea 
del propio Chávez. ¿Cómo es que nosotros éramos un país productor de ganado, de café, 
de caraotas -porque hasta caraotas parece que estamos importando ahora-, y por qué no 
podemos volver a eso? Entonces, los ensayos que se han hecho son ensayos que tienen 
que ver con empresas mixtas o con empresas sociales. Y allí están esos ensayos. Yo creo 
que este es un momento bueno para revisar lo que está pasando con esos ensayos… 127 
 
While Soto, usually the most honestly radical, appears to have a more coherent position: 
 
Un gobierno, si es honesto, decide en qué campo es más productivo. Aquí cuando se 
invierte la pirámide y dejamos de ser país agrícola y hay solo un 3% de población 
campesina, todo el que esté hablando de soberanía alimentaria es un farsante, es 
mentira. Pareciera más honesto decir como dijo Kuwait: yo soy país petrolero y como 
																																																								
126 “There has been tremendous progress with Chavismo. Concretely, the progress is: I don't 
want to work, but of all that you divide out, give me my part. Certainly, there is something very 
cultural that marks Venezuela's history, which is rentierism. When Venezuelans understood or 
subjectified that their well-being had nothing to do with work, a tremendous ideological 
dislocation took place, and that has been going on for 120 years. It doesn't come from Chavismo, 
nor from Marxism-Leninism, nor from AD or COPEI. Venezuelans said: it's possible to live 
without working. What happens with rentierism, in other words, with that living without 
working? That explains, makes more complex, tangles everything up. Marxist theory states that 
men, due to industrialization, will create a working class that will be more exploited every day 
and it will organize itself and fight to take hold of the production apparatus and then will free 
itself. But what happens where riches ooze from the earth? Marx couldn't foresee that.” 
127 “Attempts have been made, but they haven't gone beyond being attempts. And it was a line of 
Chávez himself: How is it that we used to be a country that produced cattle, coffee, beans – 
because it seems like we are even importing beans now – and why can't we return to that? Then, 
the attempts that have been made are attempts that have to do with mixed enterprises or with 
social enterprises. And the attempts are all there. I believe that this is a good time to review 
what's going on with those attempts...” 
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petrolero no me ocupo de la producción de nada, pero tengo petróleo y dólares más que 
suficientes y traigo de todo: papas, fresas que llegan 24 horas después de cosechadas. 128 
 
However, for the opposing María Corina Machado, founder and former president of the 
Venezuelan civil organization Súmate as well as the highest vote-getter in the National Assembly 
election of 2010—albeit ousted by the Chavista majority in 2014 for promoting that year’s street 
protests—this compounded socio-economic catastrophe has a political origin. She said to me: 
Una de las cosas que promovió el chavismo fue generar la mayor dependencia posible de 
toda la sociedad en el Estado, de todos los sectores, empezando obviamente por los 
sectores políticos, descabezando o minimizando los partidos como organizaciones 
intermedias, y luego los sectores económicos […] porque todo espacio que represente 
autonomía había que liquidarlo. Y en el plano social, lograr que el mayor número de 
ciudadanos dependiera del Estado, y que dependieran además de una forma humillante, 
porque no es ni siquiera el empleo público, sino la dádiva, la transferencia directa, 
absolutamente condicionada no ya solamente a la militancia política sino a la renuncia a 
tu libertad, a tu libertad de pensamiento y a tus ideales y convicciones. Eso me parece 
dramático porque lo que se ha tratado de destruir es esa relación esfuerzo-logro, 
esencial en una sociedad que quiere avanzar y que quiere progresar. Eso en términos 
negativos, además de lo que señalé antes respecto de la división y de la confrontación en 
todos los planos que, además, ha generado una sociedad profundamente violenta, porque 
los incentivos a la violencia son obvios, no solamente más de diez millones de armas 
ilegales en la calle, 18.000 bandas criminales, tráfico de drogas generalizado -con todos 
los males que eso va trayendo para destruir y atacar a la familia- y la impunidad, por 
encima del 97%. Ese es el incentivo directo a la violencia, intencional desde luego.129 
																																																								
128 “A government, if it is honest, decides in which field it is most productive. Here, when the 
pyramid is inverted and we stopped being an agricultural country, and there is only 3% of the 
population who are peasants, anyone talking about food sovereignty is a fraud, that's a lie. It 
would seem more honest to say something like Kuwait: I am an oil country, and as such, I don't 
take up the production of anything, but I have oil and more than enough dollars and I bring 
everything over: potatoes, strawberries that arrive 24 hours after being harvested.” 
129 “ One of the things that Chavismo promoted was to generate the highest possible dependence 
of all society on the state, from all sectors, starting, obviously, with the political sectors, 
beheading or minimizing the parties as intermediate organizations, and afterwards, the economic 
sectors […] because any space that represented autonomy had to be terminated. And in the social 
sphere, to ensure that as many citizens as possible would depend on the State, and to have them 
depend, also, in a humiliating manner, because this isn't even about public employment, but 
rather about alms, about a direct transfer, absolutely conditioned, not just to political militancy 
anymore, but to one's renunciation of freedom, of one's freedom of thought, of one's ideals and 
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The deliberate dismantling or replacement of every competing social institution that 
could not be directly controlled or coopted by Chávez is the most salient structural trait of his 
first years in government.130 This fractal pattern of demolition was repeated in every area from 
the moment the old political parties crumbled after the tsunami that resulted from their disastrous 
neoliberal policies took Chávez to power. It started with the branches of government responsible 
for checks and balances by adding an “Electoral” and a “Citizens” power and taking over all five 
powers; it continued by creating official worker unions, a parallel (second) public health system, 
by seizing the Central Bank’s autonomous and the oil industry’s semi-autonomous functions, by 
founding new Bolivarian public universities while defunding the old public ones, just because 
like the old public health system, their meritocracies would not be coopted; it followed with the 
expropriation of private industries, agricultural land, and most of the press when not forcing their 
bankruptcy. And, as the icing on the cake, all conceivable public infrastructure projects—such as 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
convictions. That seems dramatic to me because what has been attempted to destroy is that 
relationship between effort and achievement, essential in a society that wishes to advance and 
wants progress. That, in negative terms, apart from what I noted before with regards to the 
division and confrontation at all levels (which also has generated a profoundly violent society, 
because the incentives to violence are just obvious, because not only are there more than ten 
million illegal weapons out in the streets, 18,000 criminal gangs, widespread drugs trafficking – 
with all the ills that that brings along in order to attack and destroy the family – and more than 
97% impunity.) That is the direct incentive for violence; intentionally, of course.” 
As explained before, from the three poltical leaders who capitalized from and helped promote the 
wave of spontaneous students’ protests in February of 2014, Caracas’ Mayor, Antonio Ledezma 
and former presidential candidate Leopoldo López (Venezuela’s most emblematic political 
prisoner after during one of Caracas’ largest protests he was filmed surrendering voluntarily to 
the government forces) have been incarcerated several years. Machado was charged with treason 
and impeached by her fellow legislators in the former Chavista-controlled Congress. Although 
she has been constantly harassed and threatened, she remains free at the date of this text. See:  
Centro de Justicia y Paz’s Report to the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations: 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/VEN/INT_CCPR_CSS_VEN_
20686_E.pdf 
With respect to the impunity of which Machado speaks, see figures and footnote on page 54. 
130	Brewer-Carías, Ibid.	For a substantially briefer text regarding the private industry, read Juan 
B. Salas, “Aparato productive nacional registra caida del 80%,” 	El Impulso, December 2, 2015: 
http://www.elimpulso.com/noticias/economia/aparato-productivo-nacional-registra-caida-del-80 
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the maintenance of our dams and reservoirs—started to be directly assigned to the select circle of 
Chavistas that for the past eighteen years have been constantly reshuffled to manage all the 
public and many former private institutions. It is naïve to think that public security could have 
escaped this fate. But the dismantling of Venezuela’s liberal institutions is also at the core of the 
country’s impunity, lynchings, endemic corruption, hyperinflation, hyper devaluation, health 
crisis, emigration, essential goods’ shortages, and of its infrastructural crises and productivity 
meltdown. The next charts show, respectively, Venezuela’s inflation, from 2009 until 2018 (the 
IMF’s projection for 2018); its consumer price index and currency exchange rate, from 2003 
until 2015; and basic food basket paired with minimum wage, from 2006 until 2016.131 132 133        
  
																																																								
131 Moisés Rendón and Mark L. Schneider, “Potential Scenarios for Venezuela’s Future,” CSIS, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 20, 2017: 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/potential-scenarios-venezuelas-future 
132 Pasqualina Curcio, “Los ciclos del Dólar paralelo en Venezuela,” CELAG, Centro 
Estratégico Latinoamericano de Geopolítica, August 16, 2016: http://www.celag.org/los-ciclos-
politicos-del-dolar-paralelo-en-venezuela/ 
133 Mercy Benzaquen, “How food in Venezuela went from subsidized to scarce,” The New York 
Times, July 16, 2017: 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/16/world/americas/venezuela-shortages.html 
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“Venezuela was the first nation in the world to be certified by the World Health 
Organization for eradicating malaria in its most populated areas, beating the United States and all 
other developed countries to that milestone in 1961.” 134 Thus read the recent article by The New 
York Times quoted below. Yet the following graph reproduces the “official” numbers today. 
																																																								
134 Nicholas Casey, “Hard times in Venezuela Breed Malaria as Desperate Flock to Mines,” The 
New York Times, August 15, 2016: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/15/world/venezuela-
malaria-mines.html 
Graph: “La dramática crisis económica y política de Venezuela en doce gráficos,” La Patilla, 







A similar exercise to compare both Caracas and Venezuela with other cities and countries 
worldwide could be made for any of the previous categories to demonstrate that Venezuela’s off-
the-charts statistics have long surpassed any conventional explanation. As with Venezuela’s 
homicide rate, their extreme—incomparable, truly—nature, reflected in the ghastly repetition of 
that sideways grin in all related charts, does not speak of the usual “multiple factors” that 
variously contribute to social and economic crises, but of one same, unique, and main 
exacerbating cause at the root of a compounded catastrophe. Indeed, when the slant in each 
graphic is so eerily similar, the realities they depict are but symptoms of a common malady that 
both foments and transcends each particular reality: Venezuela is also the country with the 
highest hyperinflation (4,000% in 2017), the highest “unofficial” hyper-devaluation, the highest 
official impunity rate (at 98% according to the prosecutor general’s office!), and the highest 
“misery rate,” quadrupling the next-worst ranked.135 This oil-rich nation has received over one 
																																																								
135 Catarina Saraiva and Michelle Jamrisko, “These Are the World’s Most Miserable 
Economies,” Bloomberg Markets, February 4, 2016, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-04/these-are-the-world-s-most-miserable-
economies 
According to InflationData.com, “The original Misery Index was created by economist Arthur 
Okun during the Johnson administration in the 1960’s […] It helps determine how the average 
	 55	
trillion U.S. dollars in revenues during the chavista era, yet its poverty rate increased from 55% 
when Hugo Chávez took power in 1999 to 82.8% in 2016.136 His long-time former Economy 
Super-Minister, Jorge Giordani, and others have accused government officers of pocketing more 
than $300 billion of crude oil revenues over the past decade alone.137 A Chavista assessment! 
In the segment of my interviews that inspired this thesis’s title, José León Uzcátegui told me:   
Yo soy psiquiatra y tengo una especialización de economía petrolera. Un periodista me 
preguntaba sobre esta doble condición y le decía: nada más natural, Venezuela es locura 
y petróleo. Claro, no se queda allí. Lo que mejor la define es el capitalismo rentista que 
el mismo Chávez llamaba socialismo rentista y, como pasa con el socialismo en general, 
ahora está más claro que antes que no hubo tal socialismo sino capitalismo de Estado 
[…] Se ha producido un cambio importante en la redistribución de la renta. Eso lo sabe 
cualquier venezolano, desde los que se han enriquecido a costa de los pobres hasta los 
pobres que siguen viviendo en la pobreza pero que, desde un buhonero hasta un taxista, 
esperan una parte del reparto más allá de lo que se haya robado toda la burguesía. […] 
Ciertamente, en esta revolución bolivariana ha aparecido una nueva burguesía a imagen 
y semejanza de la que se construyó en la cuarta república. Sea más o menos cierto, más 
allá de los discursos, más allá de esa dirigencia que puede ser incapaz, corrupta, 
mediocre, la gran posibilidad está en el pueblo que entendió y asumió el discurso de 
Chávez y pudiéramos estar en un proceso de transición hacia otro momento.138 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
citizen is doing economically, and it is calculated by simply adding the annual inflation rate to 
the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate:” https://inflationdata.com/articles/misery-index/ 
136 See the next chapter for a more detailed explanation of Venezuela’s current poverty rates. 
137 Eyanir Chinea and Corina Pons, “Venezuela ex-ministers seek probe into $300 billion lost in 
oil revenue,” Reuters, February 2, 2016: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-
idUSKCN0VB26F 
Editorial Board, “Prepare for the worst: Venezuela is heading towards complete disaster,” The 
Washington Post, February 11, 2016: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/inflation-
poverty-food-shortages-venezuela-heads-toward-disaster/2016/02/11/10aad5b4-d035-11e5-88cd-
753e80cd29ad_story.html 
Regarding Venezuela’s current poverty rate, see: “Resultados de la Encuesta Nacional de 
Condiciones de Vida, ENCOVI 2016, Universidad Simón Bolívar Noticias, February 21, 2017 
https://usbnoticias.info/post/49835 
Due to the lack of official statistics, the study, called ENCOVI, is a household survey of 6,430 
families conducted by the Central University of Venezuela, the Andrés Bello Catholic 
University, and the Simón Bolívar University together with the Fundación Bengoa Food and 
Nutrition Group and other non-governmental organizations.  
138	“I am a psychiatrist and have a Master’s in Oil Economy. A journalist asked me about this 
double condition and I answered: nothing more natural, Venezuela is oil and madness. Of course, 
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But Venezuela transitioned somewhere else. According to a Washington Post editorial: 
The country is running desperately short of food and medicine. Venezuelans spend much 
of their time waiting in lines outside stores, but increasingly the shelves are bare. The 
head of the national pharmaceutical association appealed for aid to the World Health 
Organization, saying that distribution of 70 percent of basic medicines was disrupted. The 
chairman of the largest domestic food producer has said that if the government does not 
quickly seek aid to import food, it “will cause grave harm to ordinary Venezuelans.”139 
  
A second factor proposed by the Chavistas to understand the increment in violent crime 
is that Venezuela “has become the main transit country for Colombia’s cocaine, which has led to 
the presence of Colombian criminal networks in Venezuela and the development of organized 
crime.”140 However, that argument suffers from mistaking the consequences of a series of 
deliberate and horrendously executed policies with the causes of violent crime, and points us 
again to the same responsible party by referring us to the Chavista era. A third, very important 
consequence whose implications take us closer to our root cause has to do with what has been 
called “the privatization of security in Venezuela.”141 This process, by which individuals and the 
infamous “collectives” take the law into their own hands, is a direct consequence of the power 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
it doesn't stop there. What best defines it is the rentier capitalism that Chávez himself called 
rentier socialism, and, as it happens with socialism in general, it is now clearer that there was no 
such socialism before, but rather State capitalism […] An important change has taken place in 
the distribution of income. Any Venezuelan knows that, from those who have become rich at the 
expense of the poor, all the way to the poor who continue living in poverty, but who –from a 
street vendor, all the way to a cab driver– expect a part of this sharing, beyond what all the 
bourgeoisie might have stolen […] Certainly, a new bourgeoisie has appeared in this Bolivarian 
revolution, in the image and likeness of the one built during the fourth republic. Whether it's true 
or not, beyond the speeches, beyond that leadership that might be incapable, corrupt, mediocre, I 
believe that the great possibility lies in the people, who understood and assumed Chávez's 
discourse, and we might very well be in a transitional process towards another moment.”  
139 The Washington Post, Ibid. 
140 Jeremy McDermott, “Venezuela with more than 21,600 murders in 2012: NGO,” InSight 
Crime, December 28, 2012, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/venezuela-21600-murders-
2012 
141 Grattan, Latin Correspondent, Ibid., http://latincorrespondent.com/2016/01/venezuela-
violence-hits-record-levels-in-2015-colombia-murders-lowest-in-20-years/ 
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vacuum caused by the “abandonment of state protection and the absence of punishment, rampant 
corruption in almost all branches of the security forces, a lack of investment in the police force, 
weak gun control which has led to a proliferation of arms, and a lack of coherent security policy” 
that manifests in nearly every conceivable area: from routine lynching to extrajudicial killings.142 
A more recent, equally ominous result has been the militarization of repressive security 
under the so-called “People’s Liberation Operation”—“OLP” by its acronym in Spanish—, that 
neither “points to a decline in violence in society, but, on the contrary, to an increase.” Adding to 
the Masacre de Barlovento, the Observatorio Venezolano de la Violencia estimates that police 
officers shot dead about 3,800 people in 2016, making the OLP one of the most homicidal forces 
in the world.143  As mentioned, the OVV was founded by the Social Sciences’ departments of 
Venezuela’s largest public universities to address the vertiginous increment in violent crime in 
2005—well into the years of unimaginable riches gained from a stark rise in oil price, the same 
year that the government stopped providing official figures of violent crime—. They explain: 
The institutional destruction that the country continues to suffer from is the most 
significant explanatory factor in the sustained increase in violence and crime. The 
institutions of society, in terms of social life based on trust and governed by rules and 
laws, is diluted more and more each time to the arbitrary power and the predominance of 
social relations based on the use of force and weapons.144 
 
																																																								
142 Andreína Aponte, “In Venezuela, lynchings kill one person every three days. Report,” 
Reuters, December 28, 2016: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-violence-
idUSKBN14H1PJ 
143 Reuters Staff, “Venezuela to charge soldiers over 12 deaths in security operation,” Reuters, 
November 27, 2016: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-venezuela-crime-idUKKBN13M0Z6 
144 Grattan, Ibid. 
Other structural and cultural factors that promote mayhem in the region in general could be 
mentioned, such as a machista penchant for violence (partly because of a mistrust or incapacity 
for the verbal articulation of feelings), alcohol and drug addiction, the lack of opportunities for 
education and employment, an excess of segregation in the cities, and urban density in the slums, 
perhaps even the diminished role of religion and the church, but they would be only of academic 
interest here, for they cannot truly explain Venezuela’s distinctively off the charts statistics.  
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The two best-known principles of criminal investigation are: first, asking, “who benefits?” when 
a crime has been committed; and, secondly, figuring out if there is a pattern to the crime. If the 
answer to the first is obvious, I expect to have suggested a “pattern of institutional destruction” 
that is at the core of most of Venezuela’s off-the-charts realities in this absurdly compounded 
catastrophe. Together with the abysmal levels of corruption, incompetence, and disrespect for 
civilian laws of a government essentially militaristic, where obedience rather than efficiency has 
been the cardinal rule, that pattern should help explain the most recent failed state in our world:  
The descent began almost twenty years ago. When Chavez took power in Venezuela in 
1999 and launched his so-called “Bolivarian revolution,” he echoed the socialist 
programs of socialist ally Cuba in investing in poorer communities, running literacy 
campaigns and setting up health clinics with Cuban doctors. More equality, he hoped, 
would lead to less crime. [Yet] Chavez criticized the police for being repressive, while 
his hardcore supporters formed their own armed groups ostensibly to fight crime. Roberto 
Briceño, a sociologist who heads the Venezuelan Violence Observatory, says the tactic 
weakened law enforcement and led to increasing chaos on the streets. “There has been a 
destruction of the institutions, a breaking of social rules,” Briceño says. “There are armed 
groups the police know they can’t touch.” At the same time, Venezuela has seen the 
growth of the criminal gangs that plague much of Latin America […] There are drug 
cartels with links to the security forces, several leftist guerrilla groups, right wing 
paramilitary forces opposed to the socialist government, and heavily-armed street gangs. 
This tangle of competing gunmen has proven a lethal cocktail. When supporters of 
Chavez formed the armed community groups, known as collectives, the socialist 
government largely tolerated them, rarely seizing their guns or raiding their bunkers. 
Cienfuegos [not his real name] claims there are now about 8,000 such militants in 
Venezuela, mostly in the Caracas area, although there is no official registry.145 
 
But as if a humanitarian crisis and having become one of the most violent countries in the 
world were not enough, this anti-socialist destruction of the country’s institutions has had as well 
tragically inconsistent consequences. Next, we explore in what ways and how they came about. 
																																																								
145 Ioan Grillo and Jorge Becerra, “Venezuela’s Murder Epidemic Rages on Amid State of 





Venezuela’s Crooked Lorenz Curve: Matching Homicides, Inequality, and Corruption 
 
The diverse natures of men, combined with the necessity to satisfy in some manner the  
sentiment which desires them to be equal, has had the result that in the  
democracies they have endeavored to provide the appearance  




The correlation between high income inequality and a sharp increase in homicides has been well 
documented by scholarly studies during the past few decades. There is also abundant academic 
literature that explains this reality’s socio-psychological dynamics.146 In an ambitious study 
conducted in 39 countries between 1965 and 1995, World Bank economists Pablo Fajnzylber, 
Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza found that homicides and inequality are positively 
correlated within countries and between countries. This is a causal interaction. That is, inequality 
induces homicides. They explain: “income inequality, measured by the Gini index, has a positive 
and significant effect on homicide rates. By using the corresponding coefficient estimate, we can 
evaluate the crime-reducing effect of a decline in inequality in a given country.”147 There are two 
competing explanations for this correlation and both are consistent in their findings of a robust 
correlation between homicides and inequality. The first one, from the camp of the economists, 
explains that “crime rates (in general) depend on the risks and penalties associated with 
apprehension and the potential gains from crime and the associated opportunity cost.”148 They 
																																																								
146 See Richard Wilkinson, “Why is violence more common where inequality is greater?” Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences (2004) 1036: 1-12; Martin Daly, Margo Wilson, and 
Shawn Vasdev, “Income Inequality and Crime in Canada and the United States,” Canadian 
Journal of Public Health – Revue canadienne de criminologie (2001) 47: 1-36; “Income 
Inequality and Violent Crime,” The Equality Trust Research Digest: Violence, No. I-2011. 
147 Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman, and Norman Loayza, “Inequality and Violent Crime,” 
Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XLV (Chicago: The university of Chicago, April 2002), 17 
148 Ibid., 1-2 
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argue that crime may be more prevalent in poor communities because the distribution of police 
services and the justice system favor the rich. The second view, from the sociological camp, sees 
the problem rather as one of “relative deprivation,” and proposes that “inequality breeds social 
tensions as the less well-off feel dispossessed when compared with the wealthier.”149 Thus, they 
maintain that “the feeling of disadvantage and unfairness leads the poor to seek compensation 
and satisfaction by all means, including committing crimes against both poor and rich.”150 
Without providing official statistics, the Chavista discourse still persuades too many that 
Venezuela has now at least a more equal and just society. But with a reality so distorted that it is 
impossible to measure with the usual inequality ratios, I will resort to its homicide statistics to 
portray how the facts contradict that discourse. I do not pretend that what I have written in this 
text will show a bulletproof causal interaction between homicides and inequality in Venezuela. 
Instead, paraphrasing the political scientist James C. Scott’s preface to his Against the Grain: this 
chapter “aims, at its most ambitious, to ‘connect the dots’ of existing knowledge in ways that 
may be illuminating or suggestive” of a robust correlation. 151 For rather than ameliorating the 
country’s historical average inequality for Latin America, here I will suggest how Chavismo’s 
self-styled “socialism” has made of Venezuela one of the most unequal countries in the world.  
As we have seen, in Venezuela’s case, poverty cannot explain its skyrocketing crime 
statistics during Chavismo’s first fifteen years. And the last three years of steadily declining oil 
revenues, continuing rise in violent crime and drastic worsening of poverty, extreme poverty, 
and—as we will argue in this chapter—of growing vast inequality do not change this fact:  
																																																								
149 Ibid., 2 
150 Ibid. 
151 James C. Scott, Against the Grain. A Deep History of the Earliest States (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2017), xi-xii. 
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 In the previous chart, we see how except for the sharp but brief drop in oil prices that 
occurred between June of 2008 and February of 2009, the period from 1999 to 2014 was marked 
by a prodigious increase in oil revenues that was strategically redistributed but benefited people 
of all classes.152 Oil prices quadrupled in the fifteen months after Chávez was elected president 
from its lowest price in a quarter century: from $6.33 in January of 1999 to $25.12 in April of 
2000, when he was first reelected.153 They kept or exceeded ten times the price of January of 
1999 from 2006 until November of 2010. Twenty times the price of the month after Chávez 
gained the presidency in 2008 and fifteen times the price of January of 1999 between the years 
2011 and 2014.154 Adding to that superabundance, Venezuela’s foreign debt increased from 
about $35 billion in 1998 to $139 billion in December of 2016. 155 Equally counterintuitive is 
																																																								
152	Theodore Cangero, “Venezuela, Socialism, Hyperinflation, and Economic Collapse,” 
American Insitute for Economic Research, AIER, March 1, 2017: 
https://www.aier.org/research/venezuela-socialism-hyperinflation-and-economic-collapse 
153 “U.S. FOB Costs of Venezuela Crude Oil (Dollars per Barrel),” U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, April 3, 2017, 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=ive0000004&f=mm 
154 Ibid. 
155 Foreign debt according to the World Atlas; homicides according to the UN’s UNODC, 2012. 
See respective footnotes on page 42.  
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that, in these eighteen years, homicides rose in Venezuela only at the pace of its foreign debt, for 
they nearly quadrupled, from 32.9 homicides per 100,000 people in 1999 to 119.87 in 2016: That 
is, during the most affluent period in the history of a country that was rich beyond measure by 
nearly every other developing country’s standard, Venezuela’s homicide rates went through the 
roof. Meanwhile, its government switched its official statistics for a growing socialist rhetoric. 156 
In the previous chapter we proposed that the root cause of Venezuela’s aggregate 
catastrophe has been the systematic dismantling of its democratic institutions—which is exactly 
the opposite of any other democratic socialism. But if Chavismo gained legitimacy as some sort 
of social democracy by means of fifteen elections (while oil prices reached or were at their 
historical peak), in time it portrayed itself as a new kind of socialism that would upgrade the old 
institutions. In this chapter we explore how the litmus test for any socialism: within-country 
income inequality, compares with its reality today. Although the last Gini indexes available for 
Venezuela—from 2006 until about 2011—reflect a decrease in income inequality from 0.5 to 
0.4, I will introduce this subject with a chart that we already know, if certainly with a twist:157 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Eshe Nelson, “Venezuela is too poor to import food and medicine. So why is the government 
still paying off its debt?” Quartz, December 20, 2016, https://qz.com/866593/venezuela-is-too-
poor-to-import-food-and-medicine-so-why-is-the-government-still-paying-off-its-debt/ 
156Mayela Armas, “Venezuela, el país de las cifras ocultas,” Crónica Uno, September 9, 2015: 
http://cronica.uno/venezuela-el-pais-de-las-cifras-ocultas/ 
Regular homicide statistics stopped in 2005, the year Chávez announced his “socialism of the 
21st century.” 




Besides being the most homicidal countries in the world, there is another trait shared by 
this chart’s y-axis list—except for Venezuela, according to its government’s socialist discourse 
and its non existent statistics. But it is neither the size of their populations nor their degree of 
economic development—or of global power—but that all are among the most unequal countries 
in the world. But for South Africa, all are in the Americas. In South Africa’s case, together with 
Namibia (until 1990 governed by South Africa under its apartheid laws) and their landlocked 
neighbor, Botswana, these are the only middle-income countries among the thirty-five that 
compose Sub-Saharan Africa. And the three have alternated the title of most unequal country in 
the world since reliable data became available in the 1980s. As economist Branko Milanovic 
explains in his Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization, “a higher total 
income allows a part of the population to enjoy much higher incomes without driving everybody 
else beyond the starvation point. Higher income gives more ‘space’ for inequality to increase.”158  
																																																								
158 Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality, A New Approach for the Age of Globalization 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2016), 51. 
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Before continuing with the Latin American countries in the previous homicide chart to 
decipher Venezuela’s reality, the United States provides a key missing element. The U.S. makes 
the chart with four cities, although those four cities combined make roughly 0.7 percent of the 
U.S.’s population. But with about 4.4 percent of the world’s population, the U.S. has over twenty 
two percent of the world’s incarcerated population. Either calculating per 100,000 people or per 
total populations, the U.S. has by far more prisoners than any other country in the world.159 
 
International Rates of Incarceration 2015 - International Center for Prison Studies (ICPS) 
     
 
 
But, perhaps more interestingly, when we correlate the steep rise of the U.S. inmate 
population since 1980, the year when income inequality started a vigorous return in the U.S. after 
decades, we get a chart that almost mirrors its inequality. That proportion remains when include 
total correctional population (adding the people in probation and parole), for a total of over 2% 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
And Namibia, which is also one of the world’s most sparsely populated countries, in its Hardap 
region has a homicide rate higher than that of Johannesburg: 39.6 per 100.000 people. Botswana, 
landlocked in Southern Africa, and Lesotho and Swaziland, two tiny countries respectively 
enclosed and almost totally enclosed by South Africa, fare a little better: the three are among the 
twenty-five most murderous countries in the world. Petr H., “25 Countries with the highest 
murder rate in the world,” List 25 (from United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), January 8, 
2015, http://list25.com/25-countries-with-the-highest-murder-rates-in-the-world/ 
159 International Center for Prison Studies, 
https://rankingamerica.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/prisoners.jpg 
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of the U.S. people!160 Both the incarcerated and correctional populations increased fourfold since 
1980, and income after taxes for the top one percent also quadrupled (while the bottom quintile’s 
growth has been just of about 20%, and that of the next three quintiles of roughly 40%):161 
 
        
      
																																																								
160 Danielle Kaeble and Lauren Glaze, “Correctional Populations in the United States, 2015,” 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, December 2016, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf . 
Last two charts, Wikipedia. 
161 Chad Stone, Danilo Trisi, Arloc Sherman, Emily Horton, “A Guide to Statistics on Historical 
Trends of income Inequality,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, November 7,2016, 
http://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-
in-income-inequality . Comments and first chart. 
 
	 66	
      
 
The United States, which according to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s thirty five members is the group’s most wealth-unequal country (as well as the 
third most income-unequal after Chile and Mexico), would fare far worse in homicide rates were 
it not for its well honed, gargantuan policed State.162 This is also important because it explains 
the otherwise odd absence from the chart of two of the six most conspicuously unequal countries 
in Latin America: Chile and Panama. However, if Panama does not show by cities, it is one of 
the twenty-five countries with the highest homicide rates.163 And the Chilean miracle continues 
at the expense of being second only to the United States in the OECD’s incarceration rates:164  
																																																								
162 Mark Deen, “Chile, Mexico, U.S. Have Highest Inequality Rates, OECD Says,” Bloomberg 
News, November 24, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-24/chile-mexico-
u-s-have-highest-inequality-rates-oecd-says 
163 Petr H., Ibid. 
164 Chart “Incarceration Rates in OECD Countries,” May 1, 2014, The Hamilton Project, 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/charts/incarceration_rates_in_oecd_countries 
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The extreme violence among rival gangs, “the maras,” that move between El Salvador and the 
U.S. afflicting both countries has been the continuation, by other means, not of diplomacy but of 
the civil war that ravaged El Salvador from 1979 until 1992. Following the war’s devastation, its 
Gini coefficient has continued a downward spiral: from 53.95 at the end of the conflict to 41.84 
(in 2014).165 Thus, but for the relatively less unequal Jamaica, at the bottom of our homicide 
chart and with a Gini of 45.5, the rest of the countries shown are the most unequal in Latin 
America (and after a handful of Sub-Saharan African countries, in the planet); from a highest 
Gini of 53,7 in Honduras: 53,5 Colombia; 52,9, Brazil; 52,4, Guatemala; (51,7, Panama and 
50,5, Chile, neither in the chart) and 45.9 for the second least equal OECD country: Mexico.166  
																																																								
165 “GINI for El Salvador,” FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October 17, 2016, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SIPOVGINISLV 
166 Marcelo Justo, “¿Cuáles son los 6 países más desiguales de América Latina?” BBC Mundo, 
March 9, 2016, 
http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2016/03/160308_america_latina_economia_desigualdad_ab 
& OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD), OECD, July 2016, 
http://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm  ; There is abundant literature on 
the subject of NAFTA, unemployment, and drug trafficking. See, for instance, Carmen Boullosa 
and Mike Wallace, A Narco History: How the United States and Mexico Jointly Created the 
“Mexican Drug War” (New York: OR Books, 2015). 
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It could be argued that our homicide chart represents a sample too small to claim that, 
after a certain threshold, income inequality in countries above subsistence level translates into 
either exorbitant homicide rates or a “policed state;” and moreover transpose that equation to 
prove that Venezuela must be a highly unequal country. Couldn’t it be that, just like Jamaica, 
Venezuela is an anomaly? But Jamaica is the chart’s outlier because it appears both at the bottom 
and with just one city. While the other forty-nine most violent cities in the world are all spread 
among just nine countries, Jamaica, as a country, would never have made it into that chart. 
Venezuela, per contra, appears first in the chart by city, and with eight of the fifty most 
homicidal cities in the world, second only to Brazil’s twenty-two. There is another dual link 
between homicides and income inequality that is out of the scope of this thesis. Namely, that 
over two thirds of homicides happen in the cities’ slums, partly as a form to gain or maintain 
social status by violent means; and that in Venezuela’s slums, killings while “resisting arrest” 
swelled in 2016 from 65% to 80%, together with extrajudicial killings.167 According to every 
academic research, Venezuela’s homicide rates alone contradict the Chavista discourse of having 
created a more equal society. Rather than ameliorating Venezuela’s average inequality for Latin 
America, Chavismo’s “socialism” made of the country one of the most unequal, and it appears 
that one of the poorest, in the world: the next maps illustrate the latter point.168 I will conclude 
with how a Chavista oligarchy ran with the money both under the radar and off-the-charts. 
																																																								
167 Carlos Nieto, “Venezuela, país inseguro,” PROVEA’s Official Webpage , January 13, 2017: 
https://www.derechos.org.ve/opinion/venezuela-pais-inseguro 
168 First chart: James Davis, Susanna Sandström, “Global Distribution of Household Wealth;” 
United Nations University-WIDER, 2006, https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/global-
distribution-household-wealth 
Second and third charts, respectively: the “Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook,” 2012 and 
2016, Credit Suisse Research Institute, October 2012 and November 2016, 
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Davies%20et%20al%202012_global_wealth_databook.pdf 
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According to the UNU’s World Institute for Economics Research, still in the year 2000 
Venezuela was one the wealthiest countries per capita in Latin America. Even after the crisis that 
brought Hugo Chávez to power, the country was in the “$10,000 to $49,999” group of per capita 
wealth with countries like Finland, Saudi Arabia, and New Zealand. In the following two charts, 
by the Credit Suisse Research Institute, we see how after a decade of superabundant oil revenues, 
by 2012, the country was of average wealth, comparable to Russia, Eastern Europe, and China. 
By 2016, Venezuela was ranked in the “Below USD 5,000” category, at the levels of India, the 
poorest Asian and Latin American countries, and Sub-Saharan Africa excluding Southern Africa.  
How could over one trillion dollars from oil revenues be squandered, or merely disappear 
in fifteen years in a country with a tenth of the United States’ population? For the specialists in 
income distribution, the name of Vilfredo Pareto holds a special place. Branko Milanovic, former 
lead economist in the World Bank’s research department, says: “[Pareto] was the first economist 
to have been seriously interested in empirical analysis of inter-personal inequality,” rather than in 
the fixed social classes of landowners, capitalists, and labor that had been compared up until that 
time.169Although his across the board generalization of an immutable 20/80-distribution has been 
widely discredited in modern economics, two of his theories do apply to the Venezuelan case.170 
																																																								
169 Branko Milanovic, “What Remains of Pareto?” Globalinequality (blog) February 28, 205: 
http://glineq.blogspot.com/2015/02/what-remains-of-pareto.html 
170 “More than a hundred years ago the Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto made 
the famous observation that 20% of the population owned 80% of the property in Italy. Later on, 
he created a mathematical formula to describe the unequal distribution of wealth in his country, 
which is known as the Pareto distribution. In the late 1940s, business-management consultant 
J.M. Juran generalised Pareto’s findings into the 80-20 rule, which is also known as the Pareto 
Principle. Here are some examples of the Pareto Principle as it applies to various situations: 80% 
of the revenue comes from 20% of the customers, 20% of products yield 80% of sales, 20% of 
society hold 80% of its wealth and so on.” Rosie Dunford, Quanrong Su, Ekraj Tamang, and 





The first is his 20/80-distribution as it relates to Chavismo in a sui generis way. For if 
after World War II the efficiency of social institutions (and of social expectations in a newly 
polarized world) to achieve a more democratic redistribution of income spread to most of the 
West—and, in Latin America solidly to Venezuela thanks to its wealth and to the exclusive 
partnership that its oil guaranteed with the U.S., Chavismo is at its core a movement against 
modernity. Disguised as a progressive discourse, it displaced the old elite—Pareto’s theory of 
the “circulation of elites”—first by votes and, only after taking over the old institutions with its 
military-civilian alliance, by sheer power.171 This is clear these days of canceled elections, the 
shutting down of congress, the proscription of opposition leaders and of intensified repression.172  
Pareto died less than a year into Mussolini’s regime; whether he would have agreed with 
Fascism, as his detractors assert, or not, his observations of how the dynamics of power operated 
in most of the world until the first two decades of the twentieth century—regardless of political 
system—apply to Chavismo today. But sadly, in Venezuela’s case not only most of the old elites 
were either displaced or assimilated; in 2016, the ravages of Chavismo’s institutional destruction 
achieved its “Pareto Principle:” After years of strangling and expropriating private industries and 
farm lands that were later abandoned, just when the country must import nearly everything but is 
bankrupted, the UPI reports that: “Venezuela's Living Conditions Survey found that nearly 75 
																																																								
171 “It is just a minor simplification to say that Pareto thought that there was an iron law of 
income distribution, namely that inequality did not change whatever social system was in 
power. It gave consistency to his theory of the circulation of the elites, because whatever elite be 
in power (land-owning, capitalist or bureaucratic), income distribution would be the same 
although the people who would be rich or poor would be different.” Milanovic, Ibid. 
172 See the concluding postscript for an updated account of these events until August of 2017.  
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percent of the population lost an average of at least 19 pounds in 2016 due to a lack of proper 
nutrition […] and 82.8 percent of Venezuelans are considered poor due to their income.” 173  
But if all that Chavismo’s “socialism” has achieved is to recreate a crude 20/80 Pareto 
distribution by squeezing 80% of the former middle classes into the bottom levels of poverty, the 
Gini index could still indicate a reduced inequality as long as there has been a decrease in all 
declared incomes.174 For its part, the Palma index, which I present below, only considers the 
ratio of the richest 10% of the population’s share of gross national income divided by the share 
of the poorest 40%. But if we were to apply only that ratio to the current Venezuelan reality, we 
would neglect precisely 80% of the people that suffered a cataclysmic shift as to their formerly 
more homogeneous share, which is why José Gabriel Palma excludes them. He elucidates: 
There is a high degree of homogeneity across regions/countries regarding the share of 
income that the middle and upper-middle classes are able to appropriate. This is most 
striking among rich countries — i.e., no more diversity here, as in the Gini and top and 
bottom deciles. Moreover, Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union are 
no longer outliers; and South Africa and Brazil (as well as Latin America’s median 
country, Peru) are close to India, Uganda (Sub-Saharan Africa’s median country), and 
Thailand (East Asia-2 median country) […] The other major stylised fact is that the share 
of this half of the population is about half of national income […] perhaps rather than 
‘middle classes’ from now on this group should be called the ‘median classes’ […] 
																																																								
173 Andrew V. Pestano, “Venezuela: 75% of population lost 19 pounds amid crisis,” United 
Press International, February 19, 2017, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-
News/2017/02/19/Venezuela-75-of-population-lost-19-pounds-amid-crisis/2441487523377/ 
“Resultados de la Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida, ENCOVI 2016, Universidad 
Simón Bolívar Noticias, February 21, 2017 https://usbnoticias.info/post/49835 
Due to the lack of official statistics, the study, called ENCOVI, is a household survey of 6,430 
families conducted by the Central University of Venezuela, the Andrés Bello Catholic 
University, the Simón Bolívar University and the Fundación Bengoa Food and Nutrition Group 
with other non-governmental organizations. Emphasis mine. 
174 Margaret Chitiga, Emmanuel Sekyere, and Nthabi Tsoanamatsie, “Income inequality and the 




change from the ‘heterogeneity’ at the top to the ‘homogeneity’ in the middle is abrupt, 
taking place as soon as one moves from the distributional scene of D10 to that of D9. 175 
 
In fact, as Palma sums up: “half of the world's population (the middle and upper-middle 
classes) have acquired strong ‘property rights’ over half of their respective national incomes.”176 
He explains this as a “a centripetal force [that] leads to growing uniformity in the income-share 
appropriated by deciles 5 to 9.”177 Confirming this, even during the severe crisis that affected 
Venezuela from the mid 1980s until the turn of the century, income poverty spread to its bottom 
six deciles (although income in general eroded). But with 82.8% of the population income poor 
today, even a part of D9, the “well-to-do,” has been impoverished. Thus, considering only the 
ratio of the richest 10% of the population’s share of gross national income divided by that of the 
poorest 40% simply cannot reflect the collapse in income that desolates 82.8 % the country.  
In Venezuela, only D9, that second richest ten percent composed by some surviving 
medium-size entrepreneurs, the highest-paid professionals and the landlords of at least a handful 
of properties can be considered “middle class” in one of the most unequal countries in the world. 
And, at over 80% of income poverty, D9 is also vanishing.178 That staggering slant that we have 
found in many of its charts is perhaps a ghastly resemblance of Venezuela’s true Lorenz curve.179 
																																																								
175 José Gabriel Palma, “Homogeneous middles vs. Heterogeneous tails, and the end of the 
‘Inverted-U’: the share of the rich is what it’s all about,” Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics (CWPE) 1111, January 2011, p. 17: 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1111.pdf 
In statistical terms, a “decile” is each of ten equal groups into which a population can be divided 
according to the distribution of values of a particular variable. That is, it sorts one hundred by 
tens. In the case of income, D1 refers to the populations’ lowest 10 percent, D10 to its highest, 
D9 to its second highest ten percent, and so on. 
176 Ibid., 1. Emphasis mine. 
177 Ibid. 
178 In statistical terms, no decile can ever “vanish,” but all deciles can indeed be “flattened.”	
179 In the red line of the graph, we can see eight “flattened” deciles. Although wholly unrelated 
as indexes go, this is a simile between the sharp slant that replicates in the graphs shown in the 
second chapter and the true slant of what a very unequal society looks like using a Lorenz Curve.  
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But ratios can be revealing as well because of what they cannot account for. If efficiently 
implemented, Chavismo’s proclaimed social investments would have reduced inequality in ways 
difficult to measure by the Gini index. However, with a hyperinflation of 4,000% in 2017 (The 
IMF projects it will be of 13,000% in 2018), other than for the few and disappearing subsidized 
staples that can be found—normally under extreme hardship—the most basic needs have reached 
astronomical prices for all but the ultra rich.180 This has the obvious effect of increasing income 
inequality in ways that the Gini was not designed to detect; and these two distortions do not 
cancel each other out either, because extreme poverty affects now half of the Venezuelan people, 
of which eight deciles (82.8%) are income-poor today. Regarding the Palma ratio, this poverty 
happens in a country where due to its hyperinflation the highest salaries pale when compared to 
the untraceable incomes that result from trading preferential dollars and a monopoly of imports 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
“Income Inequality,” StatisticallyInsignificant, July 25, 2011: 
https://statisticallyinsignificant.wordpress.com/category/data-visualisations/page/2/ 
180 Biller, Ibid. Noah Smith, “Venezuela is living a hyperinflation nightmare,” Bloomberg View, 




purchased with them, their distribution, and many times their illegal resale or re-export at huge 
profits; and from the allocation of money for “social investments” and infrastructure in a country 
where the treasury is managed by what a couple of my interviewees termed a “mafia State.”181  
María Corina Machado explained this to me in a way that we can no longer ignore:  
Este es un régimen que está concentrando toda la propiedad y las decisiones en un grupo 
cada vez más reducido de personas, con un comportamiento muy preocupante porque, 
para mí, se asemeja cada día más no a Cuba sino a Rusia, donde tenemos una mafia 
State [in English]. Esto no es la operación de un sistema capitalista, con el cual, incluso, 
podamos tener todos nuestras diferencias. Quiero hacer la diferencia para describirte lo 
que yo creo que va a ocurrir en Venezuela. En la esencia de un régimen liberal hay 
competencia, hay reglas de juego claras, hay estado de derecho, hay independencia de 
poderes a los efectos de hacer respetar los compromisos. Esto no es lo que existe en 
Venezuela hoy en día. Lo que hay dramáticamente se asemeja cada día más a la 
operación de la mafias que han ido ocupando instituciones y donde las reglas no son las 
establecidas explícitamente, transparentemente, en un contrato como es la Constitución o 
como son las leyes de la República. Por eso se ha convertido en lo que está pasando. 182 
 
The astronomical difference between the long-held lowest official exchange rate of 10 
bolivars per U.S. dollar, until January 26 of 2018 (there are still two rates), and its black market 
value of 266,630.08 bolivars per U.S. dollar, that same date, brings to mind the “wheat and 
																																																								
181 And in a continent where, as Palma argues: “according to ECLAC (2010a) income tax 
evasion […] fluctuates between 40 per cent and 65 per cent, equivalent on average to 4.5 per 
cent of GDP.” Ibid., 35. One can only imagine the numbers in today’s fully rentierist Venezuela.  
182 “This is a regime that is concentrating all property and decisions on an ever-shrinking group 
of individuals with a very alarming behavior that I find every day more, not like Cuba, but like 
Russia. Here we have a mafia State. This isn't the operation of a capitalist system, with which we 
all could have our differences. I want to point out the difference in order to describe to you what 
I believe will happen in Venezuela. In the essence of a liberal regime, there's competition, there 
are clear game rules, there is rule of law, there is independence of the branches of government to 
make sure agreements are respected. This is not what exists in Venezuela today. What we have 
looks dramatically more and more, every day, like the operation of mafias that have occupied 
institutions and where the rules aren't those explicitly, transparently, established in a contract like 
the Constitution or the laws of the Republic. That is why it has turned into what is going on.” 
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chessboard problem.”183 “If a chessboard were to have wheat placed upon each square such that 
[starting with one grain in the first] it would double the number of grains on each subsequent 
square, how many grains of wheat would be on the chessboard at the end?”184 The short answer 
is: “about 1,645 times the global production of wheat in 2014.”185A shorter one would be: 
“enough to ruin the richest country on earth.” In a smaller scale, that is how many privileged 
government officers, civilian and military, have benefited for years from their ever-growing 
centrifuges of “small” transactions. But what follows is how the government operated with the 
Brazilian Odebrecht in just one of scores of “big” transactions assigned without public bidding: 
Entre 2010 y 2014, Corpoelec tomaba el monto de la factura de OIV en dólares y lo 
convertía en bolívares a la tasa del cambio preferencial [then of 4.30]. Luego se sumaba 
a la factura en bolívares. El total se desglosaba en dos partes, 80% y 20%. El primer 
monto se reconvertía en dólares (a tasa preferencial), y el segundo se mantenía en 
bolívares. Así, una factura de 2,3 millardos [2.3 billion] de bolívares y 18,8 millones de 
dólares se convertía en una de 491 millones de bolívares y 456,9 millones de dólares. 
“fueron más de 1.000 facturas que pasaron así”, relata el ingeniero de Odebrecht […] 
“Todo el mundo sabía que eso permitiría más robo”, recuerda otro ingeniero. “Pero 
arriba se dijo que se firmaba. Corpoelec tenía a Chávez presionando encima, había 
elecciones y mucho dinero […] “Por esa vía se pagaron 1.000 millones de dólares, 
buena parte en comisiones para la gerencia del proyecto de Tocoma”, agregó. 186 
																																																								
183 Editorial, “Gobierno elimina el tipo de cambio de 10 bolívares por dólar,” El Interés, January 
29, 2018: http://elestimulo.com/elinteres/gobierno-elimina-el-tipo-de-cambio-de-10-bolivares-
por-dolar/ 
“Dólar paralelo histórico Venezuela,” Chart, Dolartoday, https://dolartoday.com/historico-dolar/ 
184 “Wheat and Chessboard Problem,” Wikipedia: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wheat_and_chessboard_problem#Origin_and_story 
185 Ibid.	
186 “From 2010 to 2014, Corpoelec [Corporación Electrica Nacional, a fully integrated state 
power corporation] would take the sum of OIV's bill [OIV Consortium, constituted by Odebrecht 
Venezuela, Impreglio, and Vincler] in dollars, and convert it to bolivars at the preferential 
exchange rate [4.30 at the time]. Then, they would add this to the invoice in bolivars. The total 
would be broken-down in two parts, 80% and 20%. The first sum would be re-converted into 
dollars (at the preferential rate), and the second would be left in bolivars. Thusly, an invoice for 
2.3 billion bolivars and 18.8 million dollars would become one for 491 million bolivars and 
456.9 million dollars. ‘It was over 1,000 invoices that were processed like this,’ says Odebrecht's 
engineer […] “everybody knew that that allowed for even more stealing,’ recalls another 
engineer. ‘But the word from above was to sign. Corpoelec had Chávez breathing down their 
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  The day I write this, “Tocoma” is a still unfinished hydroelectric power plant, one of 23 
incomplete giant projects directly assigned by Chávez to Odebrecht.187 About a related situation, 
Andrés Oppenheimer, a journalist recipient of multiple awards, reports: “Venezuela’s PDVSA is 
likely to have funneled $11 billion in illegal payments to government officials and their allies 
during the same period, according to an October 2016 investigation by Venezuela’s opposition 
led National Assembly.”188 Indeed, there are dozens of bank accounts, a few in the billions of 
U.S. dollars and many more of lesser millionaire sums, that belong to both former and current 
Venezuelan government officers or their front men that have been well-documented from 
Switzerland trough Andorra to Panama, and in other fiscal paradises as well as in the U.S.189 It 
should not take a lot of effort to project some “wheat and chessboard” numbers to understand 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
necks, there were elections coming and lots of money […] That way over 1 billion dollars were 
paid, a good part of it for commissions for management of the Tacoma project,’ he added.”  
Fabiola Zerpa, “El redondeo cambiario que benefició a Odebrecht,” Armando Info, June 11, 
2017: https://www.armando.info/historias/7479=el-redondeo-cambiario-que-beneficio-a-
odebrecht 
187 “Lista de las obras inconclusas de Odebrecht en Venezuela,” La Razón, June 6, 2017: 
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Herald,  October 8, 2015: http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-
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188 Andrés Oppeheimer, “When it gets to corruption, Brazil gets headlines but Venezuela is 
world champion,” The Miami Herald, May 24, 2017: 
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Banks, Report Says,” International Business Times, Feruary 10, 2015: 
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Associated Press, “The tiny European state of Andorra says a study shows one of its banks had 
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https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-03-09/923-accounts-at-andorra-bank-
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how the “Socialism of the 21st Century” was Chávez’s most ingenious myth besides his own 
persona. Thanks to millions of devoted believers and the nation’s money, he made it catch fire in 
the continent and among many progressive scholars, while making of a developing nation that 
just decades ago was one of the richest in the world not only a poor country today, but also one 
of the most income-unequal on earth. Or, as the director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin American 
Center – Atlantic Council, Jason Marczak, argued: “This is a country that was an economic star 
















190 Fred Imbert, “Venezuela announces a new exchange rate, but this one probably won’t help 
either,” CNBC, March 28, 2017: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/28/venezuelan-just-announced-
a-new-currency-rate--and-nobody-cares.html 
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Concluding Journalistic Postscript: About Political Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity 
Would it not be easier for the government to dissolve the people and elect another?                 
Bertolt Brecht 
Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely,  
the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy,                                                                   
but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance. 
Hanna Arendt 
Amid declining oil prices and shortages of basic food and supplies, for the first time in sixteen 
years, on December 6 of 2015, the opposition won parliamentary elections in Venezuela. It won 
overwhelmingly; with 74.3% of voter participation, the opposition’s bloc, the Mesa de Unidad 
Democrática (MUD), obtained 112 seats vs. 55 of the official PSUV, a two-thirds supermajority 
to legislate.191 An internal scuffle to reject the results was quashed late that night, when the 
minister of defense gave a then rare press conference surrounded by his high command to 
guarantee that, whatever the results, the popular will would be respected. Well after midnight, 
the government recognized its parliamentary defeat and swiftly maneuvered to neutralize it.192  
Less than two weeks later, days only before handing over the Asamblea Nacional, the 
still Chavista-controlled body elected 13 Supreme Court justices and 21 acting judges to replace 
those whose terms were to expire under the newly elected parliament, violating in the process all 
the legal terms and procedures mandated by the Constitution.193 In turn, in January, that newly 
appointed Tribunal Supremo de Justicia declared the National Assembly outside the law after 
disqualifying the three legislators from the opposition block that represented the aboriginal 
																																																								
191 Editorial, “Venezuela election: Opposition ‘supermajority’ confirmed,” BBC News, December 
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192 Editorial, “An Act of Desperation in Caracas?” Stratfor Worldview, December 22, 2015: 
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193 Alfredo Meza, “El chavismo nombra a 13 jueces fieles para el Supremo,” El País, December 
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peoples—exactly the number that granted the opposition a supermajority— alleging that they 
had committed fraud to win the elections. However, no remedies were provided (not even a new 
election in that state) and the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia declared the new Asamblea Nacional 
in contempt, voiding all its legislative and political attributions as well as its role of comptroller 
by instructing all government officers that had been summoned to investigate embezzlement and 
other crimes to disregard the new Asamblea’s requests.194 On January 15, the Tribunal Supremo 
granted President Nicolás Maduro emergency powers to rule by decree.195 On October 20th, the 
Consejo Nacional Electoral, a Chavista-appointed “Electoral Power,” cancelled the presidential 
referendum on the grounds of four complaints filed by Chavista officers in regional criminal 
courts questioning the validity of signature recollection.196 Two days earlier, it had suspended 
gubernatorial elections stating that it was a priority to resolve the economic crisis.197 In the 
meantime, Maduro stated publicly that there would be no new elections until they were certain 
that they could win: “Cuando haya elecciones que el CNE las convoque, no sé cuándo, en qué 
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195 “For 60 days,” renewed for another 60 days in March and again in May for the rest of 2016. It 
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60 días,” El País, January 16, 2016: 
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año; cuando volvamos a llegar al campo electoral debemos tener asegurada la victoria.”198 He 
also promised they “would win with guns what they could not by votes.”199 Despite the growing 
clamor, just as it had happened whenever opposition governors and mayors had been stripped of 
any real power by defunding their local governments and/or creating parallel jurisdictions run by 
Chavista loyalists, on the domestic front the country seemed to return to the watchful control of 
the Chavista Executive and its still subservient Judiciary, Electoral, and “Citizen” branches.200 
Internationally, however, but also with grave repercussions for the country, the Chavista 
government faced a predicament. According to the Venezuelan Constitution, only the National 
Assembly has the power to authorize—and thus make binding—any international agreements 
entered by the government, including as well those related to its foreign debt. Adding to the dire 
economic crisis caused by the sharp drop in oil prices that started in 2014, countries that were 
already reluctant to continue lending money to the Chavista regime realized that there would be 
no legal way in the future to enforce any agreements entered with the Venezuelan government if 
the Asamblea Nacional did not first approve them.201 On March 30th of this year, after over one 
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year of clashes between the branches of government led by the Executive and an emasculated 
Asamblea Nacional, the Tribunal Supremo assumed the Parliament’s functions and cancelled the 
immunity of its representatives. Two days later, on April 1st, the resulting outcry forced Maduro 
to “ask” the Tribunal Supremo to “reconsider” their ruling, which they partially reversed the next 
day, but that blunder caused the first significant schism within Chavismo, and its consequences 
have brought the country to the forefront of the international news as I write this postscript.202 
 It is out of the scope of this thesis to analyze the extreme levels of viciousness that the 
Venezuelan security forces and Chavismo’s paramilitary colectivos have exerted since April of 
this year to suppress months of daily multitudinous protests. Still, a few references are necessary 
before I can conclude. In its draft resolution of August 9 to suspend Venezuela from the Human 
Rights Council due to “gross and systematic violations of Human Rights,” the UN expresses: 
“Alarm” by the findings of the team deployed by the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, which documented the Government of Venezuela’s widespread and systematic 
use of excessive force and arbitrary detentions against demonstrators, and patterns of 
other human rights violations, including violent house raids, torture and ill-treatment of 
those detained in connection with the protests; security forces firing tear gas and 
buckshot at anti-Government protestors without warning; the systematic use of 
disproportionate force by security forces, mainly the National Guard, the National Police 
and local police forces, to instill fear, crush dissent, and to prevent demonstrators from 
assembling, rallying and reaching public institutions to present petitions; the role of pro-
Government armed groups, or armed colectivos, who routinely break into protests on 
motorcycles, wielding firearms and harassing or in some cases shooting at people, 
leading to at least 27 deaths (of a total of 124); the arbitrary detention of more than 5,051 
people from April through July of this year, with credible reports of cruel, inhuman or 
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degrading treatment by security forces of such detainees, amounting in several cases to 
torture, using tactics such as electric shocks, beatings, including with helmets and sticks 
while handcuffed, hanging detainees by the wrists for long periods, suffocation with gas, 
and threats of killings, and in some cases threats of sexual violence against the detainees 
or their families; and the targeting by security forces of journalists to prevent them from 
covering demonstrations, including by shooting at them with tear gas canisters and 
buckshot, despite being clearly identified, and by detaining and threatening journalists, 
and on several occasions stealing their equipment; [the UN welcomed] the Declaration of 
Lima of 8 August 2017 by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru, which determined that 
Venezuela is no longer a democracy, and that the so-called National Constituent 
Assembly is illegitimate; condemned the systematic violation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, violence, repression and political persecution, the existence of 
political prisoners and the lack of free elections under independent international 
observation; expressed concern about the humanitarian crisis; and condemned the refusal 
of the Government of Venezuela to allow food and medicine to enter the country. 203 
 
 In its article, “Venezuela: Lethal violence, a state policy to strangle dissent,” Amnesty 
International establishes a pattern: “These violent acts have targeted dissident demonstrations but 
also private homes in several states across the country, which again demonstrates the generalized 
nature of this strategy of violence.”204 And as to this premeditated policy, they document how: 
Both the illegitimate use of force in all its dimensions, and the development of state 
mechanisms of persecution against the population, are framed within a discourse of 
incitement to violence that has been promoted and used by the Venezuelan government to 
legitimize violence as the standard response to any form of dissent. In particular, calls by 
senior officials including President Nicolás Maduro himself, addressed to both state 
security forces and pro-government civilian groups, promote the use of force and identify 
dissidents as terrorists, enemies and traitors to the motherland […] The illegitimate use of 
force against the population on a recurrent basis, the creation of state mechanisms 
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dedicated to violent repression, and the repeated discourse of incitement to violence by 
the government - indicate a premeditated policy to violently neutralize any dissent.205 
 More concretely, in the presentation of its “Venezuela: Video footage exposes brutal 
repression,” Human Rights Watch describes how security forces terrorize the population: 
Security forces have used a variety of riot control munitions – pellets, marbles, teargas 
canisters, and other so-called non-lethal cartridges – in response to demonstrations. In 
several cases these munitions have been used inappropriately, at too close a range or 
directly targeting people, causing deaths or severe injury […] Security forces have also 
shot toward demonstrations from rooftops and run over demonstrators with an armored 
vehicle. In many cases, the victims clearly posed no imminent threat and offered no 
resistance. Some were not even participating in demonstrations. Security forces have 
fired teargas canisters directly toward demonstrators, health workers, and the Red Cross 
building in Caracas, and into malls, homes, universities, and health facilities.206 
 By July 31st, from 5,051 civilian detainees of whom 401 were minors, 609 had been tried 
in military courts accused of treason and rebellion, according to the U.N.’s High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, which reports cases of forced disappearances.207 And of the 1,383 people that 
remain in jail, the Venezuelan Penal Forum and Human Rights Watch have reported in a joint 
statement that 609 are political prisoners.208 For some opposition leaders, there are over 1,000.209 
																																																								
205 Ibid. 
206 José Miguel Vivanco, Americas Director, “Venezuela: Video footage exposes brutal 
repression. Violent Response to Widespread Protests,” Human Rights Watch, July 21, 2017: 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/21/venezuela-video-footage-exposes-brutal-repression 
207 Editorial, “Expertos de la ONU denuncian uso de tribunales militares en Venezuela,” 
Panorama, August 28, 2017: http://www.panorama.com.ve/politicayeconomia/Expertos-de-la-
ONU-denuncian-uso-de-tribunales-militares-en-Venezuela-20170804-0035.html 
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Latest Updates on Venezuela’s Crisis, “Arbitrary Detentions in Venezuela: Failure to Release 
Detainees Granted Bail,” Human Rights Watch, August 25, 2017: https://www.hrw.org/blog-
feed/venezuelas-crisis 
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 This brief review would not be complete without mentioning the government’s response 
to try to dodge the accusations of political crimes and of crimes against humanity, for, knowingly 
or unwittingly, it has had the nearly universal effect of turning Venezuela into a pariah State. On 
July 30th of 2017, Nicolás Maduro’s government held elections to create a “National Constituent 
Assembly” decreed by him without a prior referendum. The process has been condemned in the 
strongest terms by the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Luis Almagro, 
and 15 of its members, by the European Union at large and even by countries traditionally 
neutral like Switzerland and Norway. 210 This is how the U.S. Department of State described it:  
The process was rigged from the start, from the irregular manner in which the election 
was decreed to the government’s refusal to permit voters to object to plans to rewrite the 
constitution. The balloting itself was further designed to fill the National Constituent 
Assembly with Maduro loyalists. In a country suffering from malnutrition, the regime 
threatened that those who did not vote would lose access to food, pension, or employment 
benefits. Finally, the election lacked credible international observation.211 
But besides revising the Constitution of 1999, the immediate goals behind having a new 
Constituyente were clear to many: first, to find an alternative to legitimately supersede the 
Asamblea Nacional elected by over 14 million people on December 6 of 2015; secondly, to 
remove the powerful Chavista Attorney General, Luisa Ortega Díaz, who had denounced the 
Tribunal Supremo’s constitutional coup d’état to usurp the Asamblea Nacional’s functions, and 
who later became a thorn in the government’s side during the protests by condemning the violent 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
209 Yon Goicochea, “I am in prison because I want freedom for my country,” The New York 
Times, Septermber 4, 2017: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/opinion/venezuela-prison-
democracy.html?mcubz=0 
210 Editorial, “Más de 40 países están en contra de la constituyente,” Runrunes de El Nacional, 
August 30, 2017: http://runrun.es/nacional/319659/mas-de-40-paises-estan-en-contra-de-la-
constituyente.html 
211 Heather Nauert, Press Statement, “Venezuela’s Illegitimate National Constituent Assembly,” 
U.S Department of State, August 3, 2017: https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273024.htm 
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repression by security forces and paramilitary colectivos as well as the military trials of civilians 
and cases of political prisoners; and, finally, to contrive a new form of electoral legitimation.  
The first two proposals were unanimously approved during the Constituyente’s very first 
session, even before voting on the new body’s procedures and objectives: Ortega was dismissed, 
accused of fomenting violence, and both she and her husband, a congressman, were accused of 
extortion.212 That same day, the National Assembly’s attributions were transferred to the new 
Constituyente (which, according to Chavismo’s second-in-command, the former National 
Assembly’s President, Diosdado Cabello, “would govern Venezuela for up to two years before 
presenting the country a new constitution that would allow for elections”).213 And on August 
12th, after four months of the reported horrors against the population, and after breaking 21 
constitutional articles to come into being by means of the biggest electoral fraud documented in 
the country, an again unanimous Constituyente brought forward the twice postponed regional 
elections, but not before vetoing the Mesa de Unidad Democrática from nominating candidates 
in seven states.214 Indeed, Cabello threatened, only with a “certificate of good conduct,” granted 
by the spurious Constituyente, would the opposition’s candidates be allowed to participate. 215  
																																																								
212 Harriet Alexander, “Venezuelan Attorney General fired by newly-installed constituent 
assembly as her office surrounded by troops in ‘siege’,” The Telegraph, August 5, 2017: 
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213 Nicholas Casey, “Venezuela’s Ousted Attorney General Retreats on a Motorbike,” The New 
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214 Thays Peñalver, “La constituyente cubana,” La Patilla, July 28, 2017: 
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215 Naky Soto, “New Sanctions,” Caracas Chronicles, August 10, 2017: 
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Adding to this electoral reality, according to the Venezuelan Penal Forum, to date at least 
16 of the most popular opposition governors and mayors have been either imprisoned or barred 
from public office, or else have fled the country to avoid persecution.216  For her part, after her 
own cinematographic escape via Aruba in a speedboat, the former Attorney General and her 
husband form part now of the over two million people who compose the Venezuelan diaspora.217 
According to her statements in Brazil, she fled the country with multiple dossiers of government 
officers and their front men who she had been investigating for corruption and other charges.218 
During the spring protests, Pedro Trigo, the renowned Spanish-Venezuelan theologian, author of 
over fifty books and articles, explained Chavismo’s transformation after Chávez died as follows: 
Aunque la pretensión de Chávez era totalitaria, no llegó a serlo de hecho. Mientras se 
mantuvo la bonanza petrolera y el carisma del líder, la propuesta totalitaria fue ganando 
terreno a la medida de su capacidad para configurar lo que decretaban. El problema fue 
que esa capacidad brilló por su ausencia […] De la revolución no existe ni la sombra. 
Pero subsiste el copamiento del espacio por parte del “proceso” para lucrarse, es decir, 
mafiosamente. Si no hay ya ninguna pretensión alternativa, ya no hay totalitarismo. Pero 
si la anarquización está copada por el gobierno, que se lucra de ella e impide cualquier 
vía alternativa, y sobre todo que funcionen los mecanismos institucionales, que son los 
canales de la democracia, ante todo las elecciones, pero también la Asamblea Nacional, 
es que estamos en una dictadura. Como la gente está hambrienta y enferma y amenazada 
siempre por la inseguridad impune ¿cómo se va a oponer al gobierno? […] La inmensa 
																																																								
216 Lorena Quintanilla Muñoz, “Once alcaldes de oposición han sido suspendidos por el TSJ,” El 
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mayoría de la gente está en contra de él; pero él sigue controlando todos los espacios y 
desplaza sin contemplaciones a quien pretende ocuparlos. Es una dictadura.219 
Chávez was not, as many in the opposition argued, wearing a democratic mask to preach 
the virtues of social justice. He was in fact the first politician in Latin America who effectively 
articulated the scandalous inverse correlation between poverty and democracy in the continent at 
a time when the neoliberal policies had all but buried that discussion. But Chávez amalgamated a 
genuine and at times positively transforming “love for the people” with a totalitarian conception 
of power, essentially militaristic although equivocally respectful of democratic forms: he was 
indeed the mask of a totalitarian process that tried to seize a whole country by the relentless 
dismantling of its institutions. Yet, for this to happen, Chávez first had to pocket the country’s 
electoral majority, which he achieved by “naming” its obscene class-divide as one between a 
glorious “people,” mostly poor and all Chavistas, and everyone else, who then became the 
traitors, oligarchs and right-wingers of Chavismo’s socialist discourse. But Chávez also needed 
abundant money, and, paradoxically, he could never achieve his totalitarian goals while oil prices 
allowed him to generously redistribute it. This was not only out of ineptitude, as Trigo explains, 
but also, and mainly, due to what economist José Palma has found as a constant in much of the 
																																																								
219 “Although Chávez's aspiration was totalitarian, it never became a reality. While the oil boom 
and the leader's charisma were in full swing, the totalitarian proposal kept gaining ground to the 
extent of its capacity to adjust to what was being decreed. But this capacity was conspicuous for 
its absence […] Not even a shadow remains of the revolution. But the occupation of spaces by 
the “process” in order to profit, that is to say, as a mafia, subsists. If there can no longer be any 
alternative aspiration left, totalitarianism is no more. But if the turn into anarchy occupies the 
government, which profits from it and impedes any alternative way, and, above all, impedes 
institutional mechanisms, which are the channels for democracy – of elections, above all, but 
also the National Assembly – [it means that] we are in a dictatorship. Since the people are 
hungry and sick, and always threatened by crime and impunity, how are they going to oppose the 
government? […] The vast majority of the people are against it, but it remains in control of all 
spaces and displaces anyone who intends to occupy them without hesitation. It is a dictatorship.” 
Pedro Trigo, s. j. “Venezuela, ¿del totalitarismo a la dictadura?”, América 2.1 (originally in 
Teología Hoy), May 30, 2017: http://americanuestra.com/pedro-trigo-s-j-venezuela-del-
totalitarismo-la-dictadura/ 
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world: In Venezuela, too, the middle classes had acquired strong “property rights” over half of 
their national income. Despite the ruin of most of the country’s private industry and agriculture, 
while money was still abundant there was a relatively fluid market for the professionals of the 
public and private sectors and medium and small commerce owners and workers: they and their 
families were variously middle-class. However, less than three years of meager oil revenues and 
the corrupt diversion of much of that revenue into the “Boligarchy’s” pockets have been enough 
to reveal the across-the-board devastation and plunder of the country’s economy. What a failed 
totalitarian and coup d’état leader could not achieve by design, to own a country, is now being 
openly sought by force. Chavismo, today, is a dictatorship. Ironically, the dangerous mix of 
humanitarian catastrophe and violent repression that is spiraling out of control under Chávez’s 
anointed heir, Nicolás Maduro, was best forewarned upon Chávez’s death by one of the de facto 
powers behind the throne in Venezuela, Diosdado Cabello: “Yo les digo, señores, ustedes tenían 
que haber rezado mucho para que Chávez siguiera vivo, señores de la oposición, porque Chávez 
era el muro de contención de muchas ideas locas que a veces se nos ocurren a nosotros.” 220 
And just as the Chavista regime and too many scholars worldwide keep blaming it all on 
an economic and informational war promoted by El Imperio and the right wing, and the world’s 
right wing keeps denouncing Venezuela’s socialism for all its plagues, the Chavista people will 




220 “ I tell you, gentlemen, you should have prayed a lot for Chávez to stay alive, gentlemen of 
the opposition, because Chávez was the wall of contention for many crazy ideas that sometimes 
occur to us.” Jesús Chua Espinoza, “Ese Chávez que llamaban loco era el ‘único cuerdo’ ¡No se 



























About my Interviews and the Interviewees with summaries in Spanish of all interviews 
 
Following, I briefly introduce my interviewees in the order in which we met. After that, I offer in 
Spanish the script of questions that guided my conversations to further explore and support many 
of the arguments of this thesis. I interviewed the same number of public figures both from the 
government and from those who opposed it. Still, from each “side” of this artificially contrived 
polarization, two of my interviewees were decidedly critical both of the government and of the 
opposition. Due to their historical value, I have also included summaries in Spanish, of roughly 
1,200 words each, of all ten interviews, but I present them in counterpoint rather than in the order 
of our meetings. The full interviews are available upon request both in transcripts and recordings.  
Speaking with notables from the two sides while making them aware of my intentions was itself 
a daunting challenge.221 With the country deeply divided after the failed coup d’état of 2002, and 
thus deeply paranoid not only of “the enemy” but of being perceived as “collaborators,” for over 
a decade most public figures had limited their interviews to their own partisan channels, or, with 
luck, to those they considered potential sympathizers. My questions were basically the same for 
all my interviewees, adjusted to their circumstances, but they did require some careful wording 
and fine-tuning. After the list of my interviewees, I present my script for those in the opposition.  
 
																																																								
221  On a curious note, on July 29 of 2013, during the week I conducted my last three interviews, 
former ambassador, congressman, and journalist Vladimir Villegas, since May of that year news 
director of Globovisión TV, conducted the first interview in his now popular program, Vladimir 
a la 1, a space where, for the first time in over a decade, public figures from both the government 
and opposition started granting interviews in the same show. See “Un año de Vladimir a la 1,” El 























List of Interviewees  
Américo Martín: Lawyer, politician, prolific author and editorial journalist, former presidential 
candidate and guerrilla leader during the sixties. He was the founder of the leftist MIR party: 
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Am%C3%A9rico_Mart%C3%ADn 
Luis Pellicer: Historian with an M.A. in Latin American Studies from the Universidad de 
Andalucía and a Ph.D. from the Universidad Internacional de Sevilla, Spain. President of 
Venezuela's Archivo General de la Nación and President in charge of the Centro Nacional de 
Historia: http://www.gacemail.com.ar/notas.php?idnota=17259 
Rafael Uzcátegui: Chief Research Coordinator of PROVEA (Venezuelan Program of 
Education-Action on Human Rights), one of Venezuela's most prominent Human Rights NGOs; 
author of the book Venezuela, Revolution as Spectacle (translated into English) and coeditor of 
the only anarchist publication in the country: http://libcom.org/blog/book-review-venezuela-
revolution-spectacle-rafael-uzc%C3%A1tegui-09092011 
Héctor Enrique Soto: Minister of Culture until 2011, former Vice Minister of the Secretary of 
the Presidency and of the “Human Development” Vice-Ministry of Culture; founder of Misión 
Cultura in 2005: http://www.aporrea.org/ddhh/n115737.html  
María Corina Machado: Founder and former president of the Venezuelan civil organization 
Súmate. In February of 2010, Machado resigned from Súmate and announced her candidacy for 
the September 10 elections for the National Assembly of Venezuela; she was elected as the 
highest vote-getter in the national elections (and was recently impeached): 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mar%C3%ADa_Corina_Machado 
	 94	
Stalin Pérez Borges: National Coordinator of the pro-government UNT, Unión Nacional de los 
Trabajadores (national trade-union confederation); editor of the journal Marea Socialista: 
http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?auteur353 
José León Uzcátegui: Current Director of Barrio Adentro (social welfare program with over 
7,000 centers nationwide to provide healthcare in poor communities), former Health Vice 
Minister with an M.A. in Economy, an M.D in Psychiatry, and a Ph.D. in Social Sciences: 
http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/a168442.html   
Margarita López Maya: Historian, Academy Member of the Universidad Central de Venezuela 
and the Center for Development Studies with expertise in contemporary history and 
sociopolitical analysis of Venezuela. Visiting fellow at various universities overseas, including 
Oxford, Columbia, and Notre Dame University, and former editor of the Venezuelan Magazine 
of Economics and Social Sciences of the Universidad Central de Venezuela: 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/staff/margarita-lopez-maya 
Tulio Hernández: Arguably one of the handful most influential intellectuals for the opposition. 
A sociologist expert in Culture, Communication, and Politics, Academy Member and 
international consultant for cultural and urban politics, he is also a well-known cinematographer: 
http://www.el-nacional.com/autores/tulio_hernandez/  
Luis Ugalde S.J., President of the “Association of Universities Entrusted to the Society of Jesus 
in Latin America,” former Dean of Venezuela's Catholic University; author of numerous books 




Interview Questions in Spanish 
 
1.- El título aún tentativo de esta tesis es “Venezuela after Chávez: Politics and Propaganda”. Sin 
embargo, más que pretender una cándida revelación de las diferencias entre cada discurso 
electoral y los diversos sustratos ideológicos, dígame usted: ¿cómo cree que ha cambiado la 
conciencia política venezolana durante los últimos tres lustros?		
	
2.- ¿Cuáles son algunas de las discrepancias entre política y propaganda en cuanto al gobierno 
y la realidad que vive el país? ¿Cuál es la más grave? ¿A qué las atribuye? 
 
3.- Si algo signa al Chavismo desde sus orígenes ha sido sus contradicciones, muchas de las 
cuales se pueden entender a partir del caos político en el que se hundió el país ante el 
agotamiento de un sistema que dejó de satisfacer a sus electores. A pesar de ello, el discurso 
absolutista y plebiscitario de Chávez, y la reacción de una oposición venezolana rígidamente 
liberal, en lugar de explorar las iluminadoras ambigüedades de esta mutación política las han 
ignorado. Esto a mi parecer ha empobrecido el discurso político (Y a esto cabría agregársele un 
cierto totalitarismo académico de izquierdas que desde el exterior descalifica como 
neoconservadora hasta a la oposición más de izquierdas que se le hace al gobierno). Ante este 
diálogo de sordos, ¿cómo se hace aún política en Venezuela? 
 
4.- La amalgama de movimientos sociales y políticos que en su momento se aglutinó en torno al 
chavismo encuentra hoy equivalencias en la Mesa de Unidad. Ante esta nueva crisis de 
legitimidad, la oposición busca formar causa común en torno a candidaturas de consenso, 
¿cuáles serían, en lo social, económico y político, algunas discrepancias que usted prevé 
deberán dirimirse de resultar exitosa la estrategia unitaria de la oposición? 
 
5.- Esta es una investigación que se realiza desde los Estados Unidos. Como tal, el tema 
bilateral me interesa especialmente. Me llama la atención que el desmedido recurso discursivo 
que utiliza el gobierno sobre el “imperialismo norteamericano” encuentra un similarmente 
asombroso “vacío de discurso” en la oposición frente a una realidad económica y geopolítica 
que a lo largo de más de ciento cincuenta años ha implicado más de cincuenta intervenciones 
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militares norteamericanas y la “administración” de muchos de nuestros países como sus 
virtuales protectorados. Más recientemente, el proceso de globalización sugiere otra virtual 
norteamericanización del planeta. Si bien una de las primordiales contradicciones del chavismo 
ha radicado en su furibundo discurso antiimperialista versus su total complacencia con una 
apertura petrolera que, en los hechos, casi ha devuelto al país al “fifty-fifty” de antes de la 
nacionalización de la industria, ¿cuál debería ser, a su entender, la política del “petroestado” 
venezolano? Más aún, ¿es este petroestado rentista, importador de casi-todas-las-cosas –bien 
sea desde Latinoamérica, el “Imperio” o La China– el único paradigma viable para Venezuela?  
 
6.- En el mismo sentido, ¿cuál cree usted que debería ser la política exterior venezolana en 
cuanto a la consolidación de los bloques regionales que ha fomentado el chavismo? 
 
7.- En las últimas ofertas electorales de Henrique Capriles Radonski, se percibe un 
acercamiento que parece genuino con muchas de las políticas sociales rescatadas por el 
gobierno Chavista. Pero, más a fondo, cabe preguntarse con la historiadora Margarita López 
Maya: ¿hasta qué punto podrá negociar la oposición con un proyecto de “Estado Comunal” que 
con sus múltiples perversiones de control parece bastante enraizado? 
 
8.- Dice Fernando Mires que “El gangsterismo político es signo de que el populismo ha entrado 
a su fase terminal, la que, como ocurre con algunas enfermedades agónicas, también podría ser 
duradera”. Ante la progresiva falta de legitimación del actual gobierno y su total renuencia a 
dejar el poder, ¿cómo se puede hacer aún política con efectividad? 
 
9.- ¿Podría genuinamente referirse a algunos de los logros del chavismo, planificados y/o 
accidentales, que usted cree sería indispensable incorporar en cualquier futuro gobierno? 
 
10.- A su entender, ¿cuáles son las tres peores plagas originales del chavismo que se deberán 




1,200-word summaries of all the original interviews in Spanish: a counterpoint 
 
Tulio Hernández 
El venezolano se ha convertido en un ser más anómico. Es un fenómeno muy extraño porque, 
por un lado, la ciudadanía está más politizada que nunca, entendiendo por politización no 
necesariamente militancia sino interés, preocupación, seguimiento de la vida política, pero, por 
otro lado, la conducta, los valores, lo que se hace evidente en una salida a la calle es que el 
venezolano, incluyendo todas las clases sociales, es alguien cada vez menos apegado a las 
normas, alguien que se rige cada vez más no por un sentido de destino común sino por un 
sentido de pertenencias parciales y con un gran desapego por lo público. Por ejemplo, puedes 
entrar a un barrio, a una casa, y está limpiecita, bonita, pero en la entrada puedes conseguir 
toda la suciedad del mundo porque la gente no siente que eso es parte de sus responsabilidades. 
Creo que esto, además, tiene que ver profundamente con la polarización, la polarización política 
que genera mecanismos de solidaridad mecánica y mecanismos de desprecio automático de 
acuerdo a las pertenencias políticas de cada quien. El daño más fuerte de todo esto es que la 
gente pertenece primero a un bando que a un país, que a una nación, que a una comunidad 
nacional, y ese daño se mantiene en el otro elemento, que yo creo que no es que nació pero que 
se ha acrecentado en estos 14 años, que es la introducción del odio en la vida pública, del odio 
político, del odio ideológico e, incluso, de uno que estaba soterrado pero que se ventiló 
abiertamente que es el odio étnico, que es una sobrevivencia de la era colonial que la 
democracia no tuvo ni el tino ni la inteligencia ni la valentía de abordar. Y el otro elemento 
negativo de estos 14 años es el retorno y la multiplicación de una tara nacional que nos ha 
hecho mucho daño, que es el estatismo y el paternalismo, y una de las incidencias más grandes 
	 98	
es el retorno de la población a las prácticas del clientelismo que a su vez son prácticas de la 
mendicidad instaladas como forma de sustitución del trabajo y de la productividad. Entonces, yo 
diría que aquí hay un círculo perverso: como nunca antes somos mono productores, somos un 
estado rentista, como nunca el Estado es el distribuidor arbitrario de la renta petrolera y como 
nunca antes se ha incrementado en la gente tanto el sentimiento de que el Estado le debe algo y 
de que, como el petróleo es propiedad de todos, el Estado tiene obligación de mantenerlo […] 
Lo que ya veníamos arrastrando desde los finales de la década de los noventa, que no era una 
crisis política cualquiera sino una ruptura civilizatoria, el choque entre dos modelos o dos 
maneras de estar en la modernidad o de estar en el siglo XXI, se aceleró, se radicalizó, y yo creo 
que éste es un país roto, fragmentado por una población que ya se acostumbró a vivir en medio 
del horror, de la emergencia, de la improvisación, en medio de la idea de que el futuro no es 
más que una tela opaca, que nadie puede imaginar el futuro. Esto que estoy describiendo es, 
para mí, como una sociedad de posguerra. Es decir, en estos 15 años no hubo en Venezuela una 
guerra civil en el sentido clásico como la que ocurrió entre sandinistas y contras en Nicaragua, 
como la que ocurrió en España entre la falangistas y republicanos, y no hubo tampoco un 
proceso autoritario como el de Chile o el de Argentina, pero sí ocurrió ya una guerra profunda 
que fue una guerra simbólica, una guerra afectiva, en el orden del lenguaje, que ha dejado, 
como todas las guerras, un país devastado, un país moralmente en ruinas, donde hay una gran 
sufrimiento de tipo político, término que tomo de la sociología brasileña, usado para referirse a 
un sufrimiento producto generalmente de guerras o de grandes confrontaciones que la persona 
no puede digerir afectivamente porque no está codificado como tal. Se sigue pensando que lo 
político es algo exterior a la subjetividad o a la afectividad. En casos como el de Venezuela, 
donde durante 14 años hubo un secuestro de la psique colectiva, es la diferencia entre darle cien 
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cachetadas a un niño o decirle repetidamente eres un imbécil, eres un imbécil. Probablemente se 
tengan los mismos resultados […] Esa es la percepción que tengo, con un agravante, que en esta 
guerra la sensación es que nadie ganó, no hay triunfadores, los dos lados están adoloridos, el 
lado que gobierna dice que entre el imperio y la oligarquía le han impedido hacer la revolución, 
y el otro lado se siente perseguido, aplastado, perseguido, discriminado, ofendido, humillado. 
Entonces, lo que ha ocurrido en el país es una alianza perder-perder. 
La obra más acabada de Chávez es él mismo, es decir el haber construido rápidamente 
en el imaginario una figura, una leyenda, un liderazgo carismático en los términos de Max 
Weber, y con ese liderazgo haber sido el activador también de una afectividad adolorida que era 
la de los pobres venezolanos que se sintieron postergados, y no solo los pobres, la clase media 
baja también, la clase media que se había sentido defraudada. Ahora, cómo se produce en la 
práctica eso, porque no hay discurso que tenga eco sin beneficios concretos, es decir si no hay 
una relación costo beneficio. Bueno, en una gran inclusión que se produjo en Venezuela, pero 
esa inclusión se produjo a través del mercado. Es decir, los barrios están igualitos, tienen las 
mismas carencias. Probablemente lo único nuevo fueron las misiones que hacían sentir a la 
gente que se les estaba prestando atención directa, pero la verdadera gran inclusión fue la 
redistribución del ingreso que permitió que mucha gente se incorporara al consumo, sobre todo 
al consumo de determinados bienes eléctricos, electrónicos, del hogar, y al consumo de ropas de 
marcas y al consumo globalizado. Esa inclusión a través del mercado es realmente la única 
transformación profunda porque, a juzgar por el aparato económico, esto es un capitalismo de 
estado con un mercado tradicional de sociedades mono productoras […] Y lo que sí hay, que es 
la otra forma de inclusión, es eso que tú llamas un estado paralelo, que es más parecido a un 
campamento, a una emergencia, a un operativo que a una institución sólida; por consiguiente, 
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es un estado que se desmorona apenas le quitas el dinero, porque no hay organización. Esto es 
lo que me hace suponer que una transformación del país va a tener más dificultades. Es decir, 
volver a un mínimo de normalidad democrática, volver a un juego del pluralismo, consolidar las 
instituciones, va a tener más resistencia en el orden de la cultura política de la gente y en el 
orden de las nuevas economías, sobre todo la economía generada por el narcotráfico y todas las 
otras formas de ilegalidad, el contrabando en la frontera colombiana, la corrupción cotidiana.  
Aquí puedes traer a administrar a Santa Teresita de Jesús, pero con esa cantidad de 
dinero no solo se pervierte, sino que el Estado es más poderoso que la sociedad, hay una 
inequidad y hay un desequilibrio, hay un falla de origen para hablar en términos de video, 
porque un dirigente político que gobierne un Estado que es más poderoso que el resto de la 
sociedad estará siempre tentado al autoritarismo y a la corrupción.  
 
Héctor Soto 
Con el chavismo ha habido tremendo avance. El avance en concreto es: yo no quiero trabajar, 
pero de todo esto que se reparten denme mi parte. Ciertamente que hay algo cultural que marca 
la historia de Venezuela, que es el rentismo. Cuando un país comienza a vivir de algo que sale 
del subsuelo y que no está vinculado al trabajo, entonces hay una desviación ideológica. Es muy 
difícil así abordar las preguntas que creo que vas a hacer sin establecer una relación entre los 
dos grandes programas mundiales de los últimos 200 años, que son todas las corrientes 
colectivistas -entre ellas el marxismo o el socialismo, el socialismo de Estado, la 
socialdemocracia.- y los programas individualistas -el fascismo, el capitalismo, el 
neoliberalismo- todo eso a la luz de un país que se hizo rentista, es decir de un país que 
desvinculó por razones históricas el bienestar del trabajo. Cuando el venezolano entendió o 
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subjetivizó que su bienestar no tenía que ver con el trabajo, allí se produjo una dislocación 
ideológica tremenda, y tiene 120 años. No es del chavismo, ni del marxismo leninismo, ni de AD 
ni de Copei. Aquí hay una deformación. El venezolano dijo: se puede vivir sin trabajar. ¿Qué es 
lo que pasa con el rentismo, es decir con ese vivir sin trabajar? Eso explica, complejiza, enreda 
todo. Vamos a poner dos extremos: la teoría marxista que dice los hombres, por la 
industrialización, van a crear una clase obrera que cada día va a ser más explotada y se va a 
organizar y va a luchar por tomar los aparatos de producción y después se va a liberar. Pero 
¿qué pasa en donde la riqueza sale del subsuelo? ¿Qué pasa? Marx no pudo prever eso […]  Él 
lo que vivió fue la sociedad industrial, la revolución industrial, las máquinas, pero no se 
equivocó cuando dijo que lo económico determina lo socio histórico. Cuando te digo que en 
Venezuela cuando aparece el petróleo y se puede vivir sin trabajar te estoy hablando de la 
deformación del rentismo. A eso contribuye también el carácter de país tropical. Usted no puede 
vivir en pantalones cortos todo el año en Europa ni en los Estados Unidos. Aquí sí.  
¿Qué está pasando en Venezuela? Hay una polarización. ¿Qué es eso que se llama 
polarización? ¿Es de ideología? Yo pienso que no. Yo pienso que nadie está diciendo la verdad 
y nadie está trabajando por construir la fundamentación teórica que dice estar defendiendo. Ni 
el chavismo ni eso que llaman la MUD. En general, todos los políticos que hablan por la 
televisión, que es nuestro gran medio de comunicación, todos mienten en relación con la 
ideología. El asunto de la ideología entra para mí dentro de un esquema muy básico, muy 
cartesiano, pero que me permite explicar muchas cosas. En el mundo político hay tres vértices 
para decir si uno es de izquierda, de derecha o de qué. El primero es el papel del Estado, el 
segundo es el del individuo y el tercero el del colectivo. Son como tres categorías que yo 
arbitrariamente utilizo para explicar mi posición. Parto primero del concepto de ideología -que 
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es una organización de ideas-, luego lo político -cómo te organizas-, luego lo programático -qué 
haces en el día a día-. Yo creo que la revolución bolivariana teóricamente se inscribe en este 
vértice que es el colectivismo. En el colectivismo yo ubico un montón de doctrinas que creen que 
todos mis actos deberían tener una consecuencia positiva para alguien más y, en consecuencia, 
se revierte para mí. Eso es teórico. Allí entonces yo ubico el socialismo, el socialismo de Estado, 
el comunismo, el anarquismo, el socialismo en todas sus formas. Cuando el Estado es lo único, 
estamos hablando de fascismo. Este es mi punto de vista. Y en el individualismo hay también un 
montón de doctrinas respetables: el cristianismo, el liberalismo, el capitalismo, el 
neoliberalismo, que es la fase superior del capitalismo. Teóricamente el chavismo se ubicó aquí 
y yo me compré esa idea. Ahora ¿qué está pasando en Venezuela? Esto desaparece. Aquí no hay 
ningún debate ideológico. Aquí lo que hay es una lucha por los poderes donde hay dinero. 
Algunos compañeros están luchando por esas organizaciones llamadas ministerios, etc. de 
buena fe, para trabajar por los demás, por los pobres, y otros no. Y yo creo que en la derecha 
también pasa lo mismo, pero me cuesta admitir que haya alguien de la derecha luchando por los 
pobres. 
Chávez entra en una gran confusión ideológica porque la vida no le da tiempo. Cuando 
Chávez asume el poder creo que tiene 42 años, un muchacho, y entonces empieza a leer tesis 
colectivistas, tesis individualistas. Cuando Chávez tomó el poder comenzó a hablar del tercer 
camino, de Toni Blair, y de repente cuando se está muriendo está marxista leninista radical. 
Creo que Chávez fue víctima de la social democracia internacional que dirige Ignacio Ramonet, 
que es algo parecido al tercer camino que piensa que a los pobres hay que darles un poquito 
pero no tanto. Chávez claudicó, siendo un gran hombre. Chávez es un fenómeno, un 
extraordinario ser humano. Estuve trabajando cinco años con él, tres muy cercano. Lo tuve 
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cercano y hablamos mucho. Pero los que estaban en Miraflores, y no voy a decir quiénes son, 
empezaron a meterle en la cabeza una serie de ideas y Chávez fue el brazo ejecutor para 
liquidar las Mesas Técnicas de Agua, los Comités de Tierra urbanos y la Misión Cultura que se 
convirtió en una cosa política de 20.000 personas. ¿Pero por malo? No, por chisme, porque son 
organismos autónomos. Estaba confundido. Cada semana le entregaban un libro, la primera de 
Hollowey, la siguiente de Neri, uno era anti estado y el otro pro estado. Chávez hizo un gran 
esfuerzo. De militar empezó a leer y leer y entre estas tres doctrinas hubo una confusión que le 
metieron personas con nombre y apellido. Que la historia sepa que Chávez hizo un enorme 
esfuerzo. Si no fuera sino porque logró que el petróleo se distribuyera mejor, ya qué más le vas a 
pedir. ¿Le vas a pedir doctrina ideológica? La vida biológica no da tiempo para hacer tantas 
cosas. Que quede claro que yo reconozco en Chávez una gran intención, pero una gran 
confusión ideológica: mucho o todo el poder para el pueblo organizado o poder centralizado; 
marxismo leninismo clásico, el partido, o las comunas. El decidió. Y decidió con todo. Eliminó 
la Misión Cultura: son demasiado inteligentes y soberbios, prepotentes y autónomos. 
Chávez mató, liquidó, eliminó, exterminó, en poco tiempo, en dos años de ejercicio, a los 
pendejos, a los idiotas. Hoy en Venezuela, 2013, no hay pendejos. En Venezuela todo el que se 
despierta en la mañana y sale a estudiar, a trabajar, sabe para quién trabaja, para quién estudia 
y para quién hace cosas. Eso es bien importante porque en un pueblo en donde la política era 
algo solo de unos cuantos, de un 10%, de una gente que dirigía pase lo que pase, hemos pasado 
a una situación en la cual todo el mundo en Venezuela sabe para qué trabaja, para quién 





Aquí se habla de revolución, pero cómo va llamarse así si lo que ha hecho es aniquilar 
las fuerzas productivas. Hasta etimológicamente es un contrasentido. Revolución es avanzar con 
doble rapidez […] Hay un detalle en lo que dices que me gustaría destacar. Este gobierno se 
declara estatista y, en función de eso, estatiza todas las empresas básicas, además de la 
cementera, una serie de empresas alimentarias y otras. Nacionaliza toda una serie de empresas 
para encargárselas al Estado. Aquí está el primer problema, que es un debate que se está dando 
incluso con el Partido Comunista cubano hoy, que es confundir estatismo con socialismo. Si 
confundes estatismo con socialismo pasas por alto una cosa elemental: el Estado genera una 
clase nueva que es la que administra las empresas que antes eran administradas por el 
empresario privado, pero estos te administraban basados en el interés del lucro y la 
competencia -y en la competencia por mayor tecnología y mejores formas de administración- 
pero estos no tienen competencia. Estos son malos administradores. Son empresarios privados 
pero sin las competencias de los viejos empresarios privados. Eso se ha traducido en una 
decadencia de la producción de las empresas estatales. Venezuela está importando todo: 
cabillas, cemento, todo. Eso fue el primer error, confundir estatismo con socialismo. 
Partamos de esta base: Chávez representó la idea del cambio pero no supo materializarla ni 
ideológicamente ni en obra, sino en una apariencia de realizaciones. Las estatizaciones, por 
ejemplo. Efectivamente, despojó empresas que funcionaban bien pero que eran de empresarios 
privados, burgueses, y las puso en manos de funcionarios del partido que hablaban de 
revoluciones. Luego optó por las cooperativas. Ideó un socialismo de cooperativas. Con todo lo 
impulsivo que era, y es por eso que los académicos del Norte lo admiran, se dedicó a crear 
cooperativas. Hizo más cooperativas que nadie en el mundo. Tenía un dineral para intentarlo. 
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Pensaba que crear cooperativas era sencillamente reunir un grupo de personas y darles el 
financiamiento. Creó un banco para financiarles. Ese banco naturalmente hacía préstamos que 
no recuperaba, nadie controlaba aquello. En fin, se volvió un derroche enorme y el 80 y más por 
ciento de las cooperativas desparecieron. Del dinero nunca se supo. Quedaron algunas 
convertidas en falsas cooperativas. Para aprovecharse de las excelentes condiciones financieras 
y crediticias que se les ofrecían muchas empresas se inscribieron como cooperativas y les 
sacaron provecho. Ese fue un momento en el que se dieron cuenta de eso. Pararon. Fue cuando 
Chávez dijo que las cooperativas eran otra forma de capitalismo. Nunca recuperaron el dinero. 
Quedaron solo las que ya funcionaban de antes, y funcionaban bien, porque la idea de las 
cooperativas era una buena idea, pero no para convertirlas en lo que Chávez creía, en la base 
para la creación de una sociedad socialista de cooperativas destruyendo la iniciativa privada, la 
empresa privada. Todo eso fue un fracaso tremendo pero dejó la idea de que Chávez era 
partidario de las cooperativas. Luego creó las empresas de producción social, no basadas en el 
espíritu de lucro, para competir con las empresas privadas basadas en el espíritu del lucro. El 
resultado fue otro fracaso. No queda ni una de esas empresas. Luego la administración de las 
empresas estatales y de las estatizadas, con cogestión para darles participación a los 
trabajadores. La experiencia resultó trágica. Finalmente todas las empresas estatales están 
destruidas, incluso una que era una joya, Minerven. No vamos a decir que todas las empresas 
del Estado están condenadas al fracaso. Pdvsa funcionaba muy bien como empresa del Estado. 
La idea no es si es del Estado sino en manos de quién va a funcionar. Esa es la primera idea. Y 
la segunda es que si el Estado se vuelve empresario tiene que hacerlo en los términos de correr 
riesgo, no de financiar saldos rojos […] De allí que estamos en esa economía que nadie 
entiende cómo teniendo un financiamiento tan monstruosamente alto de dólares y divisas para 
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una población pequeña, de veinte y pico millones de habitantes, la agricultura se haya reducido 
a la cuarta parte de lo que era, se han aniquilado la mitad de las empresas industriales que 
habían, todas las industrias del Estado se cayeron, estamos importando gasolina.  
 He llegado a la conclusión de que los que realmente entiendan que esto es una farsa, 
profundamente, son los que vienen del socialismo -marxistas, socialistas- porque nosotros 
fuimos formados en varias ideas simples pero exactas. Marx decía que el socialismo implicaba 
un desarrollo descomunal de las fuerzas productivas. Precisamente ¿de qué surgía el 
socialismo? Lo dice en el prefacio de La crítica de la economía política. Dice que hay un 
momento en el que las fuerzas productivas se han desarrollado mucho pero que las relaciones 
de producción privadas asfixian ese crecimiento. Entonces, cuando las fuerzas productivas 
revientan esas relaciones de propiedad privada es cuando viene la revolución. Es decir, lo que 
viene es un desarrollo libre de las fuerzas productivas a tal grado que se producirá una súper 
abundancia de bienes materiales y espirituales y llegaremos al comunismo, porque el 
comunismo se basa en el principio de que a cada cual según su necesidad y de cada cual según 
su capacidad, es decir que aunque tú tengas menos méritos que otros pero tengas más 
necesidades te dan más. Ese es el comunismo basado en una solidaridad absoluta, pero para 
que eso sea así se requiere que haya una súper abundancia tal de bienes materiales y 
espirituales que cada quien reciba de acuerdo con sus necesidades. Esa es la ilusión del 
marxismo y del comunismo. Y Marx decía que eso iba a ocurrir al desaparecer la propiedad 
privada sobre los medios de producción, porque entonces los trabajadores van a desarrollar 
libremente, sin la interferencia de las relaciones de propiedad privada y el derecho privado, la 
capacidad productiva. Es entonces cuando dice: de allí daremos el salto del reino de la 
necesidad al reino de la libertad. Partamos de este hecho: socialismo equivale a desarrollar las 
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fuerzas productivas, porque un socialismo que empobrece las fuerzas productivas es un 
retroceso en nombre de la caridad social. Si dejas de producir, la torta es cada vez más 
pequeña.  Sin embargo, hasta muy entrados los años sesenta, todavía el Partido Comunista 
Soviético tenía la idea de producir más que los Estados Unidos y aspiraba a desarrollar una 
capacidad productiva bruta superior a la de los Estados Unidos y, después, una capacidad 
productiva neta, per cápita, también superior a la norteamericana. Con el tiempo se dieron 
cuenta de que eso no caminaba y el socialismo se reconstruyó sobre otras bases, sobre la idea 
de que lo material no importa, de que lo que importa es la solidaridad, el amor entre la gente, 
etc. Se construyó sobre otros ideales, pero no sobre la base principista de Marx.  
 Pero la intención de que hay que empoderar a la gente, hay que hacerle participar 
activamente en la construcción de una sociedad, que la construcción de una sociedad no es un 
grupo de personas que se van a reunir para decidir por los demás. No, así no. Así no va a 
funcionar jamás. Dentro de tus propias reflexiones tú tienes que establecer la fuerza de 
participación de la gente. Esa es una reflexión que se la debemos a Chávez. Yo lo reconozco 
púbicamente. 
 
José León Uzcátegui 
Yo soy psiquiatra y tengo una especialización de economía petrolera. Un periodista me 
preguntaba sobre esta doble condición y le decía: nada más natural, Venezuela es locura y 
petróleo. Claro, no se queda allí. Lo que mejor la define es capitalismo rentista que el mismo 
Chávez llamaba socialismo rentista y, como pasa con el socialismo en general, cuando se creía 
en el siglo pasado que el capitalismo había llegado a su fin, que casi las dos terceras partes del 
mundo eran socialismo, se reveló, y ahora está más claro que antes, que no hubo tal socialismo 
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sino capitalismo de Estado, es decir otra manera, ya no es la propiedad individual de los medios 
de producción sino la propiedad del Estado, puesta a su vez en manos de los particulares, de la 
nomenclatura, de la burocracia. 
 Con la muerte del presidente Chávez, que mucha gente afirmaba que no existe chavismo 
sin Chávez, creo que hay elementos que considerar. El primero es que el chavismo como una 
propuesta político ideológica que presentara el rumbo de un socialismo, de lo que Hugo Chávez 
llamó el socialismo del siglo XXI, forma parte de la crisis teórica del pensamiento 
revolucionario. Es evidente el fracaso del socialismo real por lo menos en lo que conocemos del 
siglo XX. Y colocar el socialismo en el siglo XXI no ha resuelto para nada qué entender, por 
ponerle un número más. Allí sigue habiendo un problema que no es venezolano. Es un problema 
de la crisis del pensamiento de la izquierda a nivel mundial. No es el marxismo en crisis. Es qué 
se entiende hoy en el mundo por una propuesta postcapitalista, porque en términos globales no 
hay duda de que el capitalismo nos condujo a este estado de insania mental colectiva idealizada. 
La locura. Es que estamos al borde de un precipicio. Frente a eso, el pensamiento teórico de 
otra alternativa todavía no está claro. De manera que Chávez hizo un extraordinario esfuerzo… 
En algunos momentos de su discurso hacía referencia a Mariátegui, en otros a Gramsci, en 
otros a Trotsky. Es sorprendente de dónde sacaba el tiempo para leer, para asimilar, para 
elaborar, pero no es verdad que hay una propuesta teórica que nos permita una carta de 
navegación para una propuesta postcapitalista, para no llamarla socialista. Y eso ya es un 
problema severo. Que no es culpa de Chávez, no es culpa de nadie, sencillamente es un 
problema mundial. No hay hoy en el mundo una alternativa postcapitalista clara. Todos los 
esfuerzos que se han hecho en el Foro Social Mundial han sido parte de esos intentos de 
reconstruir, de recomponer, de plantear, de definir hoy qué entender por una propuesta 
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postcapitalista. He ahí un primer problema muy claro: no tener un norte claro. Así que el Plan 
de la Patria, que es nuestra carta de navegación, combina propuestas absolutamente 
contradictorias porque incorpora propuestas de política participativa y ecosocialista al mismo 
tiempo que un modelo industrialista, extractivista, desarrollista, de la misma cosa a la que se 
enfrenta el buen vivir cuando señala que el modelo que se nos vendió duró 500 años, cuando el 
mundo entero hizo del progreso y del desarrollo una razón de ser de la existencia. De ese 
modelo lo único claro es que no es. Lo que no está claro es cuál es el que es. El segundo 
problema tiene que ver con el Estado Latinoamericano. Nosotros seguimos hablando de estados 
nacionales de modo que Bolivia es un estado nacional, y Argentina, etc. Eso no tiene nada que 
ver con el estado nacional europeo. Hasta los términos, las categorías que utilizamos no son…y 
eso tiene una gran importancia porque Venezuela, -adicional a lo que eso significa en términos 
de Latinoamérica- tiene una especificidad que se la da el petróleo. Se trata de un estado rentista 
donde el trabajo no es el valor fundamental para construir la sociedad. Es al contrario. Eso lo 
sabe cualquier venezolano, desde los que se han enriquecido a costa de los pobres o de los 
pobres que siguen viviendo en la pobreza pero que, desde un buhonero hasta un taxista esperan 
una parte del reparto. La economía venezolana es imposible entenderla si no es por el 
capitalismo rentista. Y ese es un segundo componente bien importante. No solamente no tenemos 
un modelo claro de hacia dónde vamos, sino que tenemos un tipo de economía con una 
especificidad que limita terriblemente cualquier intento de transformarla y mucho más de una 
propuesta como la del buen vivir que es, en mi opinión particular, la que más se asemeja a una 
sociedad humana, porque en esta sociedad no hemos alcanzado la condición humana. Seguimos 
viviendo en la pre humanidad. Y en Venezuela tenemos esos dos componentes: la falta de un 
proyecto y la existencia de un capitalismo rentista, adicionalmente con los males del estado 
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latinoamericano: el patrimonialismo, el prevendarismo, el clientelismo, la corrupción. Y eso 
desde México hasta la Patagonia. Nuestros estados funcionan de esa manera y Venezuela 
también y a eso se añade el capitalismo rentista. Eso genera un tejido social que tiene dificultad 
para conformarse, para constituirse. Es por eso que me asombro de cómo se ha cambiado en 
estos 14 años […] y Chávez en eso fue el actor fundamental, el gran educador, fue una relación 
que llega a la devoción, pero que ciertamente -más allá de los dirigentes del partido, del 
gobierno, de si son corruptos o no, si lo practican o no, si creen en ello o no, más allá de esa 
dirigencia- la gente común se apropió de ese discurso, lo entendió, lo asumió. Yo, que me 
recorro el país por razones profesionales, políticas y morales, puedo decir que lo que conocí no 
tiene nada que ver con lo hay hoy. Y eso evidentemente muestra la gran potencialidad. Yo 
participé en el segundo gobierno de Rafael Caldera. En ese gobierno del llamado chiripero yo 
fui director de salud de Caracas, del área metropolita, Sucre, Baruta, El Hatillo, Chacao, 
Distrito Capital y la Guaira, que todavía no era estado Vargas. En ese momento el discurso que 
hacíamos es: Caldera es la posibilidad de un paso al futuro porque permitió la derrota de AD y 
Copei. Y luego, cuando aparece Chávez y todo lo que ha representado, volvimos a pensar: 
Chávez es, de nuevo, la transición. Alguien podría decir que la transición para volver al pasado. 
Lo que sí es cierto es aquí en Venezuela pensar que volvamos a lo que vivimos en el derrumbe de 
la cuarta república -para compartir contigo que la primera parte de la cuarta república fue de 
avances y logros en términos de lo que vino después del perezjimenismo- es imposible. Se ha 
producido, para comenzar, un cambio importante en la redistribución de la renta, más allá de lo 
que se haya robado toda la burguesía, sea cierto o medio cierto. Ciertamente en esta revolución 
bolivariana ha aparecido una nueva burguesía a imagen y semejanza de la que se construyó en 
la cuarta república. Sea más o menos cierto, más allá de los discursos, más allá de esa 
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dirigencia que puede ser incapaz, corrupta, mediocre, creo que la gran posibilidad está en el 
pueblo que entendió y asumió el discurso de Chávez y pudiéramos estar en un proceso de 
transición hacia otro momento. 
 
Luis Ugalde 
Hace 14 años se empezó con utopías y esperanzas máximas, con la creencia de que bastaba 
tener buena voluntad y querer al pueblo para hacer buena gestión y curar los males del país. 
Chávez, con su magia comunicacional, con su audacia verbal y con su condición militar 
encarnadora del poder de imposición armada, resultaba para muchos ideal para castigar a los 
que traicionaron al pueblo y colmar las esperanzas de éste. 
Nadie pone a su familiar enfermo grave en manos de un médico que sea locuaz, prometedor y 
compasivo con el enfermo, si no es competente. Pero en política somos muy propensos a creer 
en la ilusión de las promesas. Chávez no sólo es promesa, es también ingresos diez veces 
superiores en manos del gobierno dispuesto a darlos a sus seguidores incondicionales en un 
trueque de dinero y ayudas a cambio de fidelidad política clientelar. En estos años ha 
concentrado todos los mecanismos del poder y sometido al Ejecutivo los poderes Legislativo, 
Judicial, militar, comunicacional, policial y de propaganda, que en una democracia están 
separados y se necesitan desconcentrados. 
A medida que se desgastan las promesas, queda en evidencia el desastre de la gestión y se 
reducen los dólares disponibles que se creían ilimitados, queda la distorsión de la realidad y el 
descaro propagandístico manipulado por el control y la hegemonía comunicacional y la 
represión con leyes hechas a la medida de las solicitudes del Ejecutivo o elaboradas por éste. 
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Esta segunda etapa, que va avanzada, es la que llamo de “cinismo” por cuanto que ya ni 
los dirigentes, ni los seguidores creen en el paraíso prometido, ven que el modelo cubano es 
fracaso y esfuerzo inútil y se han topado con su propia improvisación e incompetencia en 
diversas áreas; lo que lleva a los de arriba a mayor corrupción millonaria en previsión del 
futuro, y a los de abajo a fingir lealtad si a cambio se reciben dádivas. No están exentos de este 
cinismo-pragmatismo empresarios y gente de corazón antichavista, pero que “por ahora” ven 
buenas oportunidades de enriquecimiento […] Cada vez es más distante el discurso socialista de 
la realidad en la que los pobres sobreviven; nacen y crecen nuevos ricos en la medida en que 
estén más cerca del poder. Cada vez más se conjugan los verbos en futuro (“haremos”) en todas 
las áreas en las que, en el tiempo equivalente a tres gobiernos democráticos, ya se debía haber 
hecho […] Lo primero que debe distribuir el Estado es la capacidad productiva para que con 
ella todos los venezolanos tengan poder, organización y acceso a los bienes y servicios que 
necesitan. Exactamente el camino contrario al que ahora se quiere: instauran una sociedad 
estatista donde en educación, economía, comunicación, salud… sólo haya un empresario, el 
Estado, pues la empresa privada tiene el pecado original de la ganancia y de la mal explicada 
plusvalía. Para que haya sociedad civil autónoma hace falta una economía autónoma y millones 
de personas cuya producción y productividad no dependa directamente de un gobierno-Estado 
con interés y enfoque de control y dependencia, al estilo cubano-soviético […] Es lamentable el 
Estado Comunal en el que hacen una pinza de poder la cúpula del Ejecutivo y las comunas que 
dependen de él y se le someten. Ese Estado Comunal implica, por ejemplo la implantación de 
Consejos Educativos en la Escuela y Consejos Obreros en las fábricas con la idea de “todo el 
poder para los soviets”, es decir, todo el poder para los consejos, con lo que se anula el poder 
pedagógico de la dirección académica escolar o la gerencia empresarial. Esto elimina los 
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sindicatos autónomos del poder gubernamental central, los municipios y todas las otras formas 
de descentralización y autonomía de la sociedad. No olvidemos que la Unión Soviética 
nominalmente era República de Consejos, como fachada de la República del Partido Comunista 
único, mandado por el vitalicio Secretario único del Partido. 
Hay una evidente crisis de legitimidad en la calle. Con la inflación, escasez, inseguridad y mega 
corrupción gubernamental cada vez más a la vista, el malestar está en la calle y la dificultad 
está en lograr combinar audacia con prudencia, radicalidad con gradualidad. Se puede ser 
rápido y radical en el rechazo de lo que hay, pero la construcción es lenta y exige cambios 
profundos. La oposición necesita combinar la emotividad e indignación desbordante en el 
malestar actual con las vías democráticas para el cambio de régimen y la construcción eficiente 
y democrática del futuro. Además hay millones de venezolanos que creyeron en este régimen y 
sus promesas que deben ser acogidos para hacer políticas que no terminen en promesas y humo 
[…] pero al mismo tiempo mucha gente se siente impotente ante el poder omnímodo y busca 
salvadores. El trabajo está en crear equipos y que entre los diversos líderes haya acuerdos para 
que no terminen prevaleciendo los personalismos y las ambiciones. 
 La peor plaga, que además es muy contagiosa, es que la población se crea que somos un 
país “inmensamente rico”, por tener mucho petróleo, y que por tanto no es necesario el trabajo 
creativo para producir riqueza  nacional  y riqueza familiar, sino que la tarea del gobierno es 
distribuir la riqueza que ya existe. Así Chávez se convirtió en predicador y distribuidor de esta 
enfermedad nacional heredada. A cambio sólo pedía incondicionalidad y fe en su visión y amor. 
Esta demagogia lleva a despreciar la educación de calidad, el profesionalismo y la eficiencia 
productiva, a nombrar incompetentes, siempre que sean incondicionales políticamente. Crea 
además la ilusión y el deseo de acceder al consumo abundante de bienes superiores importados 
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sin pasar por la producción de los mismos o de los equivalentes,  que se transan en el mercado. 
Cuesta salir de la ilusión de que en Venezuela se puede dar la revolución del consumo sin la 
revolución de la producción, pues ésta está fuera y nuestros dólares son ilimitados para 
importarlos […] El petróleo debe convertirse en medio de producción de ciudadanía 
responsable, de poder social y de poder económico-productivo, distribuido en toda la población. 
Lo que se distribuye en directo no son los bienes de consumo, sino el equipamiento de cada uno 
para la capacidad productiva. Con ello se distribuye el poder (no se concentra, ni se desarrolla 
la dependencia de indigentes) productivo cada vez más autónomo frente al Estado y al partido o 
grupo que tiende a apropiarse del Estado y someter la población. También el hecho productivo, 
apalancado inicialmente por los ingresos petroleros, se vuelve cada vez más autónomo y 
autosostenido […] Otra plaga es la ilusión mesiánica de que hay acceso a la felicidad por la vía 
de creer en el mesías político, fértil en imaginación y promesas, pero anti modelo en la 
responsabilidad de gestión pública, eficiente, honesta. Hay que generar más poder-capacidad en 
toda la población para que haya menos poder-dominación de un caudillo mesiánico y de una 
camarilla única que se apropia del Estado, es decir de las leyes, de las armas, del pensamiento y 
de la información- indoctrinación […] Uno de los daños mayores que hemos heredado es que el 
mesías no creía en la democracia y sobre todo descalificaba a todos los que no fueran 
seguidores y dóciles a él. Sin reconocimiento desde el Estado de la dignidad y razón de los que 
opinan de otra manera, no es posible la democracia. 
 
Stalin Pérez Borges 
Yo pertenezco al partido (PSUV), a una corriente, como dirigente sindical. Ahorita soy del 
Consejo Consultivo de la nueva Central de Trabajadores. Yo me desprendí de Chávez y en 
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privado me he burlado del socialismo tropical, socialismo bucal, pero no creo que haya 
socialismo. El capitalismo está muy arraigado en Venezuela, pero hay un proceso 
revolucionario en marcha. Ha habido cambios importantes dentro de la sociedad. De hecho, el 
gobierno ha hecho conquistas sociales y democráticas […] Antes de Gómez, la guerra en este 
país se daba por la tierra. Primero por parte de los militares que venían desde la época de 
Bolívar, después la Guerra Federal. Después de Gómez, las peleas, la lucha de clases, han sido 
por la renta petrolera. Por muchos años Venezuela ha sido el primer país exportador de 
petróleo y de allí viene la renta, que no es cualquier renta. Exactamente qué es lo que hizo 
Chávez. Una redistribución distinta de la renta petrolera. Y lo hizo es inversiones sociales. Aquí 
los pensionados del Seguro Social, después que habían pasado una cantidad de años trabajando 
en una empresa pública, les costaba mucho cobrar la pensión a la que tenían derecho. No hablo 
de la renta o parte de la renta, porque de hecho les habían descontado mientras trabajaban, 
hablo de la pensión, para disfrutar de la cual algunas veces les costaba. Eso cambió con 
Chávez. Hoy hay casi dos millones de pensionados, personas que llevan el salario mínimo a sus 
casas. Antes tampoco era salario mínimo, era la mitad o menos del salario mínimo. Hoy en día 
en una familia, en un país pobre, en una casa debe haber uno o dos viejos que se mantienen, que 
por lo menos llevan ese ingreso mensual fijo. Esa es una cuestión muy importante. Yo no digo 
que PDVAL resuelva el problema del abastecimiento, de la comida de todos. Estoy convencido 
de que no pero, en ese sentido, muchas familias se benefician de lo mucho o poco que pueda 
vender PDVAL. En muchos barrios existe el comedor popular que existía cuando los gobiernos 
de AD, pero eran escasos. En este sentido yo creo que sí ha habido un cambio. Eso no significa 
que sea socialismo. Y en el caso de la matrícula de estudio también. Un cambio muy importante. 
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Hay que ser serio. Eso, por ejemplo, la gente que está con la oposición no lo ve. No miran los 
alcances de esos beneficios, que no son cualquier cosa.  
 En lo de la democracia participativa, yo creo que sí ha habido avances importantes, 
democráticos. Chávez, de alguna manera, aunque le acusan de intolerante, aceptó críticas. 
Chávez tuvo un proceso de aprendizaje. La constitución es obra de Chávez casi de puño y letra, 
menos el preámbulo que dicen que es de Gustavo Pereira. Lo demás, artículo por artículo, si no 
lo escribió, lo revisó. Allí, viendo la Constitución, que es lo que rige el país de verdad, aunque tú 
podrías observar la relación entre el discurso y la práctica. Ese discurso es muy democrático. 
Sin embargo hay que mencionar casos como el del Centro Internacional Miranda, integrado por 
intelectuales de Venezuela y del exterior. El instituto se dedicaba a hacer charlas, sobre todo 
con ponentes internacionales. Hubo un seminario en el los que intervinieron consideraron que 
Chávez tenía el problema de que se metía en todo. Hablaron entonces del hiperliderazgo. A 
Chávez eso le pareció una ofensa y una desconsideración y se molestó mucho. Y a Nicolás 
Maduro también. Los dos declararon en términos tremendos contra este grupo de intelectuales, 
muy ligados por cierto al proceso venezolano. Ahí tuvimos que hacer una campaña declarando 
que era cierto lo que decían y que aun si no existiese ese hiperliderazgo no se justificaba la 
reacción. Eso provocó que la dirección del Centro Internacional Miranda fuera cambiada. Y 
fueron varios incidentes de este tipo, de críticas a Chávez, de observaciones al gobierno y nunca 
pasó. Hablando de democracia participativa, Chávez dijo en algún momento –siendo la 
Constitución democrática hablando de democracia participativa- que los sindicatos no podían 
ser autónomos, no podían ser independientes. Eso fue por el 2007. Y su argumento lo planteó 
sobre los escritos de Rosa de Luxemburgo contra Lenin y contra Trotsky. Que los sindicatos 
tenían que disciplinarse, que la lucha de los sindicatos no era, en fin… Nosotros dimos una 
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repuesta, pero no se pudo. Citamos a Rosa de Luxemburgo, que se equivocó en ese punto y 
después ella reconoció. Chávez lo fue olvidando y después modificando su discurso. En el caso 
del Centro Internacional Miranda llegó a reconocer, ya cuando comenzó su enfermedad, que él 
había cometido el error de haber respondido a los intelectuales. Les dio la razón después, en 
público. En el caso de nosotros nunca nos dio la razón públicamente, nunca reconoció, pero 
después los discursos fueron distintos.  
El chavismo tiene un gran componente militar, desde los oficiales que se alzaron el 4 de 
febrero y el 11 de noviembre con Chávez. Muchos de ellos son corporativistas, antisindicales. 
Ahora mismo, muchos con conciencia antisindical. Esa es una de las discusiones que hay ahora 
en el movimiento obrero. Otra parte del retroceso de lo que se había avanzado con Chávez es 
que en algunas empresas del Estado se mantiene eso que tú llamas corpoestado, estado 
corporativo o, como uno decía antes, capitalismo de estado. Pero en medio de ese capitalismo 
de estado había cosas positivas. No era como antes que la presencia del trabajador en las 
empresas, con AD y Copei, se daba a través de lo que le llamaba un director laboral, alguien 
que nunca rendía cuentas. Ahora no. Se dieron empresas que ponían a los trabajadores a 
dirigir. Pudo haber resultados negativos en algunos casos, como en el de Sidor, donde se formó 
una mafia alrededor de los trabajadores que fueron nombrados, incluso en casos en los que los 
trabajadores estuvieron de acuerdo y aprobaron su nombramiento, pero en otros casos fue 
positivo. 
Al principio de Chávez también se desarrollaron algunas iniciativas (de movimientos 
sociales). Ahora lo que tiene que surgir son movimientos autónomos. Con Chávez vivo, y fue un 
error de Chávez, del gobierno de Chávez, todo se fue corporativizando, institucionalizando. 
Todos los movimientos. Incluso el estudiantil que surgió a raíz de cuando le quitaron la 
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concesión a Radio Caracas. Los terminaron institucionalizando, les quitaron su independencia. 
Y en el sector campesino también. En el movimiento sindical no tan así, aunque tiene un sector 
que sí. Con la Unete lo quisieron hacer pero nunca lo lograron. Nunca perdió su independencia. 
Muchos compañeros y yo logramos que se mantuviera. Entonces, lo primero que tiene que surgir 
ahora son los movimientos independientes, autónomos, que se incorporen a las cosas 
progresivas que hay que hacer en el proceso. La pregunta sería: ¿creemos nosotros que el 
gobierno va alentar y les va a dar cabida? No sé. Lo que observo es que hay mucha 
preocupación, pero está muy nuevo para hacer una caracterización ya cerrada. Decirte que los 
va a permitir o no los va permitir, no sé. Yo creo que hay que esperar. Estamos preocupados 
porque hasta el momento no los ha permitido. Las primeras señales son que nos lo va permitir, 
pero no es una caracterización cerrada, pudiese cambiar. 
 
María Corina Machado 
Efectivamente, yo creo que nuestro país ha cambiado en estos años en muchas cosas, algunas 
alarmantes. Voy a comenzar con lo negativo para cerrar con lo bueno. Yo pienso que las causas 
de ese agotamiento del sistema previo fue la forma progresiva como se incrementó el populismo 
-como mecanismo no solo de campaña política sino de gestión pública-, el clientelismo, la 
corrupción, y el rentismo desde luego. Fue el momento en el que Venezuela vivió una crisis de 
ingreso petrolero y por eso, entre otras cosas, se da ese quiebre, porque el modelo ya no daba, 
desde la perspectiva rentista quiero decir, y el centralismo. Yo creo que el año 89 y el ejercicio 
de descentralización son unas de las cosas más importantes que nos han ocurrido en las últimas 
décadas desde la perspectiva política en Venezuela. Ahora ¿qué ocurrió? Lejos de corregir estos 
males, el modelo los acentuó y es evidente que había una vocación de control del poder desde el 
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primer día, más o menos explícita o más o menos consciente en sus miembros, no quiero 
generalizar, pero sí, evidentemente, en una parte muy importante de sus promotores. Desde el 
primer día, cómo empiezan a ponerse en práctica algunas acciones no solamente de orden 
jurídico institucional, pero en el propio discurso político, fomentando la división y la 
confrontación sobre la base de todos los criterios imaginables, no solamente lo típico económico 
de la lucha de clases sino también en las diferencias religiosas, regionales, generacionales, algo 
verdaderamente peligroso pero obviamente intencional y bien pensado de parte de quien lo 
diseñó en un primer momento y de quien lo impulsó en sus diferentes etapas. Entonces yo te 
diría que una de las cosas que promovió fue generar la mayor dependencia posible de toda la 
sociedad en el Estado, de todos los sectores, empezando obviamente por los sectores políticos, 
descabezando o minimizando los partidos como organizaciones intermedias, y luego con los 
sectores económicos. A mí me pasó mucho que recorriendo el país, como siempre hago, la gente 
habla. Se me acerca un productor un campesino: María Corina, mi finquita era la más 
productiva, era la que estaba mejor preparada, con más inversión, entonces ¿por qué me la 
expropiaron? Le contesto: precisamente por eso, porque todo espacio que represente autonomía 
había que liquidarlo. Y en el plano social, lograr que el mayor número de ciudadanos 
dependiera del Estado, y que dependieran además de una forma humillante, porque no es ni 
siquiera el empleo público, sino la dádiva, la transferencia directa, absolutamente condicionada 
no ya solamente a la militancia política sino a la renuncia a tu libertad, a tu libertad de 
pensamiento y a tus ideales y convicciones. Eso me parece dramático porque lo que se ha 
tratado de destruir es esa relación esfuerzo-logro, esencial en una sociedad que quiere avanzar 
y que quiere progresar. Eso en términos negativos, además de lo que señalé antes respecto de la 
división y de la confrontación en todos los planos que, además, ha generado una sociedad 
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profundamente violenta, porque los incentivos a la violencia son obvios, no solamente más de 
diez millones de armas ilegales en la calle, 18.000 bandas criminales, tráfico de drogas 
generalizado -con todos los males que eso va trayendo para destruir y atacar a la familia- y la 
impunidad, por encima del 97%. Ese es el incentivo directo a la violencia, intencional desde 
luego. En lo positivo, yo siento que ha surgido, como en todo momento crítico para una sociedad 
en una encrucijada histórica, ha surgido una genuina conciencia y reflexión sobre lo que somos 
y lo que queremos ser como sociedad, como república, como bien dices. Entonces has visto unas 
demostraciones sin precedentes en América Latina de movilización política consciente, más o 
menos espontánea en algunos momentos, más dirigida en otros, pero en todo caso muy clara de 
lo que está en juego. Yo presiento que si de algo debemos sentirnos orgullosos es de que ha 
quedado claro que, a pesar de todas las fallas, males e insatisfacciones que pudo generar la 
democracia en su sistema, quienes crecimos en democracia e incluso quienes crecieron en esta 
neo dictadura, como yo la llamo, tenemos un ADN democrático muy marcado, muy claro, que es 
lo que nos ha hecho resistir y que va a hacer que todo esto termine de salir, porque 
evidentemente hemos demostrado su ilegitimidad, no solo de origen sino también de su forma de 
actuar. 
 Este es un régimen que está concentrando toda la propiedad y las decisiones en un grupo 
cada vez más reducido de personas, con un comportamiento muy preocupante porque, para mí, 
se asemeja cada día más no a Cuba sino a Rusia, donde tenemos una mafia state. Esto no es la 
operación de un sistema capitalista, con el cual, incluso, podamos tener todos nuestras 
diferencias. Quiero hacer la diferencia para describirte lo que yo creo que va a ocurrir en 
Venezuela. En la esencia de un régimen liberal hay competencia, hay reglas de juego claras, hay 
estado de derecho, hay independencia de poderes a los efectos de hacer respetar los 
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compromisos. Esto no es lo que existe en Venezuela hoy en día. Lo que hay dramáticamente se 
asemeja cada día más a la operación de la mafias que han ido ocupando instituciones y donde 
las reglas no son las establecidas explícitamente, transparentemente, en un contrato como es la 
Constitución o como son las leyes de la República. Por eso se ha convertido en lo que está 
pasando. La anarquía y la corrupción han ido permeando todo los planos, no solo de la 
institucionalidad sino de la vida misma en Venezuela, y eso es algo enormemente peligroso […] 
Si tú me dices una palabra que resuma lo que este gobierno y este modelo nos ha hecho a los 
venezolanos, yo te digo: nos ha humillado. Cuando tú ves una mujer tiene que hacer cinco horas 
de cola para comprar harina y leche, pero además solo puede comprar un paquete, y que en el 
Táchira te ponen un chip para la compra de gasolina, o te marcan un número en el brazo como 
si fueras un animal, o a un oficial venezolano al que le da órdenes un oficial cubano. Aquí nos 
han venido humillando uno tras otro tras otro a cada uno de nosotros. ¿Que hay algunos que 
están haciendo muy buenos negocios? Allá ellos con su conciencia, pero más temprano que 
tarde, como ocurrió en el 2002, que más allá del desastre, de los puntos de vista de las 
decisiones políticas del liderazgo político de abril de ese momento, eso fue una insurrección 
civil, pero además hermosísima. Yo estuve en esa marcha a Miraflores y estuve orgullosísima de 
haber estado allí y yo reivindico todo lo que fueron las movilizaciones en ese día. ¿Que si estoy 
de acuerdo con lo que hizo el liderazgo? Evidentemente no, pero por eso te digo que esto no es 
un problema de la gente, aquí estamos enfrentando un problema de liderazgo político, de no 
entender claramente cuál es el modelo y qué requiere para enfrentarlo, porque un sistema neo 
dictatorial no lo puedes enfrentar solamente en los términos institucionales y con las reglas de 
juego que ellos ponen. Tú tienes que meterle la presión de la gente, que es lo único que 




Pareciera que hay como un enfrentamiento entre dos relatos. Yo me mato cada vez que escucho 
de parte de los opositores eso de que éramos felices y no lo sabíamos, lo cual es un poco 
mitificar un pasado que no fue mítico, y el inverso del otro relato de que tenemos patria, de que 
hoy somos un país soberano. Yo pienso que hay que discutir mucho cómo se han dado las luchas 
del pueblo venezolano y cuál es el devenir histórico y cuáles han sido las diferentes conquistas y 
las bondades y contradicciones de los diversos gobiernos, que las han tenido, incluyendo éste. 
Quizás eso nos permitiría tener un área discursiva común para poder sentarse. Yo creo que es 
muy importante ahora, es complicado. Ahora es imposible volver al punto de los noventa que 
era un punto interesante porque era toda la época de la crisis económica, luego la crisis social 
del caracazo, el desplome del modelo de la alternancia del puntofijismo y que parecía que había 
la irrupción de nuevos factores sociales que iban a plantear nuevas ideas políticas y quizás 
también la superación de la cultura política vinculada a la renta petrolera, pero eso 
lamentablemente no ha sido así. Chávez, por supuesto que tenía sus virtudes propias, 
específicas, como político, como hombre político, pero él fue también, en mi valorización, la 
revitalización de toda una cultura política venezolana. El supo darle de nuevo un impulso al 
movimiento fundacional Simón Bolívar y al tema de la cultura petrolera, de la riqueza mágica, 
de la riqueza petrolera, todas esas cosas que nos han ido modelando como país. Ahora tenemos 
diez años de una discusión que no se ha dado en ningún lado. No hay espacios de interlocución. 
Muchas de las agendas de discusiones que quedaron a medias en la década de los noventa se 
perdieron entre gente que trabajó mucho tiempo en reivindicaciones puntuales, como el 
movimiento de mujeres o el movimiento ecologista, que hoy no se pueden sentar juntos porque 
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están en lados opuestos de la polarización, y eso ha hecho que como sociedad hayamos 
retrocedido muchísimo en el tipo de demandas compartidas que tenemos. 
 Creo que, en general, ha habido mucha mezquindad política e intelectual dentro de los 
sectores opositores. Valoro el arrojo político que han tenido líderes como Capriles o como 
Henry Falcón que han hecho alguna diferencia, pero en general la masa crítica opositora en 
una masa crítica conservadora y si pudieran y tuvieran la oportunidad volverían a la 
Constitución del 61 de un solo plumazo. Creo que eso es parte de la tragedia: no entender en 
qué país hemos estado, cuál es el problema que aquí seguimos teniendo. Chávez representó 
tendencias y tensiones que ya existían en la sociedad venezolana. Chávez no las inventó. Y esas 
contradicciones y tendencias van a seguir estando si no se resuelven de alguna manera. Lo que 
me parece preocupante es que el proyecto opositor sigue estando basado en un país gran 
exportador de recursos energéticos (y) creo que el chavismo ha elevado exponencialmente el 
sectarismo político y los fantasmas propios de la ideología de izquierda, como la de acusar de 
contrarrevolucionario a cualquiera que tenga un nivel de disentimiento. El madurismo penaliza 
no solo la disidencia de los opositores sino también la opinión disidente dentro de sus filas. Y 
eso le ha permitido que las buenas ideas que algunos sectores han intentado implementar no 
caminen, porque ha habido buenas intenciones en los grupos bolivarianos y muchas de esas 
cosas no han tenido el nivel de desarrollo esperado por el nivel de sectarismo y de exclusión 
mutua que hay ahí. Es eso, hay esa necesidad de entender la diversidad como un valor y no 
como una amenaza. 
 Yo creo contigo que esta es una polarización construida a cuatro manos. Y que además 
la polarización se debe a odios mellizares por su forma similar de hacer política en los dos 
sectores. Creo que sí, la polarización permite que sean dos cúpulas, para llamarlas de alguna 
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manera, las que pueden capitalizar la vida política del país y que no permitan el surgimiento de 
diferentes opciones que desborden los canales institucionales de los partidos políticos y que, 
independientemente de que sea el gobierno el que esté hablando permanentemente de 
repolarizar, ha sido una estrategia que le ha dado cierto beneficio a los viejos políticos para 
mantenerse dentro del discurso opositor. Cuando uno comienza a hacer comparaciones de lo 
que sucede en Venezuela con cosas similares como las que están pasando en Bolivia, en 
Ecuador, en otros países, uno percibe en estos países que hay un tercer sector, pero una 
oposición de izquierda, una oposición diferente al gobierno de Evo Morales o de Rafael Correa. 
Eso no se ha dado acá no solamente por la polarización sino porque el venezolano hace política 
en función de la renta petrolera, una política mágica también. En verdad, la gente creía la frase 
de Chávez de que yo quiero que Chávez se vaya y Chávez se va a ir mañana. Y eso depende de 
que siempre hemos creído que tenemos una riqueza que esa ahí, en el subsuelo, algo mágico que 
lo sacamos y somos millonarios sin esfuerzo.  
 Maduro está absolutamente consciente del problemas de convocatoria que tiene, y es por 
eso que ellos no están muy seguros -como Chávez sí lo hacía y tenía la capacidad de hacerlo- de 
hacer permanentemente esa medición de calle. La oposición tiene ahora mismo ese problema, 
pero por otras razones. Entonces, lo que quiero decir es que dentro del chavismo popular había 
como una relación especial con el presidente, que es una relación que todavía muchos sectores 
opositores no han entendido, porque era una relación de sintonía, de carisma, sí, pero no era de 
sumisión completa como alguna gente lo plantea […] Sí creo que hubo la intención de montar 
un proyecto autoritario, de características totalitario, pero creo que hubo mucha resistencia de 
la gente, que es una resistencia que habría que saber medir y que es muy subjetiva incluso, 
porque sí, la gente se inscribía en la Misión Vivienda, la gente marchaba cuando tenía que 
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marchar, pero cuando ya recibía la gratificación dejaba de asistir, dejaba de ir a las reuniones 
de los consejos comunales. Es decir que el proyecto como se quería promocionar desde las 
bases nunca se logró porque la gente no llegaba a fanatizarse al grado que se deseaba. 
 Yo sería partidario de pensar, te hablo a nivel muy personal, de que sería posible un 
proceso de transición negociada en base al respeto de la oposición a lo que está expresado en la 
Constitución, un texto que significa un acuerdo social muy importante en función de demandas 
positivas en la sociedad venezolana. La oposición la atacó durante mucho tiempo y ahora 
tímidamente la defiende y ya el chavismo casi no habla de ella. Yo sí estaría de acuerdo, hasta 
que tengamos un nuevo pacto social, de trabajar en función de los acuerdos que están allí en la 
Constitución del 99. Creo que fue un logro haber puesto la necesidad de la inclusión en el centro 
del debate político, igual que la necesidad de la participación, y todo esto independientemente 
de cómo se materialice en lo político. Creo que por lo menos Capriles está consciente de que no 
puede dejar afuera la atención a la pobreza, a la participación, y creo que esas son herencias 
del proceso bolivariano. 
 
Luis Pellicer 
Te lo digo con Tusídedes y con Manuel Briceño Guerrero: Hay hombres que empalman su 
corazón con el corazón colectivo y las circunstancias históricas para lograr grandes hazañas y 
grandes hechos. Si esos hombres siguen vivos en la memoria del colectivo, en el corazón del 
colectivo, serán capaces de seguir… Lo que llamamos aquí corazón es la afectividad y el 
raciocinio. Eso fue Bolívar, y eso debe ser Chávez para nosotros […] No estoy tan de acuerdo 
con que son los movimientos sociales los que traen a Chávez al poder. Esos movimientos 
colaboran con el empoderamiento de Chávez y con el surgimiento de ese nuevo movimiento, el 
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MVR, y otros, pero ni aquí había suficiente organización social ni suficientes grupos 
organizados como para hacer eso. Los había pero no en la proporción para que digamos que 
esos fueron los movimientos que llevaron a Chávez al poder. Creo que el fenómeno de Chávez es 
muy diferente a una cosa de movimientos sociales que logran tomar el poder a través de un líder 
y un sistema. Creo que se trata más bien de un movimiento popular, en términos de un pueblo 
conectado con ese líder. Es decir, aquí lo que había y lo que sigue existiendo es la conexión 
entre el líder y un pueblo y una masa […] Una aspiración social posiblemente, y seguramente 
diría yo, ciega, que además no es nueva, una aspiración que tiene más de 200 años que llega al 
poder sobre todo a través del liderazgo de un líder.  
Aquí yo creo que lo que ha pasado es que el partido no se ha ocupado de las labores que 
debe cumplir un partido. Y la primera de las labores que debe ejercer un partido es la 
conciencia de esas masas, que si tú las sigues dejando en una condición amorfa, sin ideología, 
con toda y la conciencia social e histórica que tiene el pueblo venezolano hoy, después de 14 
años, creo que todavía hace falta mucha formación, no solamente del pueblo sino también de los 
dirigentes […] El PSUV o el MVR en su momento fueron partidos que fueron creados para el 
cambio social, para la revolución. Yo creo que si hay una falla en el partido nuevo no es 
ideologizar, en términos marxistas de crear falsa conciencia, sino en crear conciencia social de 
la realidad. Y eso no es únicamente que la gente se lea el Manifiesto Comunista ni nada de eso, 
sino que esté consciente de los problemas. Por ejemplo, el espíritu de las comunas, de los 
consejos comunales. Es decir, es el partido el que tiene que estar en las comunidades haciendo 
ese trabajo ideológico, que no es la misma cosa sino que la ideologización para crear la 
conciencia social de que hay una lucha, un reclamo, de que hay una corresponsabilidad y que 
esa corresponsabilidad no quiere decir que la gente de la misma comunidad tiene que ponerse a 
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hacer el trabajo, de acomodar las cloacas, etc. sino que tienen que tener conciencia de que para 
que la quebrada esté limpia tienen que mantenerla limpia […] Hay una cosa que es muy grave, 
que es o la vergüenza o el miedo a ideologizar a la población. Y eso empieza con la educación. 
Decirles: nosotros estamos en este proyecto y este es el proyecto y yo cambio la historia escrita 
al proyecto. ¿Cómo? Sin decir mentiras. No tengo por qué decir mentiras para eso. Tú no me 
vas a decir que la encomienda era una manera de que los señores encomenderos protegieran a 
los indígenas y les dieran comida, vestido, la religión y el lenguaje a cambio de su trabajo. No. 
Tú tienes que decirme que hay explotación. Eso es descolonizar la memoria y descolonizar la 
cultura. […] Es más importante la revolución cultural que el que le entregues una canaimita 
(una computadora) a la gente. Tú entregas una canaimita a los niños pero si en esa canaimita 
no hay contenidos que le den cuenta de la realidad que ha vivido el país, de nada vale. 
 Estamos en un sistema capitalista. Entonces, yo me manejo con la fórmula capitalista en 
el mundo global haciendo unas excepciones que tienen que ver con los países hermanos como lo 
hizo Chávez y que han redundado en el éxito de la política exterior venezolana durante los14 
años y que ha sido uno de los mayores éxitos. Hay cosas que hay que ponderar en el asunto. 
¿Para quién gobierna y como redistribuye la riqueza? Porque el problema es que sabiendo o no 
de economía uno dice: durante 40 años se repartió la renta petrolera; entonces ¿seguimos en 
una Venezuela rentista? El punto es cómo se distribuye esa renta. ¿Se distribuye para los 
grandes capitalistas que quiebran las empresas y el Estado tiene que asumir la deuda privada 
como deuda pública? Eso creo que es una de las mayores estafas que ha hecho el sistema 
durante los 40 años de la democracia representativa.  
Yo creo que se han hecho ensayos, pero que no han pasado de ser ensayos. Y siempre fue 
una línea del propio Chávez. ¿Cómo es que nosotros éramos un país productor de ganado, de 
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café, de caraotas-porque hasta caraotas parece que estamos importando ahora-, y por qué no 
podemos volver a eso? Entonces, los ensayos que se han hecho son ensayos que tienen que ver 
con empresas mixtas o con empresas sociales. Y allí están esos ensayos. Yo creo que este es un 
momento bueno para revisar lo que está pasando con esos ensayos, si es por ahí que debemos ir 
o si debemos pensar en otras alternativas […] ¿Cómo hacemos para que esto no siga pasando y 
qué es lo que tenemos que hacer? No es que te lo diga yo. Puedes escuchar a Chávez en las 
últimas alocuciones y sobre todo en esa que se conoce como El Golpe de timón. Es clarísimo. 
Chávez, sin ningún tapujo, sin ninguna mentira, está diciendo: miren compañeros, esto no puede 
mantener así; o buscamos nuevas fuentes de producción y de ingreso o este modelo es inviable. 
No lo digo yo. Lo dijo Chávez […] El pueblo está seguro de que tiene el poder. Y cambió desde 
el 89. En el 89 el pueblo salió y le dijo no al paquetazo. Sabía que si salía tenía poder suficiente 
para tumbar gobiernos, para cambiar la política. Ahora el pueblo después de 14 años no solo 
está consciente, y no va a salir así no más sino que va a salir con mayor organización, porque 
salió en el 2002. No fue cualquier cosa lo que ocurrió en el 2002 y salió más organizado, con 
mejores conexiones con sectores de poder, con los militares, etc.- .Y en esta circunstancia el 
pueblo va a salir con mayor conciencia política y social, con mejor percepción de lo que está 
pasando, independientemente de que sepa o no que están bajando los precios del petróleo, que 
las variables económicas, etc. Entonces se van a sentar a discutir y preguntar por qué no está 
llegando. Uno de los cambios radicales en todo esto es que tú no le puedes decir al pueblo que 
se está yendo para los bolsillos de los ricos de este país. No, no es que está yendo para los ricos, 




Margarita López Maya 
Yo creo que la contribución del chavismo en lo que está pasando en América Latina ha sido muy 
importante. Yo creo que Chávez fue el primero que puso la agenda de los pobres sobre la mesa 
en lugar principal y dijo: si no hacemos igualdad, aquí no hay democracia y no hay nada. 
Cuando él lo dijo en los años 98 y 99 eso era absolutamente contracorriente en América Latina 
y ahora es absolutamente de consenso, de derecha y de izquierda, Santos repartiendo tierras en 
Colombia, Lula y Roussef pasando los pobres a ser clase media en Brasil, Chávez con su 
discurso súper radical y todos de alguna manera. Aquí no está pasando lo que está pasando en 
Europa. Aquí la idea es: hay que distribuir, porque la sociedad latinoamericana es 
profundamente desigual, profundamente racista, profundamente segregacionista en lo social, 
marcada por la injusticia. Por eso es que no ha habido democracia. Es un poco la lógica que ha 
marcado el destino de América en el siglo XXI y el legado de Chávez allí es importante. Ese fue 
un legado importante y él hizo el esfuerzo para que, además, se diese un diálogo entre estos 
países que no se hablaban. Hoy la relación que hay entre los gobiernos es muy diferente a la que 
había antes, incluso porque hay una camada de dirigentes que se han mantenido mucho rato en 
el poder. Se abrieron vasos comunicantes en esas naciones que pueden ir a otra cosa y el tema 
de la inclusión se volvió un tema importante de México para abajo. Cómo va a incidir eso en el 
planeta no lo sé porque venimos de un boom de materias primas en toda América Latina y eso 
está llegando a su fin. Claro, es más grave para Venezuela porque su materia prima es el 
petróleo. Cuando venga el tiempo de las vacas flacas no sé si esto va a retroceder. 
Yo tuve la impresión cuando Chávez ganó que había la posibilidad de ir hacia una nueva etapa. 
Estábamos arrastrando desde hacía 20 años una crisis estructural por el agotamiento de un 
modelo, de un proyecto socio político que había dado lo que había podido dar -país 
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industrialista, democracia representativa, etc. Ante la incapacidad de inventarse una cosa para 
seguir después de la nacionalización petrolera, pensábamos que había que ir a otro proyecto, 
buscar un proyecto económico y político para una sociedad ya más compleja, más moderna. 
Cuando Chávez apareció fue el proyecto de la democracia participativa que era una demanda 
de la sociedad, porque a través de la reforma política se va a entrar a la reforma económica. Ya 
se habían rechazado políticas neoliberales, pero no se había encontrado cuál era el modelo 
alternativo. Pero en la medida en que se avanzó en estos 14 años eso se desdibujó 
completamente. Y nosotros estamos viviendo la continuación de la misma crisis, pero, por 
supuesto, ya no con 20 años sino ahora con 35 años, y esta crisis está llegando a unos niveles 
gigantescos: en la exacerbación del rentismo, en la falta de productividad, en la anomia de la 
sociedad, en el retroceso de la modernidad del venezolano. Nosotros nos despertamos, nos 
volteamos y resulta que no logramos resolver esa crisis y ahora está peor. En términos 
económicos está peor, en términos sociales hay una descomposición brutal porque al no resolver 
la crisis económica la estructura que teníamos se ha ido desmoronando. Puede ser que hoy haya 
más empleo formal pero ¿cuál es la calidad de ese empleo en relación a los 80 y los 90? Son 
empleados del Estado, son funcionarios públicos, aparte de que sigue habiendo como 45% de 
empleo informal. Yo diría que en eso no es original el chavismo. Lo original fue que intentó salir 
de esa crisis y no pudo. Lo buscó por otros medios y fue por eso que yo lo apoyé. La idea era: si 
tú rompes el monopolio de estos dos partidos y acceden nuevos actores al poder, acceden nuevas 
ideas, nuevas iniciativas, hay una energía social con la democracia participativa donde la gente 
comienza a moverse, a movilizarse, e incluso todas esas modalidades participativas que se 
hicieron en los barrios, bueno, es posible solucionar los problemas. Se habría adelantado en la 
solución de muchos problemas, y de hecho algunas cosas sí se han resuelto, en los barrios por 
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ejemplo. Pero cuando Chávez se voltea y dice: no, ahora vamos para el socialismo y esto ahora 
es unas comunas y un territorio y un Estado paralelo, y anda gastando los reales en dos estados 
-uno que está tratando de destruir y otro que está tratando de surgir-, pero además con una 
nómina gigantesca, todo montado sobre el ingreso fiscal petrolero. El modelo productivo nunca 
se supo cuál era […] La originalidad es que maduró la idea de la participación, ahora 
irreversible. La gente siente que hay ese derecho y siente que con los partidos no basta para que 
haya democracia, y que además de esos partidos tiene que haber otra cosa, otros canales para 
comunicarse con el poder y que esos canales pasan por sujetos colectivos, además del 
ciudadano y del derecho al voto. Y que la gente puede resolver sus problemas organizándose y 
cogestionando con el Estado. Puso la idea de la democracia participativa sobre la mesa. El 
primer gabinete de Chávez era como un laboratorio. Tú entrabas y vibraba. Ahora se ha vuelta 
puramente gobiernero. 
En Venezuela, de verdad, yo sí pienso que somos muchísimo más gringos que buena 
parte de América Latina. Acuérdate que nosotros tenemos un siglo de petróleo y eso marcó en 
nosotros el american way of live. La democracia representativa nuestra está muy marcada por 
lo que fue la democracia norteamericana, la Alianza para el Progreso de los sesenta, pero antes 
de eso también. Durante la Guerra Mundial nosotros fuimos grandes aliados petroleros de los 
Estados Unidos y eso significó una relación con las élites. Allí hay demasiadas cosas. El 
consumismo venezolano es muy gringo. Y tú ves que las élites chavistas de hoy hacen lo mismo. 
No hay sino que ver esas cosas que han estado saliendo de los bolichicos de Miami, etc. Ellos lo 
que quieren es estar allá. Les gustan los aviones gringos y los yates.  
  Lo peor de esto ha sido la impunidad, la destrucción de las instituciones liberales 
básicas para la legitimidad de la democracia, la autonomía, la independencia de los poderes 
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públicos, esta cosa del desprecio hacia lo institucional, de que la ley no importa. Antes se hacían 
las cosas con pena. Tú utilizabas los recursos públicos, pero sabías que eso era un delito. 
Comprabas a los jueces, llamaba la Tribu de Morales Bello a los jueces, pero sabían que eso 
era un delito. Pero ahora con la idea de democracia burguesa, eso no importa.  Y esta cosa de la 
violencia en la Asamblea Nacional, que le rompan la nariz a una diputada y la tiren al piso 
como hicieron con María Corina Machado y que no solo no se disculpen sino que digan, como 
Iris Valera, que se lo tenía merecido. El desprecio a la institucionalidad, a las instituciones 
liberales básicas para convivir en democracia, eso es para mí lo peor, porque ¿cómo vuelves a 
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